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SYNOPSIS 
 
The career of the Anglican scholar and bishop, Kenneth Cragg, focusses attention on 
the Christian understanding of other faiths in general and of Islam in particular.  Cragg 
has been a leading exponent of a particular missionary approach to Islam, 
emphasizing that there is a 'mission to Islam' as much as a mission to Muslims.  To 
this end he interprets Islam as pointing in its deepest meaning towards Christianity, a 
course which has aroused both admiration and opposition among Christians and 
Muslims alike.  I attempt to show that his theology is strongly influenced by 
distinctive Anglican traditions, and nourished by one particular Arab Christian source. 
 Cragg, however, resists any easy classification, and faces the accusation of 
theological evasiveness as well as hermeneutic sleight of hand.  His writings show a 
remarkable consistency over thirty years and point to possibilities for reconciliation 
between deeply rooted religious antagonisms.  A further significance of Cragg is his 
awareness of contemporary secularity in its interaction with and impact upon religious 
belief.  Here again his conviction that the deepest convictions of unbelief are at heart 
religious needs to be tested.  The central question is whether he illegitimately 
'christianises' Islam, and by extension, other faiths and ideologies.  His keyword is 
'retrieval', but there are attitudes and beliefs that cannot be retrieved, only abandoned.  
Few would quarrel with the ethics he advocates, but the question remains whether his 
theological method can be accepted as valid. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
 
These are given in the body of the text (enclosed in square brackets) in two forms: 
1 references to general works by author, date and page number 
 eg. [Fyzee 1976:48] 
2 references to works by Kenneth Cragg by the initials 'KC', followed by the 
date and abbreviated title, or the article number, and page number 
 eg. [KC 1986 Call 243] 
 or  [KC 82:3] 
 
All biographical information about Kenneth Cragg has been taken either from 
Crockford's Clerical Directory 1977-1979 (London: OUP 1979), from Who's Who?, 
or from his personal conversations with the author between November 1980 and 
November 1986. 
 
 
 
TRANSLITERATION 
 
The system used in the text is essentially that of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, but with 
the normal English-language substitution of j for dj, and q for k.  Diacritical marks are 
not used in proper names. 
 
  
 
  
THE CALL TO RETRIEVAL 
 
Kenneth Cragg's Christian Vocation to Islam 
 
 page no. 
1 The Formative Influences: British Theology, 
 Arab Christianity and Idealist Philosophy 
  A  A Career in Encounter with Islam 1 
  B  Theological Conservatism and its Alternatives 13 
  C  The Importance of Lebanon 27 
 
2 The Theological Basis:  God and Man 
  A  The Reciprocity of God and Man 37 
  B  The Knowability of God 47 
  C  The Khalifate of Man 61 
  D  Theodicy and Self-Wronging 69 
  E  Christology 78 
 
3 Themes in his writing: Prayer, Faith and Orthodoxy 
  A  A God to Worship 83 
  B  The Spirit in Islam 93 
  C  The Theology of Religion 103 
 
4 Themes in his writing: Truth and Power 
  A  The Theme of Custody 115 
  B  Truth in the Custody of Power 129 
  C  Morality and the Collective 141 
  D  God's Omnipotence: The Sacred and the Secular 150 
 
5 The Theological Goal: Christian Mission to Islam 
  A  Cragg's Missionary Inheritance 153 
  B  The Concept of Retrieval 165 
  C  The Mission to Islam in Action 175 
 
6 The Question of Criteria in Interpreting Islam 
  A  How the Reviewers see Him 188 
  B  Techniques of Interpretation 200 
  C  Cragg's Interpretation of the Qur'an 209 
  D  How Cragg anthologises Islam 222 
 
7 Vocations Beyond Islam 
  A  Encountering Judaism 228 
  B  Hinduism and Buddhism 240 
 
8 A Vocation for All? 250 
 
 
Bibliographies 
 General 264 
 A Bibliography of Kenneth Cragg: 
  
 
  
               Books & Translations 278 
               Contributions to Books 281 
               Major Articles & Reviews 283 
               Other Publications & Unpublished Work 288 
 Writings about Kenneth Cragg & Major Reviews of his books 292 
  
 
  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE FORMATIVE INFLUENCES: BRITISH THEOLOGY, ARAB 
CHRISTIANITY  
AND IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
A A Career in Encounter with Islam 
 
  Albert Kenneth Cragg was born on March 8th, 1913, the younger son 
of Albert and Emily Cragg, a devout couple of Evangelical Anglican conviction.  He 
was educated at Blackpool Grammar School, and Jesus College, Oxford, where he 
read Modern History, narrowly missing first class honours.  His elder brother Herbert 
had already preceded him to Tyndale Hall, Bristol, and into the ministry of the Church 
of England, and in 1936 Kenneth was ordained to serve in the parish of St Catherine's, 
Higher Tranmere, Birkenhead, in the diocese of Chester.  Cragg's first professional 
role was as a pastor.  But he did not neglect study during his curacy, and in 1936 
successfully submitted an essay for the Ellerton Theological Prize at Oxford 
University on the subject of 'The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief.'  In 
1939 he fulfilled long-cherished hopes by beginning his missionary service in 
Lebanon, under the auspices of the British Syria Mission.  After initial language study 
and teaching in a Bible college he became attached to the American University of 
Beirut, and founded and ran a hostel for Arab students.  The university was seriously 
short of staff in wartime conditions, so Charles Malik, the head of the Department of 
Philosophy, invited Cragg to teach in the department.  He became the acting head of 
the department on the departure of Malik to be ambassador in Washington, and 
proved his philosophical competence by winning a further prize at Oxford University 
in 1947 with an essay for the TH Green Moral Philosophy Prize on 'Morality and 
Religion'.   
 
  In 1947 he and his wife (he married Theodora Melita Arnold in 1940) 
returned to England so that he could pursue doctoral studies in Islam.  In order to help 
him find sufficient income for his growing family (there were eventually three sons), 
his old Oxford college presented him to the recently vacated living of Longworth in 
Berkshire, where he lived while completing his D.Phil.  His subject was 'Islam in the 
Twentieth Century: The Relevance of Christian Theology and the Relation of the 
Christian Mission to its Problems', and it was presented not to the Faculty of Oriental 
Studies but to the Faculty of Theology.  It is important to note that Cragg's primary 
academic qualification is not as an orientalist but as a theologian.  His supervisor was 
Dr Ernest Payne, who was learned in Hinduism rather than Islam, and his examiners 
were HAR Gibb, the Islamicist and Herbert Danby, the translator of the Talmud.  On 
successful completion of the thesis (a massive work of some 300,000 words) he was 
appointed to the chair of Arabic and Islamics at the Hartford Seminary Foundation, 
Connecticut, USA, where he remained from 1951-1956.  Hartford was the home of 
the journal The Muslim World, founded by Samuel Zwemer in 1911 (in the wake of 
the Edinburgh Conference of 1910) as a focus of Christian missionary thought about 
Islam, and today one of the major English-language periodicals on Islam.  From 
1952-1960 Cragg jointly edited the journal with Edwin Calverley, his predecessor in 
the chair of Islamics.   
 
  
 
  
  In 1956 he published his classic work The Call of the Minaret (revised 
and reissued in 1986), and left Hartford to be a residentiary canon of St George's 
Cathedral, Jerusalem (at that time part of Jordan).  'Residential' he was not, however.  
Two years earlier he had been awarded a Rockefeller Travelling Scholarship (at the 
suggestion of Wilfred Cantwell Smith), and this had taken him on extensive journeys 
through the Middle East from Tangier to Baghdad.  This experience helped to develop 
the idea of a Study Programme, which, with the encouragement of the International 
Missionary Council and Bishop Stewart of Jerusalem now took shape in 1956 as 
'Operation Reach'.  From 1956 to 1959 he was constantly on the move alerting 
Christian groups throughout the Middle East and beyond to the issues of Christian 
engagement with Islam and with Muslims, and holding Summer Schools on Islam at 
St George's College, Jerusalem.   
 
   This period of intense travel ended with the appointment of Cragg, 
now known internationally as a Christian interpreter of Islam, to St Augustine's 
College, Canterbury.  He was a Fellow from 1959, and Warden from 1961.  The 
missionary scholar had moved into a position of ecclesiastical leadership.  His 
colleague and predecessor as Warden was Kenneth Sansbury, subsequently Bishop of 
Singapore and then General Secretary of the British Council of Churches.  The 
intention had been that St Augustine's should serve as a Central College for the 
Anglican Communion, providing a variety of courses for older ordination candidates, 
for those with considerable ministerial experience and for potential church leaders.  
The institution lacked, however, a historic constituency among the ecclesiastical 
parties of the Church of England, and was not adequately supported either by the 
General Assembly or by the rest of the Anglican Communion.  It closed in 1967, 
leaving Cragg with no clear future.  At this time Campbell McInnes, Anglican 
Archbishop in Jerusalem, repeated a suggestion made earlier that Cragg should 
become his assistant Bishop, but proposed a year's 'breathing space'.  Before the end of 
that year, however, McInnes had resigned through ill health, and extensive discussions 
about the nature of Anglican leadership in the Middle East meant that George 
Appleton, his successor, was not appointed till 1969.  Cragg in consequence became a 
Visiting Professor in the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, one of the leading universities 
in West Africa, before taking up a temporary appointment as a Bye-Fellow at Gonville 
& Caius College, Cambridge.   
 
  Cragg was consecrated Assistant Bishop in the Jerusalem 
Archbishopric in February 1970, and lived in Cairo for some two and a half years.  He 
resigned, however, in 1973 to allow an Egyptian Arab, Ishaq Musa'ad, to become 
Bishop of the revived Anglican diocese of Egypt, which had been suspended since 
1958.  He had collaborated with Musa'ad on a translation of 'Abduh's Theology of 
Unity when they had both been at Canterbury in 1964.  Cragg's book Paul and Peter 
(1980) is dedicated to Musa'ad and two others.  Cragg, now again redundant,  moved 
to Sussex University, where he was Reader in Religious Studies until obliged to retire 
in 1978, at the age of 65.  He was also honorary Assistant Bishop in the diocese of 
Chichester.  From 1978 to 1981 he returned to parochial life as Vicar of Helme, just 
outside Huddersfield, in the diocese of Wakefield, where he was also an Assistant 
Bishop.  In 1981 he retired to a village near Oxford (again becoming an Assistant 
Bishop in the diocese), and in 1986 published the twenty-fourth of his books (which 
include four translations of Arabic texts).   
 
  
 
  
  The bare bones of his career give some idea of the sustained 
commitment to study, to the Muslim world, and to the Christian Church which has 
characterised his life.  Pastoral, missionary and academic concerns have been its 
keynotes.  It is also abundantly clear, especially from what happened to Cragg in the 
late sixties and early seventies, that the Anglican Communion is not well organised to 
make maximum use of a man with the particular combination of gifts that he 
possesses.  No way could be found of employing him adequately in the Church of 
England in 1967, or in the Episcopal Church in Jerusalem and the Middle East (the 
new title of the Jerusalem Archbishopric) in 1973.  Nor, after his departure from 
Sussex University in 1978, did the Church of England seem to be alert to the 
possibilities of using so gifted and experienced a man in ministry to the growing 
number of Muslims in Britain, though his move to Huddersfield reflected that 
concern.  
 
  Cragg's career might be seen as an indication of the marginal status 
which has sometimes been the reward of British people deeply involved with other 
faiths and cultures.  Over a century ago, in 1884, the great Persian scholar, Edward 
Granville Browne, at the outset of his career was warned by the Cambridge Arabist 
William Wright that 
The posts for which such knowledge will fit you are few, and, for the most part, 
poorly endowed, neither can you hope to obtain them till you have worked and waited 
for many years.  And from the Government you must look for nothing, for it has long 
shown, and still continues to show, an increasing indisposition to offer the slightest 
encouragement to the study of Eastern languages. [Browne 1984:3] 
As far as the churches of Britain are concerned, Islam and other faiths have until very 
recently been equally remote issues, and expertise on them infrequently sought.  
Ecclesiastical debates generally centre on quite other matters.  But some of Cragg's 
own contemporaries with extensive involvement in the world of Islam have not found 
themselves marginalized in the life of the Church.  David Brown and Sir Norman 
Anderson, both at one time missionaries in the Middle East, became respectively 
Bishop of Guildford and Chairman of the House of Laity in the Church of England's 
General Synod. 
 
  Was it then a question of personality?  Some might suppose that 
Cragg's intellectual powers meant that he lacked 'the common touch', but this is not 
supported by his parishioners at Helme, who witness to a pastor eager to communicate 
with every sort of person at all ages in the village.  It seems that through a 
combination of circumstances Cragg became one of those extremely able people who 
are almost exclusively identified with their field of specialism in spite of real interests 
and ability outside it, and consequently do not win general confidence as a church 
leader. 
 
  There is no doubt about the tributes paid to Cragg's importance as a 
highly-skilled interpreter of Islam for Christians and as a missionary to Islam.  Among 
English-speaking interpreters of Islam he is in the general tradition, and of the stature 
of men like Samuel Zwemer, Duncan Black Macdonald and Temple Gairdner.  A 
garland of praise can easily be put together for him.  For the historian of Western 
attitudes to Islam, Norman Daniel: 'Bishop Cragg is the most perceptive and 
authoritative interpreter of Islam in English (or, in my view, in any language) to 
Christian readers.' [Daniel 1986]  For the Indian Muslim diplomat and scholar Asaf 
  
 
  
Fyzee (commenting on Cragg's contribution to a series of books on other faiths): 'No 
better man could be selected to deal with Islam in the English speaking world.' [Fyzee 
1976:48]  For the Oxford historian of the Middle East, Albert Hourani, Cragg 'is one 
of our finest Islamic scholars'. [Hourani 1960:128]  Wilfred Cantwell Smith calls 
Cragg 'the eloquent conscience of the Protestant missionary movement' [Smith 
1969:306], and Max Warren, the General-Secretary of the Anglican Church 
Missionary Society, called him 'my revered and beloved teacher'. [Warren 1971:12]  
The biographer of Warren, one of the most significant of post-war missionary 
thinkers, reckons that 'The Call of the Minaret... made an indelible impression upon 
Max's whole philosophy of mission.' [Dillistone 1980:200]   
 
  What sort of person earns such accolades?  The career outlined above 
reveals a man at home in three continents, tireless in travel, closely associated with 
half a dozen universities, deeply involved in the task of Christian ministry at several 
different levels, and perhaps above all gifted with a desire and ability to communicate 
in the spoken and written word whether in the parish magazine or the learned journal. 
 His output has been prolific, including not only the twenty-four books and full-length 
translations already mentioned, but contributions to twenty-one other books, and over 
eighty major articles, as well as four series of lengthy pamphlets and the editorship of 
The Muslim World for eight years.  This gives some clue to the fascination with 
words which marks Cragg most as a scholar and thinker.  For he not only produces 
words but plays with them, feeling for their richness and their ambiguity.  A typical 
passage begins with a favourite quotation: 
'Rescue a word... discover a universe...  Can we bury ourselves in a lexicon and arise 
in the presence of God?'...  Words are the highways of the traffic of ideas, sentiments, 
emotions, and relationships, and the work of the world is done by them...  (In 
translation) the word is the point of exchange. [KC 1986 Call 243, 244] 
Here Cragg opens his theme of 'the Call to Interpretation' by reminding us of the 
power and flexibility of words.  The same idea begins the book itself.  And not 
content with other people's words, Cragg continually coins new ones of his own: 
'scriptuary', 'Arabicity', 'dissession', 'equijacent', 'paradoxiality', 'illude'.  There is 
always the chance that such inventions may puzzle, or irritate, or confuse the reader.  
But words inspire him with a sense of adventure, and a desire to be bold and creative 
with them.  The alternative, he feels, is a smaller and poorer world.  'Unrisking minds 
mean cautious trusts and so, in turn, diminished meanings.  The claims of 
communication ought always to be paramount.' [KC 1968 World 74] 
 
  The range of his quotations reveals a mind with broad sympathies, and 
a highly developed skill for making connections between apparently unrelated topics.  
Among novelists he quotes from Americans in particular - from Hemingway, 
Faulkner, Melville, Steinbeck and Henry Thoreau, but also from George Eliot, DH 
Lawrence, John Cowper Powys, EM Forster, Somerset Maugham, and Laurens van 
der Post; from Proust, Camus, Sartre, Thomas Mann, Kafka and Dostoevsky; from 
James Joyce, Samuel Beckett and Chinua Achebe.  With poets the list grows even 
longer: from Chaucer, Langland, Shakespeare, Donne, Herbert, Milton, Vaughan, 
Traherne, Blake, Wordsworth and Browning: from Hardy, Burns, Kipling  and de la 
Mare: from Wilfred Owen, Arthur Clough, TS Eliot, George Macdonald, Rainer 
Maria Rilke, RS Thomas and especially Robert Frost.   
 
  Such a random recital by no means exhausts his repertoire.  Nor are 
  
 
  
such quotations restricted to his more general and discursive works, like The Privilege 
of Man and Christianity in World Perspective, where one might anticipate some 
broader brush-strokes.  A chapter in The Mind of the Qur'an begins with a passage 
from a letter of Van Gogh [KC 1973 Mind 146], and a chapter on Buddhism with one 
of the reflections of Dag Hammarskjöld in his Markings. [KC 1986 Christ 245]  The 
reader may suddenly turn the page to seven verses of a poem from Pushkin, entitled 
'The Prophet' [KC 1971 Event 85], or find himself following the association of ideas 
in Pasternak's Russian translation from Hamlet, put back into English. [KC 1986 
Christ 11f]  Cragg has a particular fondness for beginning chapters or sections of 
chapters with some apparently remote quotation which turns out on closer 
examination to be remarkably apt.  The most sustained example of this comes at the 
opening of The Privilege of Man, which begins with Hemingway's The Old Man and 
the Sea, and passes in rapid succession to the opening words of John Cowper Powys's 
A Glastonbury Romance, Samuel Beckett's Malone Dies and Herman Melville's Moby 
Dick, before settling on the curtain-raising words of Hamlet as the right beginning. 
[KC 1968 Privilege 1,2]   
 
  Virtuoso catenas of quotation like this may irritate some readers, but 
they illustrate the capacity of a mind searching the ranges of literature for clues about 
how to begin communicating with the bewildering variety of human experience.  
When that mind also possesses a keen sense of the nuances of words, the search for an 
appropriate title to a book can be prolonged, and the result more awkward than 
arresting.  The sure touch sometimes falters.  Cragg reveals that he 'toyed' with several 
titles like 'In Stead of God' and 'In Lieu of God' for what became The Privilege of 
Man, only to discover it had also become the title of a popular film, with a rather 
different meaning. [KC 1968 Privilege vii]  The introduction to The Christian and 
Other Religion, so often misquoted with a final s to Religion, also hints at a 
problematic choice of title. [KC 1977 Other xiii] 
 
  These literary skills and considerations raise the question at the outset 
of whether Cragg's is not a rather 'literary', in the sense of unreal and artificial , 
approach to the subject of religion.  There is perhaps a conflict within him between a 
deep love of literature of all kinds, and an equally deep conviction that where faith is 
concerned it is better to meet the faithful people than to turn to books to understand 
them.  Should he open the dictionary or go to the mosque?  But Cragg is very critical 
of any 'spectator attitude' on the part of writers, any attitude to human experience 
which treats it primarily as raw material for literature.  He twice attacks the novelist 
Somerset Maugham for suggesting that 'Nothing befalls (the artist) that he cannot 
transmute into a stanza, a song or a story and having done this to be rid of it.' [KC 
1976 Passage xiv & 1977 Other 128]  All his books urge a personal engagement with 
the people of other faiths, and not merely with their thought or their history.   
 
  How successful and complete has his own engagement been?  We shall 
want to examine in chapter 6 what gaps are evident in Cragg's account of Islam, but it 
seems wise to concentrate our main efforts on establishing the essential theological 
convictions from which Cragg works as an interpreter of Islamic literature and life, in 
terms of his doctrines of God and Man (chapter 2), of his understanding of the nature 
of religion (chapter 3), and of the central question (for Cragg) of the manner in which 
those truths are guarded and promoted, of their political custody (chapter 4).  Having 
examined his theological 'method' in this way, we then need to identify his theological 
  
 
  
goal, the task of mission (chapter 5), before coming to the crucial question of the 
adequacy of his criteria of interpretation (chapter 6).  Chapter 7 takes up his treatment 
of religions other than Islam, and chapter 8 comes to a final assessment.   
 
  The question which needs to be borne in mind throughout this 
examination is whether, despite Cragg's great reputation in certain circles, his view of 
Islam and other faiths, and the view of Christianity on which it is ultimately based, 
turns out finally to be a rather idiosyncratic and personal view, not easily shared or 
expounded by others, or recognised as having much degree of plausibility by Muslims 
themselves.  Alternatively, can it be said that Cragg's theme and the techniques he 
proposes of 'retrieval' offer a theological method with profound evangelical and 
ethical implications?  That his work has significance for relations between different 
faith communities which are of critical contemporary importance?   
 
  The initial task must be to investigate further his personal and religious 
background in order to discover in more detail what has shaped him as a thinker, and 
whom it is he has in mind when writing. 
  
 
  
B  Theological Conservatism and Its Alternatives 
 
 
It was a life of unrelieved repetition, with never a new thing, from the time the study 
year began until it was over...  Throughout these studies it was all merely a case of 
hearing re-iterated words and traditional talk which aroused no chord in my heart, nor 
taste in my appetite...  I had become competent to understand what the shaikhs 
repeated.  But all to no point. [KC 1976 Passage 1,2] 
 
  Cragg does not suggest that his motive for translating the final volume 
of Taha Husain's autobiography was anything other than his admiration for the 
tenacity of the blind scholar, his defiance of his handicap.  The translation was done in 
Cairo at a time of 'considerable personal difficulty' connected with his resignation as 
Bishop in 1973,  and this must have impressed meaning on the message of courage 
and hope implicit in the book.  But there is another significance in Husain's story for 
understanding the mind of Cragg.  The passage quoted above reflects Husain's 
experience of the Azhar, the great bastion of traditional Muslim learning in Cairo, and 
the book goes on to recount the stages of his intellectual liberation, culminating in his 
achievement of a doctorate at the Sorbonne.  Cragg too passed from an Azhar to a 
Sorbonne, and the experience marked his life and shaped his thinking permanently. 
 
  As already noted, Cragg was reared in a devout evangelical family, 
supporters, like their parish church, of the Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society 
(BCMS).  Cragg's brother Herbert (1910-1980) remained all his life in this 
conservative evangelical Anglican tradition, and was for many years Chairman of the 
Keswick Convention, a yearly focus since 1875 for studies on what its Handbook calls 
'practical scriptural holiness'.  Kenneth sent Herbert a copy of The Call of the Minaret 
on its publication in 1956, but was convinced that the book had remained unread 
because of its 'unsound' views.  It was only many years later that he was moved to 
discover his brother quoting from it in his very last address at Keswick.   
 
  The move to a more liberal interpretation of Christian faith did not 
happen rapidly.  At Jesus College, Oxford, where he was an undergraduate from 
1931-1934, Cragg studied Modern History, but was already thinking of working 
overseas as a BCMS missionary.  On the completion of his degree he wanted to do his 
ordination training and theological studies at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, which was also 
an evangelical college but with a more open tradition.  But family and parish pressure 
directed him to the college founded by BCMS for missionary and ordination training, 
Tyndale Hall in Bristol, where his brother had also studied.  There he found few 
satisfactory answers to his growing theological questioning.  Critical studies of the 
Bible were treated as material to be learnt for the Church of England's General 
Ordination Examination and then forgotten as quickly as possible.  Cragg found that 
his attempts to discuss theological questions with the teaching staff were dealt with 
only by handing out a series of cyclostyled notes.  These gave the interpretation of the 
issue concerned which was accepted within the college and the BCMS tradition.  He 
found himself wearying of the insistent question asked about any prominent 
churchman, potential speaker or colleague: 'Where does he stand?'  A man's 
theological position seemed to have overtaken his importance as a person.  It was 
when Cragg went to his first parish appointment as curate that he began to find 
freedom from these attitudes.  The vicar of the parish was Henry Hill, to whom, with 
  
 
  
Francis Graham Brown, the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, Cragg later dedicated The 
Call of the Minaret.  Hill was himself conservative in theology, but held that 'you 
cannot repudiate relationships in the name of dogma', and sought to remain on close 
personal terms with those of very different persuasion in the locality. 
 
  The complex history behind an ecclesiastical tradition characterised by 
such apparently closed minds needs to be carefully understood.  Ten years of Cragg's 
youth, from 1918 to 1928, were years of continual theological conflict within the 
Church of England.  In 1917 Hensley Henson (Bishop of Hereford 1918-1920, Bishop 
of Durham 1920-1939) was nominated to the see of Hereford amid intense 
controversy over his theological views. [Chadwick 1983:ch 6]  Owen Chadwick has 
compared the affair with the earlier cause célèbre over the appointment of Frederick 
Temple to Exeter in 1869, and noted how much more radical the theological issues 
involved had become by the time of the second dispute. [Chadwick 1970:146]  At the 
time many conservative minds were convinced of a menacing increase in theological 
liberalism within the Church of England.  The Modern Churchmen's Union held a 
conference in 1921 at Girton College, Cambridge which confirmed that impression.  
This provoked the setting up in 1922 of a Commission to examine the existing 
agreement on doctrinal questions within the Church of England, 'with a view to 
investigating how far it is possible to remove or diminish existing differences'. [Vidler 
1961:200]  But the Commission did not report until 1938, and meanwhile many other 
theological storms swept over the Church of England, not least the Prayer Book 
controversy of 1927 and 1928.   
 
  The most pertinent of these storms to the present discussion was the 
dispute within the Church Missionary Society (founded 1799) which led in 1922 to 
the breakaway of a substantial minority of its members to form the Bible Churchmen's 
Missionary Society (BCMS), the society supported by Cragg's family and his parish 
church.  The issues of this dispute again focussed on the interpretation of the Bible, 
and also on the extent to which the Church Missionary Society (CMS) should demand 
conservative theological orthodoxy from its missionaries and other bodies with which 
it co-operated.  How comprehensive of doctrinal variation was the society to be?  In 
the tangled webb of resolution, amendment and counter-resolution which marked the 
public counsels of CMS in 1922 it became clear that the conservative party was 
determined to maintain official recognition of the authenticity of the Bible as they 
understood it, and that the 'utterances' of Jesus, which included his references to Noah, 
David and Jonah, were no less important than his teaching.  For it had been customary 
for conservative scholars to defend the literal historic truth of the Old Testament by 
citing the references of Jesus to the Flood, the Davidic authorship of Psalm 110 and 
the reality of Jonah's whale.  HP Liddon's Bampton lectures of 1866, for example, 'the 
finest Bampton lectures of the century', had based the infallibility of the Old 
Testament on the infallibility of Christ. [Chadwick 1970:75, 101]  At a critical point 
in the CMS debates the resolution under discussion stated that 'we believe in the 
absolute truth of his (Jesus') teaching'.  The conservative party wanted the addition of 
the two words 'and utterances', but this was defeated, and the issue, says the historian 
of CMS, 'proved decisive for the formation of the BCMS'. [Hewitt 1971:471]  When 
the BCMS drew up its doctrinal Basis article 2 referred to: 'Belief in the essential 
Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ; His Incarnation and Virgin Birth; the truthfulness of 
all His utterances...' 
 
  
 
  
  Bishop Stephen Neill, whose own family was split over the 
CMS/BCMS issue, wrote that the result of the events of 1922 was that  'for the 
moment Evangelicalism was reduced to a level of less repute and less influence in the 
Anglican world than at any time in the preceding hundred and fifty years.' [Neill 
1965:400]  If the issues had been clearly and unambiguously theological, Evangelical 
morale might not have been so adversely affected, but as so often this was not the 
case.  Another historian of the Church of England has written that 
it would be facile and irresponsible to think that the formation of BCMS represented 
an exact split between conservative and liberal Evangelicals since it was much more 
difficult to define the exact casus belli, for its seeds were sown in seemingly minor 
issues and flowered in outwardly unimportant clusters of words. [Manwaring 
1985:26] 
The same writer entitled his chapter on the post-First World War period, 'The 
Defensive Years', and suggested that the first stage of BCMS' existence was marked 
by being 'much misunderstood' and 'developing a kind of siege mentality.' [ibid 28]   
 
  'Outwardly unimportant clusters of words' suggests precisely the sort of 
theological shibboleth against which Cragg rebelled.  Like others who had much 
earlier ceased supporting both CMS and BCMS after 1922, Cragg severed his formal 
connections with BCMS during the years of his curacy, paid back the money which 
had been spent on his theological training by the society, and when he came to the 
time for missionary service, went abroad neither with BCMS nor with CMS, but with 
the British Syria Mission, a small interdenominational society which had a strongly 
evangelistic concern but had originated in welfare and educational work. 
 
  We must leave for the next section the influences of Lebanon, of Islam, 
Arab Christianity and philosophy upon Cragg's intellectual development, and ask what 
influences from the British theological tradition were available to fill the vacuum 
caused by abandoning Evangelical conservatism.  His own writings give only 
scattered hints of his specifically theological debts, but his thesis of 1950, and 
especially its fourth chapter, offers several clues.  Cragg wrote that 'Historic 
Christianity has persisted into the middle of the 20th century by virtue of a painful 
exposure to every form of scrutiny and testing.' [KC 161 pt2:1]  This had admittedly 
been carried out by a minority, but it was  
a creative minority whose influence and achievement have permeated and infected the 
whole, even if its undoubted excesses have sometimes been no less guilty than the 
inertia of the masses. [ibid 4f] 
 
  We shall have cause to note again the reliance of Cragg on the concept 
of 'a creative minority' in relation to Muslim understanding of Islam.  Here it is 
important to realise that Cragg's abandonment of conservative evangelicalism did not 
entail contempt for the school of thought which had first nurtured him.  He writes 
sensitively about 'the mutual debt of critic and devotee', and, speaking perhaps from 
experience within his own family, reckons that 'the reactions of the devout... supplied 
the inertia which had to be soundly overcome - the corrective which saints often 
administer to scholars.' [ibid 7]  He is aware of 'the inglorious quality of many 
controversies', but sees in them the necessity for mutual admonition.  He concludes 
that, judging from Christian experience, 'it might almost be right to say that Islam is in 
dire need of heretics and of a conservatism capable of giving them an honest 
reckoning.' [ibid 8, 9]  Here is an early sign of the fruitfulness of theological 
  
 
  
controversy in his own thinking, which is determined to promote a dynamic and 
dialogical mode of mutual correction between conservative and radical rather than the 
dogged but static defence of a single viewpoint. 
 
  Cragg has considerable confidence in the long-term value of the 
debates in which Christians have historically been engaged, and entitled one of the 
sections of his thesis 'The Alert Frankness of Christian Self-Criticism'. [ibid 3]  In this 
section he illustrates his argument by fixing on the contributors to Lux Mundi, a 
volume of essays produced by a group of Anglican theologians of Catholic tradition in 
1889, and particularly on their editor and most famous member, Charles Gore 
(1853-1932, Bishop successively of Worcester, Birmingham and Oxford). [Gore 
1889]  With the ten pages of Gore on the Scriptures, comments Stephen Neill, 
'Anglo-Catholicism had moved out of the obscurantist fundamentalism in which Dr 
Pusey would gladly have imprisoned it.  Liberal Catholicism had been born.' [Neill 
1965:272f]  But Gore did not merely, as Neill says, allow as valid the 'reasonable 
results of scientific criticism of the Scriptures'.  He offered the doctrine of Kenosis, or 
Christ's voluntary self-limitation, based on Philippians 2:7 and 2 Corinthians 8:9.  The 
late nineteenth-century Christian mind found itself in a dilemma because the findings 
of scholars on the dating and authorship of the psalms and prophetic writings seemed 
to run counter to Jesus' own words from the Gospels.  Liddon, as we have seen, had 
defended the Old Testament, as he thought, by the New.  Cragg identified Gore's 
theory as a historic solution to the dilemma. [KC 161 pt2:6]  If Christ's words seemed 
contrary to the results of critical scholarship it was because as a genuine human being 
he knew no more on such questions than others in his day, or perhaps because he 
spoke in controversy ad hominem, citing the Jonah story as parable but not necessarily 
as history.  It will be noted that it was  precisely this issue of Jesus' validation of the 
Old Testament which was at the heart of the CMS/BCMS controversy in 1922. 
 
  Cragg clearly appreciated the emphasis in Lux Mundi on the 
Incarnation rather than the Atonement in the life of Christ as a timely move, which set 
the Atonement in a broader theological context than had been customary, particularly 
in his own Evangelical tradition.  The stress on the work of God in and through the 
genuine humanity of Jesus also assisted an engagement with contemporary secular 
thought.  For many had been troubled by the impact of Darwinian work on evolution 
and were tempted to suppose God ousted from his world by new scientific 
discoveries. [cf Mozley 1952:18]   Cragg returns to the Lux Mundi school of writers 
in an appendix designed to illustrate for Muslim readers  
something of the spirit and form of the Christian 'liberalism', as a measure of what 
awaits Islam and what Islam owes itself...  (Lux Mundi) was a plain example of the 
constructive influence that could be exerted by a band of colleagues, responding to the 
vocation to intellectual trusteeship in religion, alert to contemporary thought and 
conceiving of all truth as capable of inward harmony. [KC 161 pt2:263, 264]   
 
  Cragg, like most readers of Lux Mundi, fastened on the essay of Gore 
on the Holy Spirit and Inspiration as particularly significant.  Gore had affirmed a 
form of the doctrine of the humanity of Jesus which no Anglican theologian had 
previously approved, and offered a way of releasing what had become a logjam of 
inconclusive discussion on the authority of the Bible and contemporary critical 
research.  By 1950 his proposals had become conventional.  But this general 
movement of Christian thought could easily be seen to validate Muslim strictures on 
  
 
  
Christian orthodoxy by emphasizing the humanity of Christ at the expense of his 
(previously supposed) divine omniscience, and Cragg has some difficulty in 
conveying the significance of Lux Mundi without allowing this.  In consequence, as 
he attempts to indicate the spirit and manner of its treatment of 'a domestic issue 
within Christian Theology' without going into the precise details of its proposals, his 
writing becomes rather cloudy.  Referring to critical questions about literary form and 
date in Old Testament literature he paraphrases Gore as saying that 
The truth of the Incarnation, so often earlier regarded as closing all questions, in fact 
left them open, and their being open rather than closed was more congruent with the 
nature of the Incarnation. [KC 161 appendix 3:12, 11] 
 
  Here is a characteristic of Cragg's thought we shall meet with again, an 
unwillingness to have anything too tightly defined, often expressing itself in rather 
elliptical language.   But it is particularly the idea of divine self-limitation in Gore's 
essay which Cragg valued, even though the clearest expression of the 'Kenotic Theory' 
was limited to a footnote. [Gore 1889:360 cf Ramsey 1960 6]  Gore later wrote in his 
Bampton Lectures that  
The method of God in history, like the method of God in nature, is to an astonishing 
degree self-restraining...  It is physical power which makes itself felt only in 
self-assertion and pressure: it is the higher power of love which is shewn in 
self-effacement. [Ramsey 1960:34f] 
Cragg, however, refers only to Lux Mundi among Gore's writings, and this raises the 
suspicion that, moving by the instincts of a mind which is eclectic rather than 
systematic, his encounter with the thought of Gore was influenced by the accident of 
residence rather than a methodical search for ideas congruent with his own.  For from 
1947-1951, the years of his thesis research, Cragg lived as Rector in Longworth 
Rectory, the very place where the original papers for Lux Mundi were first delivered, 
and where their authors and their successors used to meet annually for 25 years.  The 
Rector of Longworth in the years from 1889 to his death in 1915 had been JR 
Illingworth (1848-1915), a contributor of two of the Lux Mundi essays, who invited 
'The Holy Party', as they became known, for summer exchanges of theological 
reflection. [KC 161 appendix 3:9f]  Behind the 'Holy Party' too was the influential 
figure of the philosopher TH Green, never an orthodox Christian but extremely 
congenial intellectually to the idealism of the Lux Mundi authors, especially 
Illingworth and Scott Holland, who was a personal friend. [Reardon 1971:434]  We 
shall meet TH Green again in connection with Cragg's encounter with philosophy.   
 
  It is not then to the Liberal Catholic and (in later years) rather 
authoritarian Bishop Gore that Cragg turns for the development of these Kenotic ideas 
but to the Baptist scholar H Wheeler Robinson.  In his book Redemption and 
Revelation in the Actuality of History [Wheeler-Robinson 1942] Wheeler Robinson 
has a passage entitled 'The Kenosis of the Spirit', saying that  
the phrase is meant to suggest that God as Holy Spirit enters into a relation to human 
nature which is comparable with that of the Incarnation...  There is a far wider activity 
of the Spirit, which would, if we could conceive it clearly, bring all existence into 
unity, and show us the divine self-emptying from the foundation of the world.  
Through this long and patient kenosis, God has carried the burden of all humanity, the 
humanity which it is His purpose to redeem.  The believer is simply entering into a 
new and greatly deepened experience through Christ of what God has been doing all 
the time by His 'prevenient' grace. [ibid 290, 295] 
  
 
  
Cragg twice quotes from this section of Wheeler Robinson's book [KC 1959 Sandals 
86f and KC 1977 Other 119] He is also clearly moved by a quotation of Wheeler 
Robinson's from the American theologian Horace Bushnell (1802-1876) to the effect 
that if we could see the suffering of the Spirit within humanity it would 'make the 
world itself a kind of Calvary from age to age.' [KC 1959 Sandals 87, KC 1986 Christ 
278] 
 
  We have suggested that Cragg's theology is eclectic rather than 
systematic, and moves in part at least by the prompting of location.  Bushnell may 
serve as a second example.  He was a New England Congregational minister who 
served as pastor of North Church, Hartford, Connecticut from 1833-1859, in the very 
town where Cragg served as Professor of Arabic and Islamics.  Bushnell's book 
Vicarious Sacrifice (1866) was a reaction against the modified Calvinism of NW 
Taylor's so-called 'New Haven Theology', and was criticised by FW Robertson for 
being 'shadowy' and vague, and by RW Dale for lacking an objective understanding of 
the Atonement. [Douglas 1974 arts 'Bushnell', 'New Haven Theology' & Reardon 
1971:219, 464]  Cragg has written, in connection with Bushnell and the Atonement, 
of his own reaction, 'partly in response to Islamic pressures about divine "effortless" 
forgiveness', against  
those 'forensic' interpretations which somehow involve a 'change' in the divine posture 
brought about, from outside, by the afflicting of Jesus...  I suppose a register of 
Bushnell's feel for kenosis and his finding it in creation per se and certainly in the 
'grievings' of the ever-patient Holy Spirit, far outweighed what may, or may not, be 
proper by way of strictures on his 'vague-ness'. [Letter to the present author, 17.10.86]  
 
  There is no doubt that Cragg seems drawn to writers who might be 
criticised for blurring the distinction between the revelation of God and the general 
experience, intellectual and emotional, of humanity.  The late 19th century theologians 
were concerned to claim evolution and progress and contemporary science for Christ.  
Illingworth actually saw the Incarnation as giving rise to a new species of human 
being. [Ramsey 1960:4]  Behind much of their thought lay that of FD Maurice 
(1805-1872), for whom 'every child that is born is born into a world already redeemed, 
and in Baptism this truth is proclaimed and the child is put into relation to it.' [Ramsey 
1951:35]  Cragg uses Maurice in another of the appendices to his thesis as an 
illustration for Muslim readers of significant Christian thinkers.  There, however, he 
treats Maurice only as a Christian Socialist, emphasizing the unity of his religious and 
social thought, and the courage which enabled him to sustain attacks from both 
political and ecclesiastical sources.  He saw in him a precursor of William Temple. 
[KC 161 appendix 2]   
 
  There are however at least two respects in which Cragg's thought is 
reminiscent of that of Maurice.  Maurice's writings provoked quite contradictory 
estimates from his contemporaries, according to whether his hearers found his 
language cloudy or illuminating.  One historian's judgement is that 'he exalted his 
hearers, but he could not make them understand what he said.' [Chadwick 1966:349]  
The reason probably lay in Maurice's principle of the complementarity of apparently 
opposed truths, and his related opposition to theological system-building of all kinds. 
Stephen Sykes has criticised Maurice's influence on twentieth-century Anglicanism 
for just these features. [Sykes 1978:19]  As we shall see in chapter 3, Cragg's early 
exposure to a rigidly doctrinaire understanding of theology engendered a comparable 
  
 
  
suspicion of theological systems and a particular dislike of handling questions of the 
status in Christian eyes of other religions or religious ideas. 
 
  The second respect in which Cragg resembles Maurice is related.  
Maurice lectured in 1845-6 on the religions of the world, contending that in Christ is 
the wholeness of truth of which other faiths reveal only partial expressions. [Reardon 
1971:194]  In his lectures on world religions however he charges the Muslim with 
being 
the worshipper of a dead necessity...  Because he does not acknowledge a loving Will 
acting upon mens' wills, to humble them in themselves, and to raise them to God, 
therefore he becomes the enslaver of his fellows...  Because he will not acknowledge 
that the highest and divinest unity is that of love, but rests all upon the mere unity of 
sovereignty, he has never been able to establish one complete government upon the 
earth. [Maurice 1886:152] 
Maurice argued that the Muslim concept of the absolute power of God had a strong 
tendency to be reflected in political autocracy.  Cragg agreed in his thesis of 1950 that 
when law and religion are identified  
this sets the whole course and tone for the relationship of society to God, stereotypes 
the social order, externalises devotion, discourages necessary social change and keeps 
religion static. [KC 161 pt1:96] 
Thirty years later his views had not changed: 'If we have an ultimately repressive 
theism, we shall have repressive society.' [KC 89:206]  This, and the allied 
self-justifying stance of those who govern in the name of God, proves to be Cragg's 
major 'dissuasive' from Islam. [ibid] 
 
  We shall see whether this theological inheritance has proved adequate 
to cope with the demands Cragg has made upon it. 
  
 
  
C  The Importance of Lebanon 
 
 
  The British Syria Mission had been founded in 1860 by Mrs Bowen 
Thompson, the widow of a British engineer who had lived for some years with her 
husband in Turkey, and felt a keen desire to help the widows and orphans of the 
Lebanese massacres of 1860.  Her work was first known as 'The Ladies Association 
for the Moral and Religious Improvement of Syrian Females', and later as 'British 
Syrian Schools'. [Maitland-Kirwan 1930, Scott 1960:30 cf Tibawi 1966:156]  It began 
in Beirut but soon extended its work to education and evangelism in the mountain 
villages, working among boys as well as girls, and among the crippled and the blind.  
It was an interdenominational society with ecclesiastical links to what became the 
National Evangelical Synod of Syria and Lebanon, with a Presbyterian church order. 
[Scott 1960:121]  It declined to join other missionary groups in their representations 
against religious persecution, preferring to extend its educational work without 
political involvement.  At an early stage it challenged American supremacy in the 
education of girls, and by its heyday in the late 1890's had fifty schools running. 
[Tibawi 1966:164, 223, 261,290]  In 1960, after the Mission's withdrawal from Syria, 
it became the Lebanon Evangelical Mission, and merged with the Middle East 
General Mission in 1976 to become Middle East Christian Outreach (MECO) with its 
present headquarters in Tunbridge Wells. 
 
  Cragg entered then into a tradition of evangelistic and educational 
concern in the Middle East which could not but face him with the issues which 
confronted Islam in adjusting to a modern world dominated by European science, 
technology, and commerce.  The Mission's magazine Under Syrian Skies records his 
arrival in April 1939 as only the second man ever to serve with the British Syria 
Mission. [p 50 cf Scott 1960:100]  He was assigned initially to the Lebanon Bible 
Institute at Shemlan close to Beirut, and later issues of the magazine see him involved 
in leading groups of students on evangelistic tours. [Jan. 1941:21, April 1943:44f]  
Soon after his arrival Lebanon, as a French mandate, passed under the suzerainty of 
the Vichy Government in France, and Cragg and his new wife were evacuated to 
Jerusalem and then worked for a time at the CMS Hospital in Gaza, where their first 
child was born.  Francis Graham Brown, the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem in whom 
Cragg found a real father-in-God, wanted a residential hostel in Beirut for the many 
Palestinian students drawn there by the American University.  So after his spell at the 
Lebanon Bible Institute, and in addition to work in the Anglican chaplaincy at Beirut 
Cragg found himself in charge of the Justin Martyr Hostel, named after the Palestinian 
Christian martyr of the second century who had worn the philosopher's robe.  From 
the beginning Cragg's vocation among Muslims was involved with education, 
scholarship and philosophy.  
 
  The hostel was affiliated to the university, and in order to have some 
status in it and also to help the hostel finances, Cragg at first taught English classes, 
while he himself learnt much about Islam informally from his students.  The 
American University of Beirut was founded in 1866 as the Syrian Protestant College, 
and took its present name in 1920.  The particular tradition of its American 
Presbyterian founders emphasized ethics and good citizenship rather than a dogmatic 
Christianity, and Cragg describes the Principal of his days there, Bayard Dodge (who 
had married into the family of the founder, Daniel Bliss), as a 'virtual Unitarian'. 
  
 
  
[Dodge 1958]  Compulsory chapel for students on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays 
avoided explicitly Christian themes, but was supplemented by a series of house study 
groups where Christianity could be seriously discussed.  In these Cragg recalls using a 
book entitled Types of Philosophy by the liberal American thinker, WE Hocking, who 
is also well known as the chairman of the group which produced the controversial 
report Rethinking Missions. A Laymen's Inquiry after One Hundred Years. [New 
York 1932]  It was partly Hocking's report which provoked Hendrik Kraemer into 
writing The Christian Message in a non-Christian World by way of refutation. [Sharpe 
1977:82ff, 155] 
 
  The country of Cragg's initial encounter with Islam is also of great 
significance.  Lebanon in the early 1940s was emerging from French tutelage to a 
fragile independence.  With its distinctive confessional polity whereby power was 
divided by custom between a Maronite President, a Sunni Prime Minister, a Shi'ite 
Speaker of Parliament and an Orthodox First Deputy, the Lebanese National Pact of 
1943 inspired hope that Muslim and Christian together could secure the future of an 
independent Lebanese nation.  Economically dependent, as it proved, on being 
Europe's gateway to the Muslim world, and always subject to the changing policies of 
great powers, Lebanon was for some a symbol of the precarious possibilities of 
reconciliation among peoples and confessional groups long at odds with one another.  
Cragg was resident in Lebanon as the National Pact was hammered out, and as 
Lebanese Christians and Muslims weathered the early storms of independence and 
extensive political in-fighting. [Salibi 1977:192f]. 
 
  Charles Malik, head of the Department of Philosophy and a member of 
the (Chalcedonian) Orthodox Church in Lebanon, became Cragg's mentor and 
colleague in the American University of Beirut (AUB).   Later Malik was to be 
Lebanese Ambassador in Washington and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Lebanon 
from 1956-1958, closely identified with President Chamoun's pro-Western policy. 
[Salibi 1977:199]  At this time he held particular hopes that Lebanon could be a great 
place of meeting.  In 1952 he wrote: 
The Lebanon has a positive vocation in the international field.  It is not political.  It is 
spiritual and intellectual.  It consists in being true to the best and truest in East and 
West alike.  This burden of mediation and understanding she is uniquely called to 
bear...  Lebanon - little and fragile as she is - is the only country, not only in existence 
today but perhaps throughout history, where East and West meet and mingle on a 
footing of equality.  The vigorous Moslem citizens of Lebanon bring in the integral 
contribution of the East, while the Christian citizens are in deepest spiritual and 
historical communion with the West.  If this situation can endure, there is a wonderful 
possibility of creative confrontation. [Malik 1964:197, 198] 
'Creative confrontation' might be a phrase straight out of Cragg's own writing, but the 
development of Nasserite Arab nationalism, and its growing conflict with Israel was 
to threaten Malik's vision and ultimately to make it look Utopian.  But even in 1970 
Malik could write of Lebanon as a unique meeting place of the two great world 
religions, though by this time he was also saying that 'this age, whatever else it might 
be, is patently and fatefully ideological.' [Malik 1970:xiii] 
 
  During Cragg's years in Lebanon, however, it seemed that the AUB, as 
a powerful intellectual centre in the Arab world, and Malik as a powerful force within 
it, might bring about the reality of the vision.  It is significant that it should have been 
  
 
  
an Orthodox Christian, and not, for example, a Francophile Maronite who shaped 
Cragg's career at this point.  For the Maronites tended to claim a Phoenician rather 
than an Arab identity, [eg Corm 1964:41] and to have fought on the side of the 
Crusaders.  Malik, in contrast, judged that the Orthodox had 'worked more closely 
with their Muslim compatriots on civic, social, cultural and national problems than 
any other Christian group', and were the best suited to undertake dialogue with Islam. 
[Malik 1969:305, 341]  Malik's Christianity was far from being a Crusader outpost 
from Europe.  He might at times have described it as a 'Christian Hellenism' in 
deference to its Byzantine links, but the cultural roots of his Church lie in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem have fought extended 
battles with the Greeks to establish their Arab identity in leadership and liturgy. [ibid 
325-328]  Malik's spiritual ancestors suffered as much from the Crusades as any 
Muslims, and their representative figure could well be the theologian John of 
Damascus, protosymboulos to the Umayyad dynasty, though Malik, at least, would 
not have subscribed to John's very negative views of Islam as a Christian heresy.  
Malik had few illusions about the four historic sees of his Church: 'You cannot expect 
great spiritual heights from four orphans quarrelling miserably like children in a 
totally alien world'. [ibid 326]  At the same time he wrote about Orthodoxy in the 
Middle that: 'The Muslim spirit encompasses it.  It is free only within this spirit.' [ibid 
299]  
 
  There are obvious connections here with Cragg's search for what he 
later described as 'Islamic reasons for being Christian.' [KC 92:166]  If, as Cragg 
wrote in his Thesis, 'all truth (is) capable of inward harmony' [KC 161 pt2:264], and if 
the culture surrounding the Christian is shaped and permeated by Islam, then for his 
own soul's health and for the witness of the Church, he must find the true meaning of 
that culture, the answer to its deepest questions and concerns, in the untapped 
resources of his Christian faith.  The alternative is emigration, physical or 
psychological, or perhaps a retreat into a cultural eccentricity unrelated to the public 
life of the nation.  By moving to the AUB and becoming a colleague of Malik, Cragg 
had left the 'private' world of the evangelical mission, and associated himself 
decisively with the public life and culture of the nation. 
 
  Malik had grand, even grandiose, ideas about the significance of the 
Middle East.  While (in Malik's rather eccentric judgement) it had shown no creativity 
in science or philosophy 'it has been reserved to it to storm heaven itself and open its 
doors.'  Although 'the historical discontinuities are appalling... yet it is here that 
history started'. [Malik 1970: xxxii, xxxiii]  Western civilisation is only an offshoot of 
'what was revealed, apprehended, loved, suffered and enacted' in the Middle East. 
[Malik 1964:189]  He complained that people in the Middle East were interested in 
everything except propagating their faith [Malik 1969:336], yet 'man can regain his 
full stature as man... only in relation to, only as an outpouring from, the events of 
Bethlehem, Nazareth and Jerusalem.' [Malik 1970: xxxvi] 
 
  The corollary of this is a willingness among Muslims also to think 
through the fundamentals of Islamic culture.  Malik wrote that 'there is room for a 
hundred Muhammad 'Abduhs', and room too for a serious Muslim consideration of 
Christianity.  'There isn't a single Moslem scholar in all history, as far as I know, who 
has written an authentic essay on Christianity.' [Malik 1964:215f]  The hope for more 
'Abduhs inspired Cragg's 1950 thesis, the journeys of Operation Reach and the 
  
 
  
translations (including one from 'Abduh) in particular, while he often pleads for a 
reciprocal attention by Muslims to Christianity.  In particular Malik's bold grasp of the 
'wonderful possibility of creative confrontation' has offered Cragg a vision of a 
Christian approach to Muslims which does not totally reject the work of 
controversialists like Pfander and Zwemer, but attempts to reorientate it in a 
completely new spirit of love, without the armour of political patronage, without the 
assumption of cultural superiority and without the expectation of destroying Islam by 
dialectical victory.  In 1952 Malik wrote that Lebanon stood for existential freedom, 
'freedom of thought, choice, being, becoming...  To be able to perform her moderating 
and mediating function between East and West, the Lebanon must be and feel secure 
in her existence...  Thus the secure existence of Lebanon measures the degree of love 
abroad...  The principle of international politics is power; but Lebanon's power is 
reason, truth, love, suffering, being.' [Malik 1964:198, 199] 
 
  We have seen the influence of a 'kenotic' and incarnational theology on 
Cragg, and it is easy to see how Malik's thinking would have fitted into this growing 
pattern.  Even though Malik later abandoned his exalted conception of Lebanon for 
the 'realist' defensive policy of a Christian enclave, Cragg retained something of the 
original vision.  He did not of course have the political responsibilities and experience 
of an ex-ambassador to Washington.  Thirty years after Malik's 1952 essay Cragg 
mourned the ending of Lebanese stability and its rare intercommunal understanding: 
 Lebanon, it is true to say, was martyred in the Arab confrontation with Israel... 
 There is deep pathos here, as well as bitter irony.  Lebanon was, in commendable 
measure, exemplifying what an inter-Arab experiment in cross-communal 
relationships might achieve.  It could well have afforded a precedent for how such 
relationships might have availed for Jews themselves...  It enjoyed a degree of 
intellectual liberty unique in the Arab world. [KC 1982 Jerusalem 70, 71] 
We will see in ch 7 what solution Cragg sees for the Palestine/Israel problem and 
whether he or Malik is in the end the greater realist.  It is clear at least that, whatever 
its subsequent history, the Lebanon of the 1940s was a seed-bed of hope for interfaith 
understanding. 
 
  We have seen how intellectual liberty was precious, because hardly 
won for Cragg.  His sense of its value was undoubtedly fostered by the need to teach 
philosophy, which presumes it.  Cragg acquired enough expertise in philosophy in the 
AUB to win an Oxford University prize in the subject, and gain the agreement of his 
old college for his doctoral studies.  If Lebanon were to provide the physical 
environment for the meeting of faith communities, philosophy might provide the 
intellectual meeting-place.  We have already seen how Cragg used Hocking's book 
Types of Philosophy with Muslim and Christian student groups working on religious 
issues.  Hocking was a idealist philosopher who described philosophy as 'the resolute 
effort for integrity,' a search for wholeness which he expected that the world would 
before long find fulfilled in the Kingdom of God.  For him the Kingdom of God 
meant the 'spiritual unity of all men and races'. [Sharpe 1977:83, 84]  Hocking's idea 
was one of 'reconception', in which all faiths would undertake the rethinking of their 
basic convictions, preserving their cores of truth but expanding to include the insights 
of others.  Cragg later criticised Hocking for this approach, but it clearly influenced 
his early thinking, and even in 1977 he admits that 'its spirit is admirable'. [KC 1977 
Other 76f]  It is interesting that philosophical idealism is also prominent among those 
that Cragg admired in the Lux Mundi movement of Liberal Catholicism, and above all 
  
 
  
in their philosophical mentor TH Green.  Cragg's 1947 philosophical essay won a 
prize named after Green, and dealt with the issues of ethical theism that characterised 
the idealist tradition.  But Cragg was in no sense a professional philosopher, or he 
would not have incurred some of the criticism that he does. [see chapter 2.B]   When 
he taught in the Department of Philosophy at the AUB he had to read up the 
seventeenth century writers at great speed to keep ahead of his students.  Nevertheless 
the interest was significant, and to some degree sustained in the rest of his career.   
 
  Evangelical Christians are not commonly drawn to philosophical 
studies.  The popular books of Francis Schaeffer in the 1960s and 1970s were 
significant for their advocacy of philosophy in the service of Christian faith, and 
together with the Christian rationalism of CS Lewis marked a turning point for British 
Evangelicals.  Throughout Cragg's youth and early career professional British 
philosophy was typified by the atheism of Russell and Ayer, and this served to 
reinforce the suspicion of contemporary philosophy engendered by Biblical 
conservatism and, for the more widely read, the attacks on natural theology by the 
Barthian school, and those it influenced like Hendrik Kraemer.  Cragg's interest 
therefore marked a further departure from his origins. 
 
  It also gave him a concern for those Muslim writers who were most 
alert to the broader intellectual implications of their faith, writers like Muhammad 
'Abduh, Iqbal and Kamil Husain.  Of his work in translation 'Abduh's Theology of 
Unity and Husain's The Hallowed Valley are notably speculative books.  We shall see 
in ch 6 how this approach to Islam may be justified as an interpretation of the faith.  
Meanwhile we have to establish his basic theological presuppositions. 
 
 
  
 
  
Chapter 2 
 
THEMES IN HIS WRITING: GOD AND MAN 
 
 
A  THE RECIPROCITY OF GOD AND MAN 
 
  The writings of Kenneth Cragg return continually to one consistent 
theme which marks virtually all his work.  It is the need for contact, for 
communication, for relationship, between human beings estranged from one another, 
and between humankind and God.  He reflects the experience that many Christians 
concerned with other faiths have had that they cannot remain content to sit in a mental 
bunker and fire dogmatic missiles at strangers.  Whatever their understanding of the 
beliefs of the others they feel the urge to be in personal contact with them, to speak 
and listen face to face.  In a profounder but essentially similar way people have 
universally found themselves driven to seek personal knowledge of God, to know - at 
least in some degree - as they are known.  'God' says Cragg, 'cannot be greeted with a 
mere agreement to study Him.' [KC 1986 Call 158]  The note of salutation is 
characteristic, and focusses attention on the need for a relationship, an exchange, a 
two-way process of communication.  Cragg's is, in perhaps a new sense, a theology of 
the word, a theory of relationships and of the inter-personal communication which is 
integral to them.  'All theology,' he says baldly, 'is about relationship.' [KC 1986 
Christ 75] 
 
  'A theory of relationships' may suggest undue abstraction, a reification 
of what is properly left unschematised and undissected in the exchanges of personal 
engagement.  Cragg is never guilty of that, but 'theory' in its original sense of 
contemplative wonder (epiα) is not an inappropriate term for his thought, which is 
always characterised by a fundamental concern for spirituality, prayer and worship.  
The question, in fact, is not whether Cragg's thought is too philosophical and rarified 
to be easily translated into practical programmes, but whether his appreciation of the 
spiritual dimension in interfaith relationships does not lead him into a highly 
idiosyncratic understanding of Islam, and ultimately into a certain evasiveness where 
the harder issues of theology are concerned.  We shall see in chapter 3 that he is aware 
of the danger of appearing to do without a theology of religion, but we shall also have 
to ask (in chapter 6) whether his interpretive techniques are adequate for the material 
he is handling.    Here we aim to set out the basic theological tools he works with, and 
to test their adequacy for the task he essays. 
 
  The concern for relationships leads Cragg to propose as the foundation 
of his thought about all religion the 'reciprocity' of the doctrines of God and man.  
'Whenever we study or confess doctrines of God we proceed upon parallel 
affirmations about humanity.  So inseparable are the two realms that every theology is 
inevitably also a view of the human.' [KC 1986 Call 38]  This reciprocity, or 
'interpenetration' of God and man is constantly argued by Cragg whenever the doctrine 
of God is under scrutiny, and his typical course is to plead that the act of creation itself 
opens God to a kind of vulnerability to his creatures. (see section D)  How 
well-grounded is such an argument in an inter-faith debate?  Christians (and perhaps 
Jews) rely essentially on the Biblical text that God created men and women in his own 
image (Genesis 1:26).  But do Muslims have the same theology of creation at this 
  
 
  
point?  The Qur'an contains no parallel to this text, but does speak of Allah giving 
Adam life and spirit by breathing into him with His own breath (15:29, 38:72).  In 
addition Muslim and Bukhari record a tradition (via 'Abu Huraira) that Muhammad 
said: 'Allah, the Exalted and Glorious, created Adam in His own image with His 
length of 60 cubits.' [Muslim 1976:IV:1481, Bukhari 1908:79:1]  Ghazali has it 
differently, saying in one place that Bukhari records it in the words: 'Allah created 
Adam in the form of Al-Rahman', a version with which Ibn Hanbal evidently agreed. 
[Gairdner 1924:s.34,35; cf Sweetman 1967:I.2.194; Massignon 1913:129 n2]. 
 
  Many writers, especially of the Sufi and esoteric schools of Islamic 
thought have made use of this tradition, especially in the development of the idea of 
al-'insan al-kamil, the 'perfect man', often identified with Muhammad.  Al-Muhasibi 
employs the tradition in his mystical meditation on the letter alif, in the shape of 
which all other letters were first made, but became corrupted, just as Adam, formed in 
God's image, lost that shape by disobedience. [Schimmel 1975:188, 417] Al-Ghazali 
and his critic Ibn Rushd both refer to the tradition. [Ghazali 1971:IV:6; Gairdner 
1924:s.7,24,34,35; Sweetman 1967:II:2:113]  Ibn Qutayba defends its authenticity 
against the Mu'tazilite mutakallimun, and the accusation of anthropomorphism. 
[Lecomte 1962: 242]  SH Nasr links the tradition with the Qur'anic text of God's 
breathing his spirit into man, and continues 'There is therefore, something of a "divine 
nature" (malakuti) in man', though he omits to say that malakuti would itself signify 
something angelic rather than divine. [Nasr 1975:18]  Elsewhere, however, Nasr 
speaks of man's nature as both nasut (human) and lahut (divine) in an apparent echo of 
al-Hallaj and Ibn 'Arabi. [ibid 90; Schimmel 1975:270]  (Al-Hallaj has been regarded, 
probably incorrectly, as influenced by the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation 
because of his use of these originally Christian terms. [Schimmel 1975:72])  Nasr, 
however, seems to be following Frithjof Schuon in making of man a 'theomorphic 
being', denoted by his three faculties of intelligence, free will and the gift of speech.  
Schuon calls these faculties 'deiform'.  [Schuon 1963:15] 
 
  Other Muslims, however, are much more reticent about the tradition, 
alarmed perhaps by the implications of its reference to God's 'sixty cubits'.  Nasr omits 
that part of the tradition altogether.  The curious sixty cubits may refer to a discussion 
about the nature of Adam's body in Paradise, and the extent of the change he suffered 
in expulsion.  Some, like Abu Thawr al-Kalbi, argued that the tradition could mean 
that Adam was made in his own proper form (ie not God's) of sixty cubits. 
[Massignon 1913:129 n2; Brewster 1976:37]. Alternatively, the sixty cubits could 
refer to God's form, as an example of the grosser types of anthropomorphic 
conception of God. [Wensinck 1932:67f, 148]  One senses the reticence about the 
tradition even in Schuon, who manages to speak with two voices on the subject, 
saying that 'Islam is far from relying explicitly and generally on man's quality of being 
a divine image, although the Quran bears testimony to it...(in 15:29 and 38:72)... and 
although the anthropomorphism of God in the Quran implies the theomorphism of 
man.' [Schuon 1963:16] 
 
  There may indeed have been no general and explicit reliance on man 
being made in the divine image in Islam, but was Temple Gairdner quite wrong to 
suggest that it was this tradition 'that above all else led Moslem thinkers into 
temptation' - the temptation of trespassing on the uniqueness of Allah?  He felt that 'its 
very riskiness seems... to have fascinated them supremely from the very outset.  Not 
  
 
  
one of them could let it alone.' [Gairdner 1924:31]   
 
  Gairdner is of course particularly concerned with mystical Islam, and 
Nasr and Schuon represent Shi'ite and Sufi interpretations of Islam.  For most Sunnis 
it is not the tradition of man being made in God's image, however reliably recorded, 
but the correct exegesis of the Quranic texts which occupies their mind on this point, 
especially the verse where the Qur'an speaks of God breathing into man 'of My 
spirit'.(15:29)  This action of God immediately precedes an order to the angels that 
they should 'fall down in obeisance unto him'.  This might be understood to imply that 
it is the divine spirit in man that the angels are to honour.  But Muslim interpretation 
does not in fact dare to make that connection. [except 'Attar - Massignon 1982:II:371] 
Modern exegetes interpret the breath of God's spirit as the faculty of God-like 
knowledge and will [Yusuf Ali 1975:ad.loc.], or as 'man's inborn faculty for 
conceptual thinking'. [Asad 1980:ad.loc.]  It is noticeable that most authors derive no 
general permission from this passage or from other parallel ones to argue by analogy 
from human nature to the character of God, in the fashion that Christian authors have 
done, taking their authority from passages like Luke 11:11-13.  There is indeed one 
passage in al-Ash'ari where he cites Joseph's willingness to face imprisonment rather 
than agree to adultery with his master's wife (based on Sura 12:33).  Joseph therefore 
in a sense wills injustice for himself, yet cannot be considered sinful.  Similarly, runs 
al-Ash'ari's argument, God may will acts of human evil without sinning himself.  Watt 
says, however, that this line of thought may have been suggested by Christian writers 
and, perhaps for that reason, was not much used by later Muslim authors. [Watt 
1973:310] 
 
  Here then we find a problem for Cragg at the very outset of his 
interpretation of religious issues between Christians and Muslims.  If the key doctrine 
is that of the reciprocity of God and man, where is the common ground between 
Christians and Muslims?  Since the doctrine concerned is the doctrine of God, the 
question could hardly be more acute.  What does Cragg do in such a case?  It is 
notable that he does not attempt a frontal assault on Islam by arguing the essential 
likeness of God and man, although that is certainly his own conviction.  He might 
have been tempted to quote Schuon that 'the anthropomorphism of God in the Qur'an 
implies the theomorphism of man.' [Schuon 1963:16]  He does not quote Genesis 
1:26, though it is no doubt in his mind, or argue the authenticity of the tradition which 
echoes it.  His preference is to focus on the meaning of the work rather than the 
character of the nature of God, and to explore the significance of the situation brought 
about by the very fact of God having created man.  Instead of entering the 
well-trodden territory of the comparative natures of God and man he wants to use the 
common ground of Christians and Muslims in the doctrine of creation to suggest that 
in the very nature and fact of creation God has initiated a relationship with the human 
race, and this is a two-way thing.  Here perhaps we see the influence of Gore and 
Bushnell. 
 
  Nevertheless it must be questioned how far this fundamental category 
of 'relationship' is appropriate here.  To what extent do Muslims naturally use such a 
term to describe the debt of appropriate living owed by human beings to their creator? 
 The modern sense of 'relationship', with its personal and emotional content, is 
naturally hard to find in classical texts, but we look in vain to the Fiqh Akbar II, to 
take one example of a detailed Hanafite statement of Muslim belief, for any language 
  
 
  
which approximates to this meaning.  Even where we seem to read such language, the 
appearance is misleading.  Article 25 gives a sense of the extreme care with which 
classical Muslim theologians handle the 'meeting' (liqa', itself a Qur'anic term) of God 
with men: 
Allah's being near or far is not to be understood in the sense of a shorter or longer 
distance, but in the sense of man's being honoured or slighted.  The obedient is near to 
Him, without how, and the disobedient is far from Him, without how.  Nearness, 
distance and approach are applied to man in his intimate relation with Allah, and so it 
is with Allah's neighbourhood in Paradise, and with man's standing before Him, 
without modality. [Wensinck 1932:196] 
 
  Here indeed the term 'intimate relation' (munajah) is used, and 
believers are assured that they will meet God in Paradise [ibid. 130].  For the Sufis 
munajah meant the 'intimate conversation' with God in prayer. [Schimmel 1975:155 cf 
Wensinck 1932:238]  But in the Fiqh Akbar II text what is given with one hand seems 
to be taken away with the other in the constant repetition of the formula 'without how', 
that is without demanding or giving an explanation as to how the term applies to God. 
 We shall return to this issue in discussing Ghazali's language about God in the next 
section.  Among modern writers, where some use of a term equivalent to 'relationship' 
might be expected, the situation varies.   In the case of a writer like Abu'l-A'la 
Maududi it is noticeable that he reserves the term 'relationship' or 'relations' (Urdu: 
ta'aluqat) for the subject of human relatives, friends and acquaintances.  Where God is 
concerned the language is different.  God is the Master (Urdu: malik) to whom the 
only 'relation' is that of obligation and obedience: 
If you incur a loss by acting according to the wish of the Master, let it be so.  You 
should never mind if life is lost, hands and feet are broken, children are lost and if 
money and property are destroyed.  Why should you be grieved at all?  If the owner 
himself desires loss of his things, it is perfectly within his right... You are not the 
master of your soul. If you give your life according to the Master's wish you will only 
be fulfilling your obligation towards Him. [Maududi 1975:30] 
Here it seems clear that the use of the term 'relationship' as applied between God and 
his creatures, or servants, feels inappropriate to Maududi, and it is avoided.  The 
servant may indeed have a relationship with his master, but it is not the same kind of 
relationship that he will have with his equals and his kin, and so the use of a different 
word is preferred.  The quotation here is from a Friday sermon, and seems to reflect 
the anxiety we have already noted among Muslims not to speak anthropomorphically 
of God. 
 
  However, another contemporary Pakistani Muslim, Fazlur Rahman, 
speaking in an analytical rather than a devotional context, gives voice to a different 
understanding of Islam.  He points out that the characteristic terms associated with 
God in the Qur'an are 'orderly creativity, sustenance, guidance, justice and mercy', and 
that 'all these are relational ideas.' [Fazlur 1980:1].  But this in no way implies 
anthropomorphism or theomorphism.  The gulf between God and man is preserved 
because God in his essential nature is unknowable.  His  transcendence remains 
unaffected by his activity in revelation.  Writing about al-Ghazali, Fazlur Rahman 
claims that he 
affirmed an agnosticism about the ultimate and absolute nature of God and maintained 
that He was knowable only in so far as He was related to and revealed Himself to 
man.  This revealed and relational nature of God is constituted by the Divine Names 
  
 
  
and Attributes. [Fazlur 1979:95] 
Though Fazlur Rahman elsewhere questions the value of the 'medieval theological 
heritage' represented by Ghazali for today [ibid 257], he employs this idea of God's 
'relatedness' extensively in his description of the world the Qur'an addresses.  Man and 
nature are entirely dependent upon God and his mercy, and this 'necessarily entails a 
proper relationship between God and Man - a relationship of the served and the 
servant - and consequently also a proper relationship between man and man.'  These 
relationships are 'normative' for all human conduct [Fazlur 1980:2,3], and Fazlur 
Rahman can even speak of man becoming a 'friend' of God. [ibid 12]  Fazlur Rahman 
is not alone in using such language.  Nowaihi addressed Christians in Cairo Cathedral 
with the words:  
Islam is based on the direct and intimate relationship between God and man; a 
relationship so direct and so intimate as to cancel all need for any mediation between 
them. [Nowaihi 1976:221] 
 
  Has Cragg then found an adequate common language in which to 
pursue with Muslims his conviction of the reciprocity of God and man?  A cluster of 
questions arises here, some of which must be pursued at a later point.  How far are 
either Maududi or Fazlur Rahman typical of the broad range of Muslim opinion?  
Does Cragg, who has published little about the classical writers or about Maududi 
[KC 1965 Counsels 120-4], but with some enthusiasm about Fazlur Rahman [KC 
1985 Pen ch.6], and who was a personal friend of Nowaihi, interpret any of them 
correctly?  Cragg suggests that Fazlur Rahman, in his 'scant appreciation of Sufism 
and Sufis' has settled for too 'functional' an understanding of God in the Qur'an, 
making of the Book a mere 'repository of answers... to virtually all questions' rather 
than a meeting-place with God. [ibid 94,93]  Despite all Fazlur Rahman's talk about 
relationships in the divine/human encounter, Cragg perceives that in Fazlur Rahman's 
understanding man does not encounter God himself in the Qur'an, but rather the 
demands of his will for man.  But in fastening critically upon this alleged 
'programmatic character of the Qur'an' in Fazlur Rahman's writing [ibid 102], is Cragg 
pursuing an old Christian prejudice about the 'unknowable God of Islam'?  Does he 
subscribe to the view that Christianity claims to reveal the nature of God, whereas 
Islam claims to reveal only his will?  Does he recognise that, for example, the 
description of Ghazali's thought given by Fazlur Rahman above, would also be 
affirmed by many Christians, particularly of the Orthodox Church?  This discussion 
makes urgent for us the question of the knowability of God. 
B  THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD 
 
  The question of whether or in what sense God can be known is clearly 
critical for Cragg's basic assumption of the reciprocity of God and man.  The 
'formative period of Islamic thought' (to borrow the title of Watt's book on the 
subject [Watt 1973]) was marked by tremendous theological struggles between the 
traditionalists, above all Ibn Hanbal (780-855), and the Mu'tazilite 
rationalists.  The orthodoxy which eventually emerged from generations of 
dispute was essentially a middle way formulated by al-Ash'ari (873-935), himself 
a convert from Mu'tazilism. [Allard 1965:90]  For the traditionalists all 
possible knowledge of God was contained in the Qur'an and sunna, and only there.  
'Tout a ‚t‚ dit et parfaitement dit par Dieu dans le Coran, tout a ‚t‚ expliqu‚ 
clairement par le prophŠte'. [ibid 104]  God speaks to human beings in the 
recitation of the Qur'an, and in that process they come into personal contact 
with his living word.  But as the Hanbalite theologian Barbahari (d. 940) wrote 
'Religion is nothing but imitation, imitation of the companions of the Prophet 
of God' [ibid 108].  There can be no place for any attempt to explain or 
question what God reveals and commands.  Theology is doing, not thinking, for, 
to quote Barbahari again, 'knowledge does not consist in the abundance of hadith 
and books: the possessor of knowledge is the one who puts into practice 
knowledge and the sunna.' [ibid 109] 
 
  The difficulty was that the very attempt to put into practice the 
Qur'an and the sunna involved the use of reasoning, for not every human 
situation was explicitly covered by those sources.  From the use of reasoning in 
jurisprudence, and perhaps from the experience of argument with non-Muslims 
[Watt 1973:249, Allard 1965:123f], some passed to more inquisitive and subtle 
forms of reasoning about the meaning of the word of God, and kalam or Muslim 
speculative theology was born. [Watt 1973:180ff]  In the context of our present 
discussion on the knowability of God the significance of this movement was its 
interest in the correct use of language about God, and its strong tendency to 
regard descriptive terms for him, or sifat (attributes), even those found in the 
Qur'an, as metaphors belonging to the created order.  Since they belonged to the 
created order they could not adequately describe the eternal nature of God.  
Here we see in operation the Mu'tazilite concern for the unity of God.  For if 
God's knowledge, for example, were regarded as eternal, it would be thought of 
as itself divine, and a second god.  This kind of thinking led the Mu'tazilites 
to the well-known doctrine that the Qur'an was created and not itself eternal, 
its apparent anthropomorphisms being therefore merely metaphor, though metaphor 
admittedly given by God. [ibid 246]  For the traditionalists, who observed that 
writers like al-Jubba'i rarely quoted the Qur'an and never the hadith, this 
threatened the heart of faith. [Allard 1965:122]  Eventually, however, some of 
the traditionalists were compelled to adopt the language and ways of reasoning 
of the rationalists, if only to refute them.   
 
  By the time of Ghazali Sunnite orthodoxy on the subject of the 
attributes of God had been largely established through the work of al-Ash'ari, 
and it was within al-Ash'ari's system of kalam that Ghazali worked.  An 
examination of Ghazali's thought opens up important perspectives on Cragg.   
Fadlou Shehadi, in an extensive philosophical analysis of it, has investigated 
the apparent contradiction between Ghazali's consistent emphasis on the utter 
uniqueness and unknowability of God, as noted by Fazlur Rahman, and his parallel 
concern that Muslims should follow the path to mystical union with God. [Shehadi 
1964]  Gairdner's study of Ghazali brought him to complain of the 
'hypertranscendence of the Allah of his theology': 'Of this Absolute Being 
nothing is, because nothing can be, predicated.' [Gairdner 1914:144, 128]  
Shehadi, however, insists that the problem is not simply one for Islam, but 
affects all those whose theism makes God 'above relation', and a radically 
different being from man. [Shehadi 1964:62]  His own conclusion of the problem 
as it appears in Ghazali is that for Ghazali statements which appear to be 
descriptive of God are not in fact so, for all such 'attribution' is inadequate 
and fails to define God.  Nevertheless such statements have the valuable 
function of being vehicles for praise.  'Attribution makes religion possible'. 
[ibid 109]   
 
  It is interesting to note that this was also broadly the conclusion 
of the nineteenth-century Christian philosopher Henry Mansel (1820-1871), with 
whom FD Maurice conducted a fierce pamphlet war on the whole issue of the 
knowability of God. [Smart 1985:240; Chadwick 1966:588]  For Mansel's The 
Limitations of Religious Knowledge Examined, the Bampton Lectures of 1858, in 
some respects anticipated the dialectical theology of the twentieth century 
which rejected any metaphysical foundation for theology.  Mansel argued that a 
transcendent God must by virtue of that transcendence be unknown and unknowable, 
for human beings conditioned by the limitations of physical existence cannot 
have knowledge of the unconditioned.  Mansel distrusted the powers of human 
reason adequately to describe God, and emphasized the self-contradictory 
character of much religious language.  The infinite can only be known through 
negative concepts. [Reardon 1971:223, 226f]  He was much influenced by the 
thought of the Scottish philosopher William Hamilton (1788-1856) who said that 
'A God understood would be no God at all.' [Smart 1985:239]  In answer to those 
who regarded this as the destruction of religion Mansel argued that 'a 
conception which is speculatively untrue may be regulatively true.' [ibid 240]  
God has given us revelation so that we can worship him.  But this did not 
satisfy those like FD Maurice who reckoned that Mansel had substituted the dry 
bones of religion for the living God.  For Maurice divine revelation was not the 
unveiling of a set of propositions but the meeting of a person, 'and that Person 
the ground and Archetype of men, the source of all life and goodness in men.' 
[Reardon 1971:239]  To suggest that revelation was the imparting of concepts 
that could be used but never really understood was a travesty of God's encounter 
with men.  Later Gore also joined in the attack on Mansel in the interests of 
the Incarnation as the crown, and not the antithesis of what may be known 
through nature and reason. [Gore 1891:116f]  We have already seen the 
significance of Maurice and Gore for the thought of Cragg, and it is clear that 
he would share their criticisms of Mansel. 
 
  When we return to Ghazali the parallels with Mansel are immediately 
obvious.  As Shehadi understands Ghazali, 'Allahu akbar' means that God is 
greater, not than any other god or being, but greater than to be known by man. 
[Shehadi 1964:48 cf Gairdner 1924:s.19]  Armed with such Qur'anic texts and 
phrases the Muslim can be sure than he is worshipping God in the language God 
himself has supplied, without supposing that such words give him any power of 
stating adequately what God is.  So Gairdner was mistaken to write, in Mauricean 
vein: 'How Ghazali the orthodox was able to keep in view so definite an 
attribution as that of Creatorhood amid the Stygian darkness of his 
hyperagnosticism, is a question that can be asked but not answered.' [Gairdner 
1914:145]  The answer lies in the two roles of Ghazali, as philosopher (however 
much he disavowed that role), and as spiritual director.  Shehadi does not make 
the point, but it may well be that a religious as much as a philosophical reason 
lies behind Ghazali's anxiety to exclude the possibility of knowing God: namely 
that knowledge always gives power, and in the traditional world of the Semites 
to know a person's name gives one power over him, as Adam was taught by God the 
names of all things, though these were unknown to the angels. (Qur'an 2:31, 32)   
Where God is concerned it is simply inconceivable to have power over him.  The 
names of God are given by God and belong to God, and are to be used with a 
proper care. (Qur'an 7:180). 
 
  Shehadi includes some criticism of Cragg in the course of his 
examination of Ghazali.  He notes that Cragg indicates an awareness of the 
philosophical issues involved in the fundamental contrast of God's unknowability 
and his summons to man to meet with him.  He quotes The Call of the Minaret 
The problem of meaning in language exists for all religions and is not unique to 
Islam.  It can only be solved within the conviction that the Divine and the 
human are truly meaningful to each other: only in the confidence that the 
relationships God has with man are really indicative of His Nature.  We only put 
these convictions more shortly - and sublimely - when we say: 'God is Love.'  
Islam has never felt able to say that.  The pressure of these problems is the 
measure of its reluctance. [Shehadi 1964:79 from KC 1956 Call 55 = KC 1986 Call 
49] 
 
  Despite an acknowledgement that Cragg is not concerned to write a 
philosophical treatise, Shehadi objects to his use of terms like 'in the 
conviction that' and 'in the confidence that': 'the conviction and the 
confidence that God does truly reveal Himself do not answer in the least the 
philosophical question of how this is possible.' [ibid. Emphasis original]  He 
clearly thinks that the confidence and conviction Cragg calls to be placed in 
God as love might in logic be equally validly placed elsewhere, for example in 
the sunna of Islam.  To cite 'confidence' and 'conviction' does not in itself 
resolve the problem of where they should be employed.  This seems a justifiable 
criticism of Cragg.  Shehadi's book, however, raises a final point in this 
context which goes some way towards justifying Cragg's strictures on Islamic 
'reluctance' to identify God as Love, or indeed, anything else.  Shehadi asks 
whether, in view of the unknowability of God insisted on by Ghazali, it is 
possible to speak realistically (at least in philosophical terms) of 'God 
revealing' at all, however that revelation might be defined.  He concludes that 
there needs, logically, to be a shift in the 'locus of authority' in Islam from 
'the directness of God's authority to that of the prophet... The Prophet would 
then have to be trusted in a special way for supplying man with a theistic 
perspective that directs his religious and ethical life.' [ibid 125]  The 
Islamic bridge, in other words, from the agnostic character of theology to the 
practicalities of daily religion is to be Muhammad.  Such a shift from Allah the 
Transcendent to Muhammad as mediator of his ways is of course amply testified in 
Islamic preaching and informs daily Muslim life. [Schimmel 1985]   
 
  Some such bridge is of course inevitable if the intelligent mind and 
the worshipping heart are to find any harmomy with one another.  Gairdner, like 
Shehadi, finds Ghazali unsatisfactory on this point but speaks with much greater 
force of the 'incorrigible inconsistency' of Ghazali's position. [Gairdner 
1924:29, quoted in Shehadi 1964:78]  Ghazali, he complains, bases his whole 
treatise of Mishkat al-Anwar ('The Niche for Lights') on the analogy of light 
for God which is given by the Qur'an itself (Surah 24:35).  Yet in the same work 
he seems to deny that it really applies to Allah, who is 'transcendent of and 
separate from every characterization that in the foregoing we have made.' 
[Gairdner 1924:s.55]  But Ghazali also speaks in the very same passage of an 
'Obeyed-One' whose relation to the 'Real Existence is as the relation of the Sun 
to Essential Light, or of the live coal to the Elemental Fire.' [ibid]  Ibn 
Rushd alleged that Ghazali compromised the divine unity and taught (like Ibn 
Sina and al-Farabi) a doctrine of emanations from God, because he spoke of the 
angelic intelligences of the spheres, and seemed to imply, with his talk of the 
sun and Light and the coal and Fire that these intelligences somehow shared the 
nature of God in diluted form.  Gairdner's own lengthy examination of Ibn 
Rushd's accusation, however, exonerates Ghazali from such heresy by emphasizing 
Ghazali's normal language of the heavenly beings reflecting God's glory, and in 
no sense themselves a source of it. [Gairdner 1914:133-145]. 
 
  We have already seen that this difficulty of speaking descriptively 
of God is not exclusively an Islamic issue.  Pseudo-Dionysius, the Neo-
Platonist, writes of The One as 'neither soul nor spirit, nor representation, 
nor opinion, nor thought, nor equality, nor disparity... nor night, nor light, 
nor living, nor life...'  John of Damascus is positively Ash'arite is speaking 
of the iëiæàtà or sifat (attributes) of God: these are to be applied 'only in 
so far as He is the cause of these, and in so far as He is immaterial and the 
Creator of the universe and almighty'. [Wensinck 1932:71, 72]  Without asking 
how, perhaps?  Maimonides, the medieval Jewish theologian who wrote in Arabic, 
rejected both likeness and relationship: 
In view of the fact that the relationship between us and Him, may He be exalted, 
is considered as non-existent - I mean the relation between Him and that which 
is other than He - it follows necessarily that likness between Him and us should 
also be considered non-existent...  The meaning of the qualificative 
attributions ascribed to Him and the meaning of the attributes known to us have 
nothing in common in any respect or in any mode;  these attributes have in 
common only the name and nothing else. [Maimonides 1963:c.56] 
Then listen to the modern Russian theologian Vladimir Lossky, expressing the 
common stand of the Orthodox Church: 
God is not determined by any of His attributes; all determinations are inferior 
to Him, logically posterior to His being in itself, in its essence.  When we say 
that God is Wisdom, Life, Truth, Love - we understand the energies, which are 
subsequent to the essence and are its natural manifestations, but are external 
to the very being of the Trinity...  Like the energies, the divine names are 
innumerable, so likewise the nature which they reveal remains nameless and 
unknowable - darkness hidden by the abundance of light. [Lossky 1957:80 emphasis 
added] 
Here the Orthodox Church is surely in fundamental agreement with Ghazali about 
the nature of God against Western Christians like Cragg [and Gore, cf Gore 
1891:116f], and is even found using the same imagery of concealing light as the 
Mishkat al-Anwar.  Nor is such negative theology confined to the Eastern 
tradition.  Though developed by Clement, Origen, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, it 
finds scriptural justification in texts like Matthew 11:27 - 'No one knows the 
Father but the Son' - and Western followers as significant as St John of the 
Cross, Meister Eckart and Pascal.  Maimonides reckoned that 'We are only able to 
apprehend the fact that He is and cannot apprehend His quiddity.' [Maimonides 
1963:c.58]  Aquinas, though he disagreed with Maimonides on the question of 
attributes, did agree on this last point: 'Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus 
quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed 
potius quomodo non sit.'[Patterson 1933:113, cf Sweetman 1967:II.2.323] 
 
  At this point it may be well to raise some more general questions in 
a short digression.  The point just discussed raises the question of whether, 
like many other writers, Cragg is not pursuing some 'hidden agenda' of his own 
in the guise of an engagement with Islam, without necessarily realising the 
fact.  Is he really conducting an argument with other Christians in this way in 
order to establish a particular viewpoint of the nature of God for which Islam 
simply serves as a convenient negative illustration?  If however we grant - as 
we undoubtedly should - a genuine degree of concern for Islam, other related 
issues arise.  We need, for example, to be clear at this point that two elements 
are involved in the general aspect of Cragg's thought under discussion at this 
stage.  Cragg's position is that the doctrines of God and man are reciprocal - 
that is to say, that what is thought about God profoundly affects what is 
thought about man (which is hardly in question), but equally that what is 
thought about man profoundly affects what is thought about God.  As already 
suggested, this is controversial with Muslims.  But the implications of this 
line of thought go beyond the formulation of doctrines about what God is like 
and what man is like.  There is inevitably in its development the claim that God 
is somehow subject in some degree to the will of man, as well as the reverse.  
If it be claimed that Islam will have none of such a doctrine, Cragg's answer is 
that the implication is already there, for those who have eyes to see it, in the 
doctrine of creation and the pages of the Qur'an.  This inevitably involves him 
in the claim that he sees the deeper meaning and implications of Islam better 
than Muslims do.  It is also likely to involve him in the practice of searching 
out congenial interpreters from Muslim ranks who show signs of reaching his own 
conclusions, while others (like the classical theologians and moderns such as 
Maududi) are neglected. 
 
  This is not necessarily a condemnation of his theological method.  
It may be that time and further Muslim thought will prove him right.  Among 
contemporary Muslim authors Fazlur Rahman is quite prepared to speak (from 
painful personal experience) of 'the real picture' of revelation in Islam as 
being 'anathema' to the 'general Muslim mind', and of the Quranic 'intentions' 
about monogamy being 'thwarted' by Muslims over many centuries. [Fazlur 1979: 
14, 38]  Sayyid Qutb and others have spoken of the principles of Islam having 
been crippled in Islamic countries for many centuries. [KC 1986 Call 339 n.10]  
And what is open to Muslim thinkers must, at least in principle, be open to non-
Muslims also.  Cragg may indeed see and understand things in the fundamental 
doctrines of Islam which very few Muslims themselves have yet seen.  The 
possibility must at least be entertained, if a non-Muslim venture of 
interpreting Islam with some basic sympathy is to be sustained.  How otherwise 
is a non-Muslim interpreter of Islam to proceed?  If he has turned away from 
Christian views which see Islam only in in the negative terms of demonology or 
apocalypse, and yet is unwilling to throw in the intellectual towel by assuming 
a valid plurality of (mutually contradictory) religious philosophies, is some 
such path as Cragg's not inescapable?  The issue then turns on the cogency and 
comprehensiveness of his treatment of Islam according to carefully stated 
starting-points.  Clearly the further he diverges from generally accepted 
dogmatic markers in Islam, the more cogent his argument will have to be, and the 
more his refutation or neglect of opposing views will have to be examined.  Is 
he engaging only with a selected, minority viewpoint within Islam?  Does he 
wrestle with the question of what is normative Islam (or normative 
Christianity)?  We shall deal in chapter 6 with the awareness which he shows of 
these wider issues.  Here we need to know more about the way he elaborates his 
doctrine of God and man. 
 
  It should not be thought that Cragg is crudely anthropocentric in 
his understanding of God, as though man made God in his own image.  In the 
discussion of the Islamic cry 'Allahu-akbar' he maintains that 'the criteria of 
divine greatness cannot well be those of our devising or requiring.  It takes 
God to show us what they are.' [KC 9:136]  But he is insistent that such 
criteria be consonant with what we know of human nature.  'If God is arbitrarily 
beyond our nature, we cannot approach him except in the denial of our own'.  In 
fact to concede the omnipotence of God as meaning an utter arbitrariness would 
be to make our islam/submission impossible.  'To say: "Let God be God" makes it 
impossible to eliminate ourselves from the answer'. [KC 82:5].  In other words 
we have here a relationship, a mutuality.  In a recent essay Cragg acknowledges 
the 'very proper instinct for divine "indescribability"' which is characteristic 
of negative theology in Jewish and Christian, especially Orthodox, tradition as 
well as in Islam.  But he continues to plead for the same 'confidence' that 
Shehadi found philosophically problematic: 
Need we, in the negative theology, deny that God, as He transcends all our 
knowing and telling, also belongs within it?  Need the ineffable, the 
incomprehensible, be also the nugatory, the contradictory?  Or can we not rely 
on a confidence that, although we must always be aware of the poverty of our 
concepts, we can nevertheless take them in the seriousness of the created order 
and the prophetic revelation which gives them to us and, giving, does not mock 
or tantalize? [KC 19:191] 
 
  The difficulty of language about God, as Cragg sees it, is that 
theologians suppose that God is reluctant to be named or described, and the 
confidence he calls for is in God's willingness to be addressed by the creatures 
he has made himself responsible for.  Can this possibility of communication not 
bring about 'a certain mutuality between God and man, proper to both?' [ibid 
190]  In Cragg's view, then, the bridge we spoke of earlier between theology and 
religion is the possibility of mutual communication between God and man which 
God has implanted in the very character of his creation.  Here we see again how 
Cragg's theology is based on the fundamental possibility of communication and 
the existential need of it. 
 
  There have been voices within Islam which come very close to 
acknowledging Cragg's viewpoint.  In his review of The Call of the Minaret, 
written while he was still a Muslim, Daud Rahbar blamed the theologians of Islam 
for so emphasizing divine transcendence that the divine Personality revealed in 
the Qur'an was obscured.  'Thus the concept of God was left completely devoid of 
the element of intimacy with and challenge to human affairs.' [Rahbar 1958:42]  
Nowaihi also said, quoting Cragg, that 'The Qur'an is nothing if it is not "a 
suffering identity with creation and humanity."' [Nowaihi 1976:221 cf KC 66:38 & 
19:191]   
 
  However, the mainstream of Islamic thought is probably better 
represented here by Fazlur Rahman.  He credits Cragg with 'an extraordinarily 
sensitive response to Islamic scripture (for) a Christian', but he has no doubt 
that the God of the Qur'an is not arbitrary, and that it is a Western slur upon 
Islam to allege the contrary.  But he has a different understanding of God and 
man which emerges in the way that his use of the word 'nature' differs from that 
of Cragg.  For Fazlur Rahman the qadar or capacity of God to 'measure out' the 
potentialities of everything created, including of course man, 'expresses the 
most fundamental, unbridgeable difference between the nature of God and the 
nature of man.' [Fazlur 1980:xv,15,13]  So the 'relatedness' of God to man which 
we observed earlier in Fazlur Rahman's thinking is strictly in these 'measured' 
terms.  If God is a friend of man, it is as a 'protector-friend', or so Fazlur 
Rahman translates the wali of surah 6:14 [ibid 14]  It is instructive to compare 
the two authors on the consequences of failing to acknowledge God.  For Fazlur 
Rahman, who discusses the point in the context of shirk, the result is the loss 
of order in nature, 'the entire chain falls to pieces.' [Fazlur 1980:10].  For 
Cragg the consequence is rather that where God is not acknowledged, there can be 
no real understanding or concept of human nature.  In Cragg's terms, it is not a 
matter of 'a broken command but (of) a disrupted communion.' [KC 19:191]  Cragg 
quotes Sartre to make the point by its corollary: '"There is no human nature, 
because there is no God to have a conception of it" Sartre once wrote, in his 
darkest mood.' [KC 1968 Privilege 138].  The question is about man as well as 
God. 
  
 
  
C  THE KHALIFATE OF MAN 
 
  For Cragg then, reciprocity means this relational, existential link 
between God and man.  This is what matters, rather than some philosophical 
abstraction, and the link is celebrated in worship, which takes on in consequence the 
significance that it ennobles man as well as honours God.  So we need to see the 
Qur'an, for example, primarily 'as a mission to retrieve idolaters for a true worship', 
writes Cragg in introducing it. [KC 1971 Event 15]  For man is constituted by his 
worship, by the relationship he has with the one who created and therefore defines 
him.  God must be 'worshippable', both in the sense that he is big enough for man's 
adoration, and in the sense that man is enabled to worship him.  Man discovers his 
true self as he worships.  'Man is king and priest, but neither in isolation.  For he only 
truly rules when he validly praises, only governs as he kneels, only masters in that he 
prays.' [KC 1959 Sandals 117]  And if it be thought that such an outlook stems from 
Christianity and finds no home in Islam Cragg is ready with exegeses of the passages 
about Adam and Satan in the Qur'an. (2:30-34, 7:11-14, 15:26-35)  Iblis, the Devil, 
refuses to bow before man at the command of God. 
His defiance of God takes the form of a denial of man: it is in rejecting the status with 
which the creature is endowed that Iblis repudiates the Creator's authority.  There 
could hardly be, in terms of myth and symbol, a clearer affirmation of the lordship of 
man as that which may not be spurned without impugning the authority of God...  God 
is flouted where man is despised. [KC 1968 Privilege 28] 
 
  All the relevant Quranic passages Cragg understands as making it clear 
that the proper recognition of God involves the recognition of man, and vice-versa in 
reciprocity.  'Non-recognition of man is non-submission to God.  Satan's obduracy in 
rejecting prostration before man in recognition of his responsible dignity is 
Quranically understood as the crowning defiance of God.' [KC 1959 Sandals 117]  To 
refuse to see the significance of man is to fail in duty to God. 
 
  But is it so 'Quranically understood'?  Here we have to examine how 
far Cragg's exegesis is consonant with Muslim understanding of the same passages.  
This heavenly dispute of Satan with God concerns the risk God proposes to take in 
creating the human race.  'Wilt Thou, said the angels, place therein one who will do 
harm therein and will shed blood?' (surah 2:30).  Commenting on a parallel passage 
(38:71),  Zamakhshari identifies the fault of Iblis not in a refusal to recognise the 
'responsible dignity of man', as Cragg has it, but in setting his own judgement before 
the command of God.  'The reason why Iblis detested and scorned bowing down 
before Adam is that this would be prostration before something created...  He should 
have known that, by bowing down before a lower being at the command of God, the 
angels devoted themselves more strongly to the service of God than if they had bowed 
down before God himself.' [Gätje 1976:167,168].  Zamakhshari goes on to give 
examples which make it clear that he regards the status of the angels, and of Iblis, to 
be superior to that of Adam.  Other commentators took a different view of their 
comparative status, some relying on surah 7.19f, where Satan says 'Your Lord has 
only prohibited you from this tree lest you become angels, or lest you become 
immortals.'  Baidawi is at pains to deny that there is 'evidence here for the absolute 
superiority of the angels.' [ibid 278,171]  Whatever the exact status of angels and of 
men, however, the classical exegetes seem to be agreed that some cosmic drama was 
being enacted, something more significant than merely the emergence of the human 
  
 
  
race.  Creation was not brought about for man but for another purpose altogether.  
Man's nature is too ambivalent to bear the whole weight of God's purpose in creation. 
 'It may be argued', writes Ayoub, summarizing the classical exegetes, 
that the purpose of the entire drama of creation was for God to manifest His 
knowledge and power and to expose the pride of Iblis.  This is clearly shown in the 
creation of man. According to Tabari, God sent Gabriel, then Michael, to fetch clay, 
but the earth said, "I take refuge in God from you, if you have come to diminish and 
deform me." [Ayoub 1984:75] 
Man's existence, so far from being the crown of the rest of creation, was perceived as 
a threat to it.  We shall see shortly how the classical writers understood the status of 
Adam as khalifah. 
 
  Cragg is characteristically modern in not being much concerned with 
angels, and they find little if any place in his writing.  For him the emergence of the 
human race is overwhelmingly more important.  But if that is so, does his 
understanding run entirely counter to conventional Muslim thought when he reads the 
passages in the Qur'an about the creation of man in the way that he does?  There are 
modern Muslims who go as far, if not further than Cragg himself.  al-Mashriqi (Md 
'Inayat Allah Khan, born 1888) for example, has God saying to man: 
Be aware that I am God; you should be God's counterpart, and incarnation in little of 
the divine attributes; hear and see, like I do ('so We have made him hearing, seeing').  
My spirit I breathe into you ('and I breathed into him of My spirit').  This is so because 
I want you to be what I am... powerful and mighty... I am the great Creator; similarly I 
expect from you great creations and inventions. [Baljon 1961:55f] 
This sort of language goes much further even than Nasr and Schuon's theomorphism, 
and is not of course typical of Muslim writing, but what is the link between the 
classical exegesis and such man-centred 'modernism'?   The answer seems to lie in the 
esoteric contribution of the Sufis mediated to contemporary non-Sufi Muslims 
through Iqbal. 
 
  Here the Sufi devotion to the Prophet as representative man is 
particularly important.  In very early times the famous contemporary and nominated 
poet of Muhammad, Hassan ibn Thabit, is credited with the verse: 
God derived for him, in order to honour him, part of His name; 
Thus the Lord of the Throne is called mahmud, and this one    muhammad. [Schimmel 
1985:105f] 
Muhammad is in this way related directly to one of the names (attributes) of God, and 
the human race potentially through him, as we saw in the implications of Ghazali's 
thought.  Later speculation fastened on Muhammad's name in the form Ahmad, and 
the alleged hadith qudsi which ran 'ana Ahmad bila mim', that is 'I am Ahmad 
(=Muhammad) without the letter m' = Ahad, the One, God.  From this developed the 
idea of Muhammad as the perfect man, the al-'insan al-kamil, made in the image of 
God and a perfect copy of his Creator. [Schimmel 1975:224f] 
 
  As Ibn 'Arabi saw it, man is himself a theophany (tajalli), since 
everything that is real is an emanation from God, God manifesting himself in a 
infinity of forms, and when a man prays it is God praying within him.  But divine 
consciousness reaches its perfect expression in the perfect man, whom Ibn 'Arabi 
identifies with the spirit (rather than the earthly person) of Muhammad. [Landau 
1959:56f]  'God, wrote Ibn 'Arabi, made him His Vicegerent (khalifah) in the 
  
 
  
guardianship of the universe, and it continues to be guarded whilst this Perfect Man is 
there.' [ibid 73]  Sirhindi, however, tried to free Sufism from the legacy of Ibn 'Arabi 
by distinguishing between prophethood (nubuwwat) and sainthood (walayat).  For him 
sainthood indeed brought with it 'illuminations and appearances' (tajalliyat wa 
zuhurat) of the divine, but these were inferior, mere shadows of the Real compared to 
the direct knowledge of Real experienced by the prophets, a subjective and not an 
objective knowledge. [Ansari 1986:212] 
 
  Is Cragg then relating essentially to Sufi understandings of the Qur'an? 
 Here we need to look at the question of the interpretation of Adam as khalifah, or 
vicegerent.  Among non-Sufis there seem to have been two principal interpretations, 
as noted in Tabari.  Relying on Ibn 'Abbas, Tabari says that Adam was the khalifah (in 
the sense of substitute and successor) of the jinn, who had been the first to inhabit the 
earth, but who had been defeated by Iblis because they had spread corruption and 
murder there.  This sense is hardly complimentary to Adam, but Tabari offers a 
second, (in which he is followed by, for example, Qurtubi the jurist, d. 1273), 
whereby Adam is identified as the vicegerent of God himself, 'who shall represent me 
in judging among my creatures', because, adds Qurtubi, 'he was the first messenger to 
earth.'  (But note that it is Adam himself as prophet, and not the human race in 
principle, who is khalifah.) [Ayoub 1984:74, 76]  We have to be aware, especially in 
the earliest of the classical writers, of the political implications of any exegesis of the 
word khalifah.  Al-Hajjaj, the notorious governor of Baghdad under the Umayyads, 
used the text at 2:30 to claim that the Caliph was superior even to angels and prophets, 
while other supporters of the regime understood the title as meaning the 'Deputy of 
God'.  Abu Bakr is said to have rejected that interpretation decisively in favour of the 
sense 'Deputy (or Successor) of the Apostle of God.' [Watt 1973:84] 
 
  However Ibn Kathir is a classical writer who does see the text as 
evidence of the special favour of humanity as a whole with God, and among the Sufis 
that theme was developed extensively.  Nisaburi says that 'when man's lamp is so 
illumined with the fire of the light of God, he becomes God's vicegerent in His earth, 
manifesting the lights of His attributes in this world through justice, well-doing, 
compassion, mercy, kindliness, and domination.  These attributes,' comments 
Nisaburi, 'are manifested in neither animal nor angelic beings.' [Ayoub 1984:78]  Here 
we come close to the theomorphic conception of man which we saw in SH Nasr and 
Frithjof Schuon.  Ibn 'Arabi, noting like Nisaburi that S.2:30 does not speak of God 
'creating' (khalaq) man but of 'placing' (ja'al) him on the earth, develops an 
interpretation in which God says: 'Man is My vicegerent forming his character 
according to My character, and is known by My characteristics.' [ibid 79]  A century 
earlier than Ibn 'Arabi, Ghazali was capable of similar, though more cautious 
statements.  Quoting sura 15:29, about God 'fashioning man and breathing into him of 
my spirit', he says 'For this reason the angels of God made obeisance to Adam.  It is 
understood also from this verse: I have made you my successor in the world.  The 
Prophet Adam would not have been fit for khilafat unless he was given the connection 
(munasabah) of spirit.  The Prophet said, hinting at this connection: God created 
Adam according to His image.' [Ghazali 1971:IV:310=IV:6:675 Egyptian Arabic ed.] 
 This linking of the Sufi exegesis of khilafat and the tradition about man being made 
in the image of God appears, however, to induce a certain nervousness in Ghazali, for 
at two points in the Ihya he says that the special endowment of man must not be spelt 
out in detail in a book. [Ghazali 1971:IV:294,675]  But his use of the word 
  
 
  
munasabah (Lane: = 'resemblance, similarity, analogy, correspondence, conformity: in 
logic the relation of subject to predicate'), does seem at this point to justify Cragg's 
theme of reciprocity between God and man, despite the earlier philosophical issues 
which we noted, and Ghazali's evident misgivings at too much publicity for the details 
of such a view.  The Ihya passage quoted above actually continues with a reference to 
the tradition of God's rebuke to Moses that 'I was sick, and thou visitedst me not', with 
its close resemblance to Matthew 25:31f. [cf Gairdner 1924:s.24; KC 1970 Alive 99] 
 
  Modern interpreters, however, decline to be drawn into using this 
dangerous theomorphic language, with its echoes of al-Hallaj, and read sura 2:30 very 
differently. [eg Parwez in Baljon 1961:57]  Iqbal maintains that  
Three things are perfectly clear from the Quran: 
(i)   That man is the chosen of God... 
(ii)  That man, with all his faults, is meant to be the     representative of God on 
earth...  
(iii) That man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril...     
[Iqbal 1971:95] 
Whatever the views of classical writers about khilafat as succession, and the status of 
Adam himself as khalifah and prophet, the moderns follow Iqbal in affirming that the 
term refers to man's vicegerency from God.  Vahiduddin affirms Cragg's metaphysical 
exegesis of the relevant passages and reckons that 'the traditional exegesis which 
understands the Khalifah primarily in its involvement with the political succession to 
the Prophet has gone a long way in clouding the original Qur'anic intention.' 
[Vahiduddin 1970:67]  Tabataba'i says: 'Many are the texts which support the fact that 
the vicegerency is meant to include the descendants of Adam.' [Ayoub 1984:89]  
Maududi uses the same theme to attack Western ideas: 'this knowledge (of his origins) 
raises the status of man from the helpless and mean creature of evolution to the 
noblest creation of Allah, His vicegerent on earth, to whom the angels and everything 
in their charge were made to bow.' [Maududi 1971:58]  Leaving Paradise, he asserts, 
was not a punishment for Adam, but 'a matter of course', because the real purpose of 
creation was this vicegerency on earth.  The Garden was merely a trial and a training.  
Sayyid Qutb agrees: 'Thus God's mercy had decreed for this creature that he descend 
to the place of his vicegerency, having had the experience of this trial which he is to 
confront always if he is to be ready for the battle, and that it may be for him a lesson 
and a warning.' [Ayoub 1984:93]  Muhammad Asad supports the interpretation of the 
human race as khalifah al-ard by citing 6:165, 27:62, and 35:39. [Asad 1980 on 2:31]   
 
  
 
  
D  THEODICY AND SELF-WRONGING 
 
  Is there, in this modern Muslim shift towards a more man-centred, 
earth-bound understanding, some faint and inexplicit acknowledgement of the truth of 
Cragg's contention that 'what is due from man to God belongs with what is due from 
God to man'? [KC 1985 Jesus 45]  If the heavenly court, the attendant angels and the 
jinn fade in importance in the modern mind in favour of the earth as the theatre of 'the 
eternal battle', are not God and man drawn closer in what Sayyid Qutb calls 'the 
convenant of vicegerency', referring perhaps to the 'amanah/trust  of 33:72? [Ayoub 
1984:92 cf Qur'an 7:172-174]  Cragg's conviction is that Islam has not taken the full 
measure of its own doctrines.  He speaks of the classical Muslim theologians' 
'reluctance to be fully theist' [KC 1985 Jesus 46], and complained earlier (and no 
doubt more rashly) that: 
This Muslim tendancy to silence or 'contain' all questionings in the totalitarian fact of 
God not only compromises the intellectual life and over-simplifies religious surrender: 
it also closely affects the relation of religion to life.  God is not in redemptive relation 
with man nor is man in redemptive need of God.  Just as Islam is intellectually a faith 
without a theodicy, so it is also a religion without a radical criticism of life. [KC 161 
pt1:92] 
Such allegations are familiar from Kraemer: 'Islam... must be called a superficial 
religion... that has almost no questions and no answers... Man has no real place in the 
relation of God and man... Man is so evanescent in the hyperbolically theocentric 
atmosphere of Islam that problems of theodicy, of the cry for a God of righteousness, 
etc., are entirely absent.' [Kraemer 1938:216,217,222 - emphasis original] 
 
  We must take up in chapter 4 the significance of Cragg's criticism of 
the political dimension of Islam, but it must be noted here that, given the political 
character of all theological disputes within Islam, the charge of non-existent theodicy 
cannot really stick.  The Kharijite refusal, in early Muslim days, to obey a ruler 
regarded as sinful; the Shi'i criticism of Umayyad worldliness; the Mu'tazilite anxiety 
to uphold the justice of God; all these are evidence of a practical questioning about the 
righteousness of God which is certainly different in form but no less intense in 
character than that of Christianity, even if it be finally judged as inadequate to the 
depth of the issue. [see eg Watt 1973:238f, 1979, von Grunebaum 1970] 
 
  One way of proceeding at this stage is to examine the Qur'anic concept 
of zulm (roughly = wrongdoing), and the other derivatives of the root Z-L-M, in order 
to take serious note of a key Islamic idea and its place in Muslim thought about God 
and man.  It is also a term which has interested Cragg, and featured in his writing 
about Islam. [eg KC 1973 Mind 99f]  In 1959 he translated, with extensive comment, 
an article of Kamil Husain entitled 'The Meaning of zulm in the Qur'an'. [KC 49]  In 
this Husain notes that words from the root Z-L-M are recorded 289 times in the 
concordance of the Qur'an.  Cragg agrees that 'Their usage is exceeded only by the 
most central of all words, like Allah, Rabb, and Rasul.' [KC 1973 Mind 99]  Setting 
aside the primary meaning as noted by Lane, of 'putting a thing in a place not its own' 
and so 'transgressing the proper limit', Husain concludes that the essential meaning of 
zulm in the Qur'an is injustice or injury, and 'in the majority of cases' self-wronging, 
or injury to one's own soul, zulm li'l-nafsi. [KC 49:200, 201]  Surah 65:1 is a 
characteristic use: 'Any who transgresses the limits of God, does verily wrong his own 
soul'. 
  
 
  
 
  From an extensive examination of this word-cluster Husain draws 
some interesting conclusions.  First he sees even so fundamental a term as shirk, 
associating partners with God, as subsumed under zulm, which as we have seen is to 
be thought of as primarily self-injury. [ibid 201]  The significance of this becomes 
clear in a second point, that the Muslim 'is unable to conceive of man as being capable 
of injuring God'. [ibid 198]  Thirdly (though these points are made more incidentally 
by Husain than this presentation of them suggests), it is clear to Husain that 'the soul 
in its essential nature is pure' for if 'the soul was naturally and inherently sinful we 
would have no ground for regarding acts of evil-doing as a wrong against the self.'  
'Surely an admirable ethical viewpoint this, which characterises every sin you commit 
and every good you fail to do, as a wrong against your own soul.  Those who assess 
what they do by this criterion will find open before them, clear and sure, the road to 
the good.' [ibid 204] 
 
  It is interesting to compare this analysis with the conclusions of a 
Qur'anic (though non-Muslim) scholar like Izutsu, who confirms the sense of zulm as 
injustice, (though he finds its antonym in qist rather than in 'adl) [Izutsu 1959:212], 
but sees a considerable overlap between the roots Z-L-M and K-F-R, with kufr as the 
key Qur'anic term.  He acknowledges the sense of self-injury, but links it not with the 
incapacity of man to injure God but with God's innocence of the wrong man has 
brought upon himself. [ibid 113, 159]  'It is not God that hath wronged them, but they 
wrong themselves' (Surah 3:117)  He finds a close association between Z-L-M and 
K-DH-B = to lie.  The zalim is a liar.  For 
Who doth more wrong ('azlamu) than those who invent a lie (kadhiban) against God?  
They will be turned back to the presence of their Lord, and the witnesses will say, 
'These are the ones who lied against their Lord!  Behold!  the Curse of God is on those 
who do wrong! - Those who would hinder (men) from the path of God and would 
seek in it something crooked: these were they who denied the Hereafter!  (Surah 
11:18,19 cf 7:44f) 
 
  In the light of Izutsu's analysis Husain's interpretation begins to seem 
rather idiosyncratic, but Cragg's interest in it can also be understood more clearly.  For 
his concern is to take up the second two points which we noted from the Husain 
article, and to argue the inadequacy of Muslim thought as so expressed.  On the point 
of man's incapacity to injure God Cragg responds that this is  
valid enough in the sense that sin and Shirk, disobedience and ingratitude, do not 
affect His being God or His Godness.  But the concept is obviously incompatible with 
any serious faith, with islam as such, if it implies that our wrongness is a matter of 
indifference to Him.  Our evils 'harm' Him in the sense, at least, that all law-making 
authority must be seriously cognisant of law-breaking...  God's very demand of islam 
(willed conformity) from man requires that the lack of it (in Zulm) matters for Him 
and, in that sense, 'affects' Him adversely. [KC 49:198 n 3] 
 
  On the question of the alleged purity of the human soul as indicated in 
the concept of self-wronging, Cragg asks 'May there not be a much deeper tragedy - 
the self-wronging that is conscious and yet persistent?' and he questions the 
assumption that 'an intellectual recognition of evil is equivalent to salvation from it'.  
'Has the realisation we are wronging ourselves any more force or effectiveness, if we 
are bent on defiance and obstinately ready to take any consequences?' [ibid 204 n8, 
  
 
  
209]  Is not 'the truth about Adamic man' the Christian concept of original sin 'which 
seems, though unrecognized, to be latent in Quranic Zulm al-nafs'? [ibid 211]  It is not 
so much then that Islam is superficial in its understanding of the human situation, as 
Kraemer claimed (and Cragg appeared to echo in his 1950 thesis).  It is rather, as 
Cragg sees it, that Muslims have not yet fully grasped the implications of the Quranic 
testimony to man's predicament.  But this brings us back to the alleged Muslim 
'reluctance to be fully theist.' [KC 1985 Jesus 46]  For the depth of this human 
predicament, as Cragg sees it, requires an adequate response from God if the purposes 
of his own creation are to be fulfilled and his laws obeyed, and if authentic worship is 
to be offered him. 
 
  Cragg has argued face to face with Muslims that there is a 'divine 
responsibility' which God has incurred by the very act of creation. [KC 78:406]  
Elsewhere he has talked of the 'divine liability'. [KC 82:5 cf 90:39]  To his Muslim 
partners in the dialogue such divine-human reciprocity was unthinkable.  Khurshid 
Ahmad's view was that 'if men refuse to worship God and to obey Him, God is not 
affected.  It is not God Who seeks completion in our worship, but rather we who seek 
completion through worshipping Him.'  But for Cragg: 'You cannot create and be as if 
you hadn't.  You cannot have law and be indifferent to what happens to it.  You cannot 
educate and be indifferent to what is happening in education...  God is involved in 
wrong that jahiliyyah does to him.' [KC 78:407]  For Cragg, an 'unobligated deity' 
meant deism, 'a terribly desolating and finally contradictory concept'. [ibid] 
 
  That dialogue, Cragg felt later, 'concluded alas, in opacity', because the 
Muslim participants insisted on understanding the 'responsibility' of God in relation to 
our misdeeds in terms of the determining of our choice and therefore guilt.  God, it 
seemed to them, was being blamed for wrong-doing which should be laid squarely at 
the door of man.  They heard Cragg as advocating a human irresponsibility for wrong. 
 Cragg, however, meant it in the sense of 'undertaking  responsibility for the situation 
thus ensuing, as a shepherd does the lostness of the sheep.' [KC 82:9]  In Cragg's 
understanding God's act of creation involves him in the obligation to retrieve the 
mistakes and fallenness of those created, in a word with 'redemption'.  For Islam, it 
seems, this compromises the greatness of God, who cannot be under any obligation to 
man.  In denying such 'unobligatedness' Cragg is drawn to formulate the most insistent 
of all his aphorisms concerning the relationship of Christianity and Islam, namely that 
the question about God's greatness is 'not whether but how'. [ibid 10]  How is God 
great?  And what is the appropriate image of his greatness?  Is it that of the King, the 
Judge, the Teacher or the Shepherd?  How can both Christian and Muslim 'let God be 
God'?  - to employ the quotation from Martin Luther which Cragg has almost made 
his own. [eg KC 1965 Counsels 193] 
 
  On the question of 'obligated deity' it seems clear that Cragg's Muslim 
opponents, even if they did not take his point, were at least faithful to historic Muslim 
thought.  Early in the Ihya Ghazali sets out a kind of extended creed, part of which 
runs: 
(God) recompenses His believing servants for obedience by the command of His 
generosity and His promise, not for their deserving and because He is obliged to do 
so, for not a single act is incumbent upon Him and any injustice is inconceivable on 
His part.  No one has any right which imposes an obligation upon Allah. [Sweetman 
1967:II:2:24, quoting I:2:2] 
  
 
  
  Later in the same passage Ghazali denies the Mu'tazilite claim that 'it is 
incumbent upon God to do whatever is salutary for men'.  Men, he says, are subject to 
questions, but there is nobody to question God. [Ghazali 1971:140]  In fact in later 
classical Muslim thought there appears to be a denial that the fact of creation has any 
special significance in indicating some truth about God, so opposing the very basis of 
Cragg's argument.  The so-called Fiqh Akbar of al-Shafi'i declares in its article 20 that 
'Allah was free to create the world as well as not to create it. Allah has not created the 
world either with a view to what is salutary to man, or on any other ground; but He 
knew from eternity that He would create.  Allah is free to make the whole world 
vanish and to make it return.' [Wensinck 1932:266f]  Is Cragg then leaning to a 
modern version of the Mu'tazilite position, rationalising a claim upon God concerning 
what is 'salutary', ie. concerning salvation, which orthodox Islam cannot allow?  But 
historic Mu'tazilite thought took a different turn, based on a concept of God's justice 
which envisaged him as being obliged to reward faithful servants: 
His actions towards all men are determined by what is most salutary for them from the 
religious point of view, and by what is best fitted to lead them into the ordered path; 
nor will He withhold from them anything which He knows they need for the 
performance of what is ordered and so help them towards the due rewards of 
obedience. [ibid 82] 
 
  So on this evidence Cragg's idea of divine responsibility is supported 
neither by the Mu'tazilites, because where salvation was concerned they conceived 
divine justice as a necessary response to human deserving, nor by the Ash'arite 
orthodox who rejected any such necessity of God and refused to consider anything 
incumbent upon him, declaring that 'He is free to impose suffering on innocent 
children and animals, without indemnifying them'. [ibid 267]  Modern Muslim writers 
too maintain God's total freedom from any obligation.  'Abduh wrote: 'It is not that 
anything good for the universe is incumbent on Him to take account of because, if He 
does not do so, He will incur criticism... God is indeed exalted far above all that.' [KC 
1966 Unity 50] 
 
  Cragg's response is that this means man 'forbidding things' to God. [KC 
17:198] It seems however from the way that Muslim writers frame their objections to 
an 'obligated deity' that they have in mind principally the supposition of an external 
necessity operating upon God.  'Abduh makes this quite clear when he says: 'To speak 
of duty resting upon God suggests obligation and constraint.  Or in another phrase it 
may suggest duress and susceptibility to pressure.' [KC 1966 Unity 61]    Though 
'Abduh also says that 'The intelligent mind... would emphatically never entertain the 
idea that any of His deeds were essentially necessary to His nature', so that an inner 
constraint may be denied as well. [ibid 57]  In the introduction to his translation of 
'Abduh's Risalat al-Tauhid Cragg acknowledges that in this ''Abduh shows himself in 
line with a fundamentally Islamic instinct' [ibid 19], but complains that this lack of 'an 
imperative within Him' (God), makes it impossible to depend upon a consistency 
between the Divine knowledge and the Divine will.  The Divine nature, Cragg thinks, 
is 'properly under the "ought" which is its own', subject to a constraint which is not 
external but springs out of its inner character.  He feels that the acceptance of this 
understanding of God 'opens the door to a far more secure and authentic practice of 
prayer and adoration', as well as revolutionising the understanding of revelation. [ibid 
20]  This claim must be taken up in the context of Cragg's understanding of prayer and 
the Spirit. (chapter 3) 
  
 
  
E  CHRISTOLOGY 
 
  It remains at this point to outline the way in which Cragg's doctrine of 
God relates to his understanding of incarnation, atonement and salvation in Jesus.  His 
complaint about the Muslim understanding of Jesus is that 'whereas, in Christian 
thought, theology and Christology are mutually necessary and mutually definitive, in 
Islam theology is largely defined by the exclusion of Christology.' [KC 1985 Jesus 45] 
 It is difficult to know precisely what the latter statement means, unless Cragg is 
asserting that Muslim theology was formulated in conscious opposition to 
Christianity.  In spite of certain Muslim reactions to Christian thought this would be 
hard to substantiate in general.  For the first part of the statement we note simply that 
there have of course been many who called themselves Christians who would have 
found it difficult to agree that theology and Christology are mutually definitive.  The 
statement is perhaps best seen as an example of the Christocentric character of Cragg's 
thought.  Not that he gives any impression of being unduly defensive about traditional 
Christian dogma concerning the person of Jesus.  For Cragg 
there is a certain sense in which the issues of the Sonship of Jesus and the Trinitarian 
understanding of the divine Unity will take care of themselves, if we truly reckon with 
what it is we mean when we say: 'God is, God reigns, God loves'.  For it is out of that 
conviction, believed to be known in history and experience, that the doctrinal 
formulations derive. [KC 82:3] 
 
  Is Cragg unduly Christocentric?  It is true that his major theological 
statement about the Christian theology of religion, The Christian and Other Religion 
(1977), is sub-titled The Measure of Christ, and that this was in Cragg's view the true 
title of the book, the other being used only for 'publishing considerations'.  But closer 
examination shows that the phrase refers to Christ as the 'measure' or 'criterion' of 
God, the Christian's 'point of departure.' [KC 1977 Other xiii]  It would be rash to 
propose that Cragg pays inadequate attention to the first person of the Trinity.  As we 
have seen, for Cragg man is only truly himself when he is rightly related to God.  The 
significance of Jesus for him lies precisely at this point.  'The personality of Jesus is 
the key to the human relatedness of God because it is that relatedness in action.' [KC 
127:2:4] 
 
  This significance of Jesus is first and foremost as the 'Christ of God', 
the divine answer to the human predicament, expressing the faithfulness of the 
Creator in his responsibility towards the created order which he, and he alone 
initiated, and which he, and he alone can redeem.   For the doctrine of creation 
requires a divine involvement with the human race which Cragg sees as in itself a 
kind of kenosis, a freely-willed self-limitation 'implicit in "letting man be" as the 
creature he is. with an obligation to be muslim to God - an obligation which, patently, 
he is free to refuse'. [KC 89:200f]  And when he does refuse it God undertakes a 
response which culminates in Jesus.  If in Jesus we see God it is because 'Jesus, in the 
flesh, accomplishes the eternal mind', so that 'what happened in Jesus takes God to 
explain.' [KC 1985 Jesus 292, 291]  'What Christology is saying is that the very idea 
of God involves the relationship to mankind which we can identify in Jesus as the 
Christ'. [ibid 198]  What is seen in Christ, and what makes him appropriately the 
'criterion' of God in a sense very close to what Muslims claim for the Qur'an as the 
furqan, is the power and effectiveness of the love that suffers, that goes to all the 
lengths necessary to retrieve man from his fateful state, and offers to him the new life 
  
 
  
in fellowship with God originally intended in his creation.  What God has done in 
Christ is therefore more than the sending down of a prophetic warning or the giving of 
detailed and reliable instructions as to how to live, which is the 'Gospel' of Islam.  It is 
the restoration of relationship with God, which means life itself. 
 
  This basic conviction about the necessary 'relatedness' of God to man 
and of man to his fellow-man has profound implications for dialogue and mission, to 
which we shall come later. (chapter 5)  It is  an 'economic' doctrine of God with which 
he works rather than an 'essential' one, reflecting a soteriological rather than an 
ontological concern.  All three Semitic faiths, he thinks, operate in the same way.  
Whether Exodus, Christ or Muhammad, 'the event arouses the recognition of faith and 
the faith recognises what the event really was.' [ibid 190]  Here he would claim to be 
in line with the development of Christian doctrine from experience to philosophic 
reflection, from event to dogma.  All true understanding, he implies, takes that path, 
and cannot circumvent it without becoming trapped in the conserving, defensive habit 
of mind which Cragg brands as the 'custodial mind'. (see chapter 4)  'If (doctrinal 
formulations) are commended and contested as formulae prior to the mediation of the 
experiential meaning, we not only invite, or incite, contention, but we abandon the 
apostolic sequence of discovery and conviction.' [KC 82:3]  Again we shall need to 
examine carefully this alleged priority of experience over dogma, but it is clear that 
what he intends is a dynamic interpretation of religion which takes the educational 
sequence of the growth of faith seriously, and is thus enabled to retain a fundamental 
sympathy with all religious expression while pulling no punches in criticism of the 
adequacy of particular religious life and language.   
 
  Cragg's starting-point with God as above all Creator has profound 
consequences.  It means of course that he can attempt to relate directly to Islam 
through the Qur'an with its vivid and consistent portrayal of the rabb al-'alamin, the 
'Lord of the worlds', who constantly sustains us in being.  He does not need to keep 
asking the question whether the God of Islam is the same God as the God of the Bible, 
since although the two definitions differ in important respects there is clearly enough 
overlap to be confident that the respective terms refer to the same being.  The 
predicates may differ but their subject is the same, which means that we can (and 
must, if we are loyal) differ about the nature of God, and how he should properly be 
described, while at the same time we know that it is the one God we are talking about. 
 If it were not we should have nothing to say to each other.  'We are together under 
Him and in Him, even when we are diverging about Him. [KC 1970 Alive 18]  It also 
means that he is not constricted by the problems of the ontological relationship of 
Christ to God, but, as we have seen, is free to explain how the necessity of the Christ 
springs out of the nature of God as first and foremost Creator. 
 
  The weakness of his approach is a somewhat cavalier attitude towards 
Muslim sensibilities over the transcendence of God, and their refusal to entertain his 
notion of God's 'liability', and engage in his version of the argument about theodicy.  
Though he acknowledges at several points that the problem of religious language 
affects all faiths, he does not always indicate that the force of his criticism, if granted, 
would apply to much Christian theology also.  Consequently he does not acknowledge 
the problem of which Christianity is under scrutiny.  Moreover, if his idea of 
divine-human reciprocity be found unconvincing, because of that same issue of 
transcendence, - and we have noted a number of Christian authors who might have 
  
 
  
problems with it - the whole basis of his theology would begin to look as though it 
had more to do with the psychology of human relationships than the fundamental 
nature of reality. 
 
  
 
  
 Chapter 3 
 
THEMES IN HIS WRITING: PRAYER, FAITH AND ORTHODOXY 
 
 
A  A GOD TO WORSHIP 
 
All faiths are the interrogation of life.  They are a protest against reality on behalf of 
reality.  Gods are vital hypotheses, horizons towards which people move.  As such 
they deserve reverence.  Even though their answers may not be ultimate, their 
questions may be authentic.  The more we think them lacking, the more important this 
sympathy becomes. [KC 125:5] 
 
  Cragg is writing in this passage for a widely circulated journal read by 
people of many faiths and varied educational attainment.  His language does not show 
the careful formulation of his more scholarly work, and he should not be held too 
closely to account for the 'reverence' suggested here for 'faiths' as such.  Nevertheless 
the quotation is significant as indicating an abiding attitude in him.  For Cragg does 
not share the antipathy towards 'religion' of many of his contemporaries, whether we 
think of agnostics and unbelievers or of some sophisticated theologians for whom 
Christianity spells the end of 'religion', because 'religion' can only be understood in 
terms of human attempts to manipulate God.  As the quotation shows Cragg 
understands religious faith as a long-term endeavour in prayer and ritual and all the 
activities of religion to discover a right-relatedness to God.  It is therefore something 
deserving of a fundamental sympathy, whatever its imperfections.  It should be noted 
that he is equally appreciative of honest unbelief, believing that authentic protest 
against inadequate religion is all in the cause of better religion: 'All the articulate 
reasons for irreligion are essentially religious.' [KC 1977 Other xiii]  Again we hear 
the characteristic note of Cragg's desire to communicate with the other and be engaged 
in a dialogue with him.  And for him dialogue must be more than a courteous 
exchange of views which leaves the participants unchanged.  'Worthy religious 
thought lives in the purgatory of external criticism', he wrote in the introduction to his 
thesis. [KC 161:intro.5]  Our sternest critics, in other words, are our truest friends - a 
theme we shall have to return to in chapter 5.   
 
  His basic sympathy for the enterprise of religion and the questioning 
implied in it means an impatience with any easy assumption that man has grown out 
of the need for religion.  Of Bonhoeffer's 'religionless Christianity' he has written: 'no 
careful Christian perspective can ever make a virtue of secularity'. [KC 1977 Other 
14]  It is an illusion to suppose that man's alleged autonomy, his 'coming of age' is 
anything essentially new.  Our technological and other capacity is only on a new scale 
the gift that we have always held, and misused, from God.  The human problem has 
perennially consisted in the exercising of a proper trusteeship, expressed Biblically by 
the 'dominion' given to Adam over nature, and Quranically, at least as modern 
interpreters understand it, by the 'caliphate' of man, his 'standing in the place' of God.  
(see chapter 2.C) 
 
  At this point we need to ask how this basic sympathy of Cragg for the 
activities of religion is undergirded theologically, and whether his insights into 
religious meaning are sustained by a consistent set of theological principles.  It is fine 
  
 
  
to perceive in another religious tradition the spiritual vitality one covets for one's own, 
but is such perception the product of genuine insight or of some merely subjective and 
emotional condition, inwardly engendered?  Without a theological framework any 
modern approbation of Islam is no more soundly based than the polemical criticism of 
earlier centuries.  We require an examination of Cragg's theological understanding of 
the nature of religious faith and its varied expressions.  Not that faith as such is the 
fundamental category for Cragg that it is, for example, for Wilfred Cantwell Smith, as 
expounded in The Faith of Other Men (1962), The Meaning and End of Religion 
(1963) and other books.  Or perhaps it is that Cragg sees the essential character of 
faith as the search for a God who is worshippable in the hope that there is such a God 
to be found.  As he wrote in 1950: 'Christianity holds that a renewal of worship would 
be both the sign and the means of our salvation.  The civilized world can only be 
saved by worship.' [KC 161 pt2:99f]  The search may involve false trails and 
unsatisfactory stopping-places, but it is the animating spirit of the search which 
matters.  Even those who appear not to be involved in the search may contribute to it 
if they are urgently concerned to point out the wrong turnings.  We have seen the 
positive value Cragg places on theological controversy (chapter 1.B), and of 'thought 
that perishes usefully.' [a quotation from Ruskin - KC 161 pt2:15] 
 
  If the search for a God who may be worshipped is central to Cragg's 
thinking, so that man and God may relate to one another, then it is that aspect of God 
which enables man to worship which is the heart of faith.  The names of God are not 
primarily for formulating propositions but for calling upon him.  'The Names are far 
from being mere attributes to be listed in a theology: they are awesome realities of 
daily life.' [KC 1986 Call 35]  Theological issues may not even be felt, as in 
Muhammad's case, in a mind 'fully possessed with its single mission.' [ibid 39]  The 
Qur'an says (51:56 - Yusuf Ali) - 'I have only created jinns and men that they may 
serve me', where the Arabic word 'abada can be translated either 'serve' or (as in 
Pickthall) 'worship'.  It is worship which is central to Cragg's thinking as the heart of 
faith.  So it is best to begin an examination of Cragg's theology of religion with his 
doctrine of the Spirit as the animator within the human person and community of the 
response to God in faith.  We saw in the discussion of his doctrine of God that Cragg 
does not make any extended examination of the question of whether the God 
worshipped in Islam and the God worshipped in Christianity are identical.  'We 
worship the same Lord, in worships informed by significantly similar, as well as 
sharply discordant, theology'. [KC 1970 Alive 18]  Naturally he acknowledges 
profound differences in definition, and even in attitudes towards the possibility of 
definition, but on Islamic grounds he resists the use of the term 'Allah' in English 
translations from Arabic, because 'to do this is to privatize that which Islam, properly 
understood, must universally affirm.  It is precisely the reality of Allah in every human 
speech which the Qur'anic conviction of sovereignty declares.' [KC 1971 Event 78]  
He does not wish to imply that 'there is something about the divine in Islam which 
only Arabic can say'. [ibid]   What he does want to imply, it seems, is that a true (and 
truly Christian) understanding of God will include the Islamic while saying 
significantly more than Islam says. 
 
  The question is: what is the source of this universal speech about God? 
 And has Cragg answered Christian objections to the use of 'God' for Allah by 
referring primarily to Islamic principles?  He recognises the problem of literary and 
other associations clinging to a word when he refers to the 'sentimental' associations 
  
 
  
of the use in English of Allah, which 'have more to do with melodrama than theology.' 
[KC 1986 Call 30]  But some Muslims have objections of their own.  Pickthall wrote 
in his translation of the Qur'an that he had retained the word Allah instead of using the 
English God 'because there is no corresponding word in English.' [Pickthall on surah 
1.]   Nor has it always been so obvious to other Christians that the Islamic usage 
summarized in Allah can be 'included' in the wider term God.  Would the 
Dutch-American missionary Zwemer have agreed whole-heartedly with Cragg? 
What is the result of our investigation of the Moslem idea of God?... In as far as 
Moslems are monotheists and in as far as Allah has many of the attributes of Jehovah 
we cannot put Him with the false gods.  But neither can there be any doubt that 
Mohammed's conception of God is inadequate, incomplete, barren and grievously 
distorted. [Zwemer 1905:107] 
 
  We have seen that Cragg would share some at least of Zwemer's 
criticisms, though he expresses them differently.  But his answer to Zwemer's 
assertion that 'Islam is anti-Christian' [ibid 120] would be in terms of the Holy Spirit, 
and of hope.  'To let oneself despair that Islam is "deist"... would also be to despair of 
the Holy Spirit, who does not fail until he bring "crisis" through to "truth" (Isaiah 
42:3).' [KC 92:166]  Here are several clues to Cragg's theological principles in this 
area.  Here is also another example of that confidence of which Shehadi complained 
in another context that it expressed conviction that a problem could be solved without 
suggesting how that might be done. [see ch. 2]  What does it mean to appeal to the 
Holy Spirit in this way?  Is Cragg using the Spirit as a kind of theological deus ex 
machina, the solution to all problems?  Cragg might take his authority here from the 
Qur'an, in the words attributed to Jacob: 'Do not despair of the Spirit of God.  It is 
only those who give the lie to him who despair of the Spirit of God' - 12:87.  
However, Cragg's translation of this verse [KC 1970 Alive 142] is supported only by 
Pickthall.  Other translators significantly do not read ruh at all but rauh and translate 
'Soothing Mercy' or 'Comfort' instead of 'Spirit'.[Yusuf Ali, Arberry and Dawood]  But 
for Cragg the key to the question of the variant Islamic and Christian doctrines of God 
is to be found in the Holy Spirit, and hence, one presumes, his choice of text here. 
 
  His particular emphasis is that the activity of the Holy Spirit is still in 
process.  Cragg urges a dynamic and not simply a static approach to doctrine.  It is all 
very well and necessary to compare the Muslim understanding of God with that 
emanating from the New Testament experience of Christ, but if the matter is left there 
a whole and vital dimension of the issue may be missed, namely that that very New 
Testament experience points to a process which should still be continuing, and which 
is inherently universal in its scope.  To the question of what 'faith we may have in the 
activity of the Holy Spirit beyond the Scriptures and the Church', Cragg answers 
plainly that 
The ways of the Spirit cannot be exclusive of the life and mystery of other faiths 
unless we are to surrender a Christ for the world.  It is precisely the partiality of all 
human witness that necessitates the universal witness of the Spirit and necessitates, 
too, the genuine partnership between them...  (Otherwise) the Holy Spirit, far from 
'proceeding', is, in brutal language, either redundant or unemployed.  So then, the very 
finality of the Gospel of Christ argues the unceasing and unfailing Spirit of God 
everywhere at work.' [KC 1977 Other 104, 106] 
To suppose otherwise and to despair of mutual understanding between Muslim and 
Christian on the matter of God, his nature and call, is an 'isolationism of the Spirit' 
  
 
  
[KC 1959 Sandals 20], a refusal to acknowledge the continuing activity of the Spirit 
except within one's own narrow confessional experience. 
 
  Cragg speaks with complete freedom of the activity of the Spirit in 
other faiths, and in reference to Ghazali declares that 'there are other masters of the 
Spirit in the two faiths, who belong in part together, in inward significance if not in 
outward community'. [KC 1959 Sandals 79]  Elsewhere, thinking perhaps of Exodus 
31:3, he speaks of 'the craftsmen of the Spirit in every people', where the context is 
clearly broader than a multi-cultural Christianity. [KC 1968 World 200]  What is 
implied in Cragg's use of the term 'spirit' here, and has he, as it appears, gone well 
beyond the rather tentative usage about the Spirit which is characteristic of his 
theological heritage?  For in the context of other faiths the characteristic references to 
the Spirit of those who share his background are generally limited to the work of the 
Spirit in bringing about a personal awareness of the significance of Christ, often in 
terms of the words of Jesus in John 16:14 - 'He (The Spirit) will glorify me, for 
everything that he makes known to you he will draw from what is mine'.  Anglican 
Evangelicals would generally prefer to say with Newbigin that 'The work of the Spirit 
is the confession of Christ'. [Newbigin 1978: 211]  There is a particular reluctance to 
credit the structures of a faith with positive spiritual value.  Norman Anderson, 
writing of 'more than one Muslim whose study of the Qur'an made him seek after 
Christ' feels that 'we must ascribe this to the Spirit of God meeting him in his need, 
rather than attribute it to the Qur'an as such.' [Anderson 1984:173, emphasis added]  
Cragg, one feels, would ask 'But why not attribute it to the Qur'an?', regarding this as 
an 'isolating' and unwarranted caution about the proceeding of the Spirit even through 
the Qur'an.  His whole thinking about the 'inward significance' which inheres 
throughout a faith indicates that he would regard such caution as misplaced.  
Reflecting recently on the emergence of Sufism within Islam Cragg has written: 
The historian or observer from without may finally believe himself pondering the 
ways of the Holy Spirit in the fertility of Islam within itself, its capacity to produce 
from within its own resources the antidote by which its own characteristic ethos could 
be queried and even transformed. [KC 103:185f] 
 
  Almost all Cragg's books strike some such note, but his Alive to God. 
Muslim and Christian Prayer (1970) is especially important in this respect.  To bring 
together Islamic and Christian texts, both scriptural and other, with the intention that 
they be prayed in common by members of both faiths, is to affirm one's faith in the 
Spirit of the One God in very concrete terms.  The book frequently illustrates his 
conviction that God does indeed speak through the institutions of Islam and in the 
Qur'an in particular.  A striking example is his quotation from surah 90, beginning 
'Would that you knew what the steep is!  It is the freeing of the slave, Or giving food 
in the hungry day To an orphan near of kin...'  The next entry in the anthology is one 
of Cragg's own compositions, and it has clearly been written in response to the 
previous passage, for it begins: 'In part we know it, Lord, The hard road of 
compassion, The strenuous demands of mercy, The steep ascent of heaven.' [KC 1970 
Alive 121]  There are similar responses in the anthology to the 'Doubters' of surah 
41:54 and the 'locks upon your hearts' of 47:27. [ibid 131,137] (Cragg confirms that 
unattributed passages are his own composition in ibid 52.)  Here Cragg answers the 
Lord whom he has heard speaking to him from out of the Qur'an, and the Qur'an 
becomes for him a book charged with God's meaning.  He speaks without 
qualification of the 'deep relevance of the Qur'an to contemporary man', [KC 1971 
  
 
  
Event 16] and suggests more tentatively that it 'has interrogatives that reach beyond 
the boundaries of institutional Islam and these are lively enough to create a 
community at least of study, if not of spirit.' [KC 1973 Mind 16] 
 
  Anderson justifies his reluctance to attribute any revelation of Christ to 
the Qur'an itself by quoting with approval the saying of Wilfred Cantwell Smith that 
'If there is any truth in the Buddhist tradition, then its truth is not "in Buddhism", it is 
in the nature of things.' [Anderson 1984:173]  Cragg would accept Cantwell Smith's 
insistence on using the word 'religion' in the singular and not the plural, as the 
frequently misquoted title of his The Christian and Other Religion confirms.  He 
would surely agree that it is in 'the nature of things' that God can be discovered, since 
he is responsible for all of them.  He quotes Richard Crashaw on religion in the 
singular with enthusiasm:  'No law controls Our traffic free for heaven'.[KC 1973 
Mind 16]  In any case he reckons that  
It is a dubious and perhaps, in the end, a barren proceeding to enquire how far 
developments in a religion are from within its own resources and genius or how far 
they come about by external influence.  What is truly original to a faith and what 
transpires from alien sources do not admit of being identified decisively. [KC 
103:179] 
But he finds Cantwell Smith's further dictum that 'there are Hindus but no Hinduism' 
too sharp, 'since one has presumably to identify Hindus by their Hinduism'.  He might 
have said that Muslims are self-described participators in Islam.  'The "-ism" has its 
claim on our concern'. [KC 1977 Other xiif]  The institutional cannot be so lightly 
dismissed, and Cantwell Smith himself is compelled to reinstate it with his use of the 
term 'cumulative traditions' to replace the disapproved plural term 'religions'.  There is 
in consequence a 'mission to Islam', as we shall see later, and not merely to Muslims, 
[KC 92:165] and such a thing is possible because the Spirit works with the 'inward 
significance' of a faith and not merely with the individual lives of its practitioners.  It 
is clear that for many Protestants, however, no human institution or cultural form can 
be credited with such positive value. [cf Niebuhr 1952:ch 2 'Christ Against Culture']  
The inward significance or deeper intention of a faith is opaque to them, perhaps 
because they pay less attention to the doctrine of creation, which would affirm all 
reaching out to God as a response to him, than to the theology of redemption which 
invariably emphasizes God's one great provision for salvation. 
  
 
  
B  THE SPIRIT IN ISLAM 
 
  It will be best to return to the wider dimension Cragg gives to the work 
of the Spirit in the context of his understanding of credal orthodoxy, and to ask 
meanwhile whether his usage can in any way be paralleled among Muslims?  Is it 
possible, for example, that Cragg has been influenced by Muslim thought at this 
point?  Alternatively, is he using language about Islam which Muslims themselves 
would find it impossible to acknowledge as Islamically appropriate?  We need to 
know whether the common operation of the Spirit which Cragg assumes is also 
predicated by Muslims.  Muslim usage of the term ruh (spirit) is complex and varied, 
and as with Biblical terminology tends to shift unpredictably from being part of a 
discourse about anthropology, the nature of human beings, to being part of talk about 
God.  The Hanbali theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziya, for example, in extensive 
discussions of the circumstances of the soul after death seems to employ the term ruh 
interchangeably with nafs (= 'soul' in the sense of 'person', 'living creature').  But a 
modern Muslim scholar can be cited who writes that 'the two terms nafs and ruh are 
quite different and one cannot be substituted for the other.  The word "yatawaffa" (in 
S 39:42) which means "causes to die" is ascribed to nafs, not to ruh.  Ruh, being a 
glimpse of God's spirit, never dies; it is immortal.' [Ahmad Subhi in Smith & Haddad 
1981:202 n42]  The Qur'an never uses the plural form arwah (spirits), but rather 
mala'ika (angels), or (in a reflexive sense) anfus, the plural of nafs, and so ruh in the 
Qur'an cannot be understood as meaning the human soul. [ibid 17, 18, 202 n 43]  But 
what then does it mean? 
 
  In a detailed analysis of the Qur'anic incidence of ruh which takes 
particular note of the chronological development in its use, O'Shaughnessy found that 
its earliest sense denoted a 'created personal being, either a superior angel or a 
member of a species above the angels'. [O'Shaughnessy 1953:23, citing 78:38, 97:4 & 
70:4]  Passages reckoned to have been revealed later seem to indicate a return to the 
basic meaning of the stem R-W-H in the sense of an impersonal breath from Allah, 
who supplies the breath of life to all living beings. [ibid 25, citing 15:29, 38:72, 21:91, 
32:9, 66:12]  After these come a puzzling set of verses linking ruh with the term 
amr=command, or affair, as in 17:85: 'They ask thee concerning the Spirit (of 
inspiration).  Say: "The Spirit (cometh) by command of my Lord: of knowledge it is 
only a little that is communicated to you, (O men!)'  The bracketed words in this 
translation by Yusuf Ali show more clearly than usual his attempt to interpret the 
Arabic text.  O'Shaughnessy renders the same passage: 'They ask thee about the spirit; 
say: The spirit is from the amr of my Lord'. [ibid 33]  Pickthall's version is: 'the Spirit 
is by command of my Lord', and Gairdner's: 'The Spirit pertains to my Lord's 
Word-of-Command'. [Gairdner 1924:22]  There are other passages linking the Spirit 
and amr in 16:2, 40:15, 42:52]  The latest of the Qur'anic verses use the term the 
'Spirit of Holiness' (bi ruhi'l-qudusi) in association especially with Jesus. (In 2:87,253, 
5:113 & 16:102) 
 
  Commentators later identified the spirit who appeared to Mary 'in the 
form of a human being, shapely' as Gabriel (19:17), and he became associated also 
with the sending-down of revelation to Muhammad on the basis of 2:97 ('Whoever is 
an enemy to Gabriel - for he brings down the revelation to thy heart...' - cf 26:193)  
SH Nasr refers to 'the archangel Gabriel, whose function in Islam is in many ways like 
that of the Holy Ghost in Christianity.' [Nasr 1975:42]   Gairdner rejects this 
  
 
  
comparison, complaining of the 'arid tameness' of the commentators with their 
'stereotyped identification' of the mysterious figure of 81:19-23 with the Angel 
Gabriel. [Gairdner 1924:20]  Nevertheless it is clear that most Muslims understand the 
Spirit in the Qur'an to have a decidedly prophetic function, associated with the 
expression of God's revelation, although it is difficult to characterise it further.   
 
  In the post-Qur'anic period the use of ruh developed more variation 
still, but generally Muslim thought regarded the Spirit of God as contingent upon God, 
and not as deity itself, or in Christian terminology 'consubstantial' with God.  Though 
the distinction cannot be made in Arabic, the Spirit in Muslim understanding would 
be 'it', and not 'he'.  There was however a measure of uncertainty as to how to speak of 
the Spirit.  Ibn Hanbal is recorded as saying that 'Whoever says that al-Ruh is created 
(makhluq) is a heretic: whoever says that it is eternal (qadim) is an infidel.' 
[Gairdner1924:40]  Gairdner says that Ibn Hanbal made similar remarks about the 
sifat (attributes), the Kalam Allah (speech of God) and the Qur'an, which could 
suggest that ruh should be thought of as an attribute of God.  But Ash'arite orthodoxy 
does not number it among the seven 'essential' attributes of knowledge, power, will, 
life, speech, hearing and seeing, no doubt because its Quranic use was very different. 
[Watt 1973:287]  Nor is it commonly spoken of as an 'active' attribute of God.  But it 
is exceptionally difficult to find consistency in this area.  Ibn Hanbal was known to 
declare the doctrines that the Qur'an was created and that it was uncreated as both 
equally heretical, presumably by way of saying that such speculation was unwarranted 
and unprofitable. [Fakhry 1983:63 cf Schacht 1971:6, Allard 1965:104]   
 
  It is the Quranic obscurity - Macdonald calls it a 'suggestive obscurity' 
[Macdonald 1932:30] - about the doctrine of the Spirit that brings about these very 
varied estimates among Muslim thinkers of its real character.  The text 17:85 in 
particular 'exercised by far the greatest influence' in preventing speculation about it. 
[ibid]  Ibn Khaldun used it to justify his 'distrust of metaphysical speculation'. [Ibn 
Khaldun 1958:I:79 cf III:36]  Iqbal thought it referred to the soul. [Iqbal 1971:102f]  
At times the Qur'an appears to some readers to place the Spirit in a most exalted 
position, as in the verse which speaks of a special Day in which 'The angels and the 
Spirit ascend unto Him' (70:4, cf 78:38, 97:4)  Ghazali in particular speculated about 
the Spirit on the basis on such verses to the point where Gairdner concluded that in 
the Mishkat the Spirit 'figures, virtually, as an Arian Logos', and raises doubts about 
the author's monotheism. [Gairdner 1924:23]  In the Sufi tradition al-Hallaj and others 
had long since identified God's amr or word-of-command with his ruh.  Ghazali 
makes the further identification of ruh with al-muta', the One who is to be obeyed.  On 
the basis of 81:19-21 ('Verily this is the word of a most honourable Messenger, 
endued with Power, with rank before the Lord of the Throne, with authority (muta'in) 
there and faithful to his trust'), Ghazali, abandoning the usual identification of this 
Messenger with Gabriel, writes of a Being who is the highest of all possible beings 
next to Allah, related to Allah as 'the live coal to the Elemental Fire'. [Gairdner 
1924:21, 96]  One can see how such passages might well bring Ghazali's monotheism 
into question. 
 
  One whose monotheism is more often queried is Ibn 'Arabi, for whom 
'The Spirit... clearly denotes the living reality of God, His living consciousness'. [Ibn 
Arabi 1980:172]  Ibn 'Arabi writes that 
... the Reality is manifest in every created being and in every concept, while He is 
  
 
  
hidden from all understanding, except for one who holds that the Cosmos is His form 
and His identity.  This is the Name, the Manifest, while He is also unmanifested 
Spirit, the Unmanifest.  In this sense He is, in relation to the manifested forms of the 
Cosmos, the Spirit that determines those forms. [Ibid 73] 
On the basis of that passage alone it would seem that for Ibn 'Arabi the Spirit was 
God, the utterly Transcendant One.  'Attar seems to speak in similar vein of God as 
the ruh kulli, the Universal Spirit. [Macdonald 1932:41]  Yet here too consistency 
eludes us, for it is clear that even in Ibn 'Arabi the Spirit is not precisely the Eternal 
Reality in itself, nor the world of which it is the source but a tertium quid, contingent 
yet joined to the Eternal, and (like the Perfect Man) an intermediate creation, a 
barzakh or isthmus between necessary and contingent existence. [EI1, art. nafs 
(Calverley); Schimmel 1985:134]  In another passage Ibn 'Arabi says that the 
greatest union is that between man and woman, corresponding as it does to the turning 
of God toward the one He has created in His own image, to make him His vicegerent, 
so that He might behold Himself in him.  Accordingly He shaped him, balanced him, 
and breathed His spirit into him, which is His Breath, so that his outer aspect is 
creaturely, while his inner aspect is divine. [Ibn Arabi 1980:275] 
 
  The Spirit of God conveys to man his divine calling but it does not 
follow for most Muslim authors that the Spirit is itself divine.  Since only God is 
non-corporeal the Spirit must be a created being, however imprecisely defined.  The 
Muslim, therefore, cannot say with St John's Gospel that 'God is spirit, and those who 
worship him must worship in spirit and in truth.' (4:24)  God is not spirit.  This at least 
is plain Sunni orthodoxy, as taught, for example by the Hanbali Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziya in his Kitab al-Ruh. [Smith & Haddad 1981:202, n 43]  Sufis may have 
thought differently, but even Hujwiri reckoned that all Sufi doctrinal error could be 
traced to faulty thinking about the ruh.  'All the errors of these sectaries (the Hululis) 
are in regard to the spirit (ruh).'  'Belief in the eternity of the spirit is one of the grave 
errors which prevail among the vulgar.' [Hujwiri 1911:261, 266]  In his 
understanding, as in that of Ibn Qayyim, the ruh was corporeal but subtle (jism latif), 
originated (muhdath) and not eternal (qadim). [Macdonald 1932:41,153, cf Smith and 
Haddad 1981:20]  Al-Baghdadi (d. about 1037) says plainly that 'The life of Allah is 
without ruh and nourishment and all the arwah are created, in opposition to the 
Christian doctrine of the eternity of the Father, Son and Spirit.' [EI1 art nafs 
(Calverley)]  The reference to Christian doctrine marks Muslim recognition of the 
sharpness of the difference.  Hujwiri comments that it is the heretics 
who assert that the spirit is eternal (qadim), and worship it, and regard it as the sole 
agent and governor of things, and call it the uncreated spirit of God, and aver that it 
passes from one body to another.  No popular error has obtained such wide acceptance 
as this doctrine, which is held by the Christians, although they express it in terms that 
appear to conflict with it. [Hujwiri 1911:262f] 
 
  Ibn Mas'ud records that the text 17:85, which says that only a little 
knowledge of the Spirit has been given mankind, was revealed on the occasion of 
some Jews asking Muhammad about it.  Ibn 'Abbas reported that it was the Quraish 
who asked the Jews for a question to tax Muhammad with, and were told to ask about 
the Spirit. [von Denffer 1985: 101f cf Hujwiri 1911:261]  In a discussion of Islamic 
art SH Nasr boldly makes a virtue of this particular Muslim agnosticism by saying:  
In contrast to Christianity, where the manifestation of the Spirit is identified always 
with an affirmation and a positive form, Islamic art makes use of the 'negative' and the 
  
 
  
'void' itself in a spiritual and positive sense in the same way that metaphysically the 
first part of the shahada begins with a negation to affirm the vacuity of things vis-à-vis 
Allah. [Nasr 1975a:143] 
 
  The consequences of all this are momentous between Christianity and 
Islam.  For by this uncertainty over the place of the Spirit Islam is prevented from 
expressing the immanence of God in terms of ruh, with its association with the 
universal breath of life, and is confined to the inspiration granted to the prophets, 
where the Spirit generally becomes hypostasised in the works of the commentators as 
Gabriel.  Alternatively the Spirit tends to become a kind of Gnostic demiurge (literally 
'craftsman') or inferior creator deity, whose function, one might say, is to protect the 
utter transcendence of God, who must be beyond such concern with material affairs.   
We saw with the concept of khalifa an early tendency to confine its significance to the 
prophets or to Islamic rulers, rather than apply it to the human race in general.  
Similarly there seemed a common reluctance to credit the human race as a whole with 
being made in the image of God, and a preference to employ that tradition in the 
development of the idea of Muhammad as al-'insan al-kamil, the Perfect Man, called 
by some 'Muhammad... God's kindness (latif).  The mystery of the Adamic Creation, 
Light of Lights, Mystery of Mysteries, Spirit of Spirits.' [Padwick 1961:256]  
 
  So too with the Spirit, we observe no sense of a common possession of 
it among Muslim believers, such as John and Paul identify among Christian believers. 
 In this absence of an indwelling deity, prompting love and wisdom in the community, 
Islam has had two recourses, once the days of prophetic inspiration were past.  One is 
the provisions of the Shari'ah and the accumulated wisdom of the way to live, 
modelled on the example of the Prophet.  The other consists of the narrower channels 
of mystical union.  The mainstream of Islamic piety, particularly since Ghazali, has 
always tried to hold the two together.  In the mystical path with its more precarious 
hold on orthodoxy the choice has seemed to lie between the mysterious 'Arian Logos' 
figure of Ghazali, and the abyss of pantheism.  Moreover, the mystical tradition 
depends upon an esoteric discipline and gnosis unavailable to the ordinary Muslim, 
and access to the truly spiritual world tends to recede up the gradations of mystical 
prowess.  The Spirit was often equated in the Sufi schools with 'aql, or Intellect, or 
First Principle, and related to Quranic vocabulary through the Pen (qalam).  
Macdonald quotes the tradition: 'The first thing God created was al-'aql'. [Macdonald 
1909:230]  This was the language of ontology, but it carried the corollary that the 
mark of the spiritual person is 'aql or 'intellect'.  Now although 'aql may be closer to 
the Greek nous with its implication of religious sensitivity than to the English word 
'intellect', its use inevitably introduces a note of elitism.  Massignon attributes this to 
Qarmatian (early Ismaili and theosophist) influence, and says 'une psychologie 
ultra-intellectualiste depersonalise l'âme, reduit rouh (=sourah) à 'aql chez Tirmidhi et 
Tawhidi'. [Massignon 1922:60]  This elitism is traceable also in Ibn 'Arabi. [EI1 art. 
'Karmatians' (Massignon)]  Among moderns SH Nasr refers to 'the sword of the 
Intellect and the Spirit' [1975a:132]  Plainly intellect, however defined, is not equally 
distributed, whereas love, a primary mark of the Christian concept of the Holy Spirit, 
is in principle available to all. 
 
  In view of all this is it possible that Cragg's language about the Spirit's 
activity within Islam could be adopted by Muslims, or are we back again with the 
implication that his understanding of Islam is not one that Muslims themselves could 
  
 
  
own?  Although the orthodox denial of God as spirit seems very discouraging, there is 
that 'suggestive obscurity' about the Spirit in Islam which is exploited by the Sufis, 
and which might lend itself to Cragg's notion of the Spirit 'proceeding', if that be 
thought of in terms of a progressive laying bare of the inner meaning, the 'intention' of 
Islam.  This relates closely to the question of his understanding of the nature of 
religious language, to which we shall come in the next section.  But it does seem as 
though Muslims uninfluenced by Sufi thought would be puzzled by Cragg's theology 
of the Spirit.  On the one hand they associate the Spirit with the revelatory activity of 
God, particularly by means of Gabriel, of which none but a prophet can claim any 
direct knowledge.  Muhammad, as we have seen, is no ordinary man in Muslim 
understanding.  On the other hand the world of the arwah/spirits (plural), the 
unrevealed (ghaib) world, is a matter of intense interest to many Muslims. 
 
  Yet Cragg is not much concerned, as we noted before, with angels, nor 
with jinn, or shaytan whether one or many.  The significance of dreams (cf 39:42), the 
prevalence of the evil eye, the world of the spirits in their unmistakably plural form 
appear not to interest him, as they interested predecessors like Macdonald and 
Zwemer. [See Macdonald 1909: Zwemer 1939]  Cragg, as we have seen, is primarily 
interested in Islamic modernism, or rather in Muslim attempts to come to terms with 
that which has faced Western Christians since the Enlightenment.  That movement of 
thought notoriously dismisses all such talk of spirits, whether evil or good, as so much 
superstition.  The consequence in the western mind has been a general emptying of the 
Unseen World of all but God himself, and even his position has been eroded in many 
minds.  Cragg, it seems, shares the assumptions of this thought-world, but refuses the 
agnosticism in which it typically results.  For him the Spirit of God pervades the 
world, so that he can respond to the 'signs' in it of the divine glory, and rejoice in the 
abundant recognition in the Qur'an of 'the sacramental earth'. [KC 1973 Mind ch.9] 
  
 
  
C  THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGION 
 
  It is time to return to Cragg's understanding of the theology of religion, 
and to deal with this under two main headings: his understanding of the character of 
theological affirmations, and his conception of the relationship between Christianity 
and other faiths.  There are scattered through his writings innumerable references to 
the proper task of theological affirmation, almost all of them emphasizing the 
insecure, risky and adventurous character of theological statement.  Many of these are 
aphoristic asides in the context of urging the establishment of relationships and 
making efforts at communication: 
There is a real sense in which we find truer loyalty by taking larger risks.  Unrisking 
minds mean cautious trusts and so, in turn, diminished meanings.  The claims of 
communication ought always to be paramount, since ensuring the truth is properly a 
function of having it received, and this is the guiding loyalty in having ourselves 
'received it.' [KC 1968 World 74]  
Characteristically the language is highly compressed, and internally structured with 
great care ('having it received', 'having ourselves received it'), which does not serve to 
promote ease in the communication which Cragg continually commends.  But if his 
style is occasionally tortuous it is not so because of a restricted technical vocabulary 
and thought-form.  For often this urging that people should communicate what they 
believe to others outside the immediate community of faith is coupled with 
admonitions not to worry unduly about precise orthodox statement of their faith.  'It is 
more urgent to be alive to God than orthodox about Him.' [KC 1970 Alive 8]  
Searching for an appropriate example Cragg lights on Dag Hammarskjöld, whose 
Markings achieved some distinction as a spiritual journal to the surprise of those who 
had not known him articulate as a Christian: 
It is better that such implicit discipleship should ripen into explicit faith in God 
through Christ than that articulate conviction should wither into barren orthodoxy or 
conforming unconcern. [KC 1977 Other 117] 
Cragg searches for the words denoting movement and process rather than the words 
with associations of stability and fixity.   
While 'the cistern contains', as William Blake observed, 'the fountain overflows', and 
'to overflow' is very much the sense of the verb in John 15:26.  Theology has so often, 
to its loss, preferred the cistern. [ibid 105] 
 
  The reference to the Johannine passage about the Spirit is typical, for it 
is the Spirit in Cragg's theology who is the active agent of truth.   
The Holy Spirit is never a sleeping partner of sleeping partners, but always an active 
spur, enthusing, employing, never excluding, the mind and will of men, not purveying 
ready-made answers but enabling responsible decision. [ibid 80] 
This work of the Spirit is contrasted with what men so often settle for, the defensive 
posture of the 'custodian-mind'. [KC 1968 World 74]  For 
there are no automatic guarantees in the Holy Spirit, no established creeds, codes, 
churches, symbols, which avail and achieve just by dint of being there, of being right 
in form, of holding fast and keeping going. [KC 1977 Other 108] 
In contrast religious vocabulary has to be flexible enough to do the job demanded of 
it: 'We only rightly possess our terminology in the capacity to do without it'. [KC 
9:136f]  The style of writing is again characteristic, and the paradox neatly turned, but 
it prompts the question of how one may adequately 'do without' the normal means of 
doctrinal expression.  How will one recognise this 'right possession' of our 
  
 
  
terminology?  For Cragg the answer seems to lie in the search in Christianity as well 
as in Islam for the inner intention, the proper meaning of the doctrine to be 
commended: 
What then do we mean when we say that God is 'the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ', 
and that 'Jesus is the Son of God'?  What will be our adequately Christian and 
intelligibly Muslim paraphrase? [ibid 137] 
And how, it might be asked, will we know when we have it right?  And who is to be 
the judge of that? 
 
  It is hardly surprising that Cragg's method involves looking for the 
operational ('economic' or dispensational) categories rather than the ontological, 
absolute ones.  Cragg sees Gairdner as pointing the way here, by his willingness to 
replace conventional but misunderstood Christian vocabulary by terms expressing 
divine action on behalf of the sinful world...  It is in line with our present urgency to 
break free of 'substance' metaphors that set Christology/theology in the realm of 
abstract metaphysics, and bring it firmly into the concrete 'operation' of divine energy 
to save, fulfilled within the human. [KC 92:166] 
It is with this in mind that Cragg develops his argument about the divine obligation 
towards his creation, and moves, especially in Jesus and the Muslim into a 
sophisticated form of apologetics, as we saw in chapter 2.  But his dislike of 
ontological discussion and arguments about status - the status of Jesus as Son of God, 
the status of the Qur'an as the Word of God - has a special significance when it comes 
to considering the status of other faiths in Christian understanding.  For at this point it 
seems very much as though he is refusing to answer the question.  Here is a critical 
issue about evasiveness, and whether Cragg is right in regarding much Christian 
theological formulation on the subject as at best premature.  That others do not regard 
it as premature may be seen from the current spate of books on the subject, with 
British authors prominent among them. [eg Race 1983, Anderson 1984, Neill 1984, 
Cracknell 1986, D'Costa 1986]  An anthology of such writings, published in 1980, 
significantly excludes any contribution from Cragg. [Hick & Hebblethwaite 1980] 
 
  Cragg has in fact two books which deal explicitly and at length, rather 
than implicitly and in passing, with the Christian theology of religion.  The earlier is 
The Christian and Other Religion (1977), subtitled The Measure of Christ.  The 
unexpected singular 'Religion' in the title points to the major thrust of the book, and to 
his unremitting insistence throughout his writing that he intends to speak not about the 
Christian religion and other religions, but about the Christian person and religion 
wherever it may be found.  So the book takes as its theme the necessity for 
relationship with other faithful people rather than the dogmatic intention of setting out 
a conceptual model of relationship between Christian faith and other faiths.  In the 
chapter where he deals with this latter topic by reviewing the work of Christian 
thinkers from Kraemer to Hick he seems content to question each of the views 
expressed without in any obvious way setting out his own.  Some reviewers found this 
unsatisfactory, calling chapter five 'somewhat skimpy'. [Whaling 1978:499]  But 
Cragg in 1977 was clear that 'the task has still a long way to go... if concluded it can 
ever properly be... we must live with some bewilderment and maybe some 
aberrations.' [KC 1977 Other 81]  Theologians do not normally advertise their 
uncertainties and inconsistencies, but Cragg is unrepentant, for 
what finally matters is the relationships achieved in the actual, in the personal and the 
social, in the Spirit.  For, whatever theory may finally satisfy the theology, the 
  
 
  
fulfilment can only be in the life. [ibid 81, emphasis added] 
This is not a simple case of intellectual humility or self-restraint, or an attempt at a 
profound statement about the limitations of words,  In Cragg it is rather a deep 
conviction about the social dimension of truth, and therefore about the Christian 
Gospel.  'To be is to meet' [ibid 11], and therefore 
'meaning of...' can never be divorced from 'meaning for...'  Since meaning is a 
transaction with others, and not a commodity, as it were, in stock, relationship is 
inseparable from faith, and faith from relationship. [ibid 24, emphasis original] 
 
  Again the reader is struck by the determination to think in a dynamic 
rather than a static mode, as befits Cragg's emphasis on the Spirit who 'proceeds', and 
his conviction that it is religious experience which is prior and gives rise to dogma, 
and not the other way round.  Yet there is a definite 'given' in his thought that will 
make his reader pause.  Is there, in this 'relational' and 'transactional' language, 
sufficient weight given to the claims for objective truth, to what George Lindbeck 
calls the status of 'unsurpassability'? [Lindbeck 1984:esp 47-52]  Is Cragg saying that 
whatever language, or conviction, forwards the relationship is 'true' to the demands of 
the situation?  Cragg acknowledges the force of that interpretation while declining to 
accept it.  Referring to John Hick's thought he writes: 
... the Incarnation is true in the truth of the attitude it evokes in the believer.  Hick 
understands it as having no other truth.  If, to use his verb, we try to 'unpack' the 
doctrine of the Incarnation we find it takes us only to our experience of Jesus as, for 
us, 'the way, the truth and the life.'  Here are taxing problems. [KC 1977 Other 75] 
 
  Cragg's answer to them is principally couched in historical terms, 
where he challenges Hick's assertion that faith-communities lived in mutual ignorance 
of one another until recent times.  He points out the fact of Hindu/Buddhist, 
Jewish/Christian, and Christian/Muslim geographical proximity and with it 
antagonism, from earliest times.  But 'most important of all', he claims, is the fact that 
Christians depend for their living faith on the logical priority of Jesus' life as historic 
actuality.  Only on that premiss can the Christian proceed to live out his image of 
God.  But Cragg's thought is tantalisingly compressed here.  If the premiss is the mere 
fact of Jesus having lived, that is important but hardly ground enough for becoming 
the basis of modern faithful existence.  It is the significance attached to the character 
of Jesus' life that matters, and here Hick would claim that the doctrine of the 
Incarnation is a much later interpretation of Jesus' life which is not warranted by the 
claims which we have reason to be sure he made about himself. [Hick 1980:66f]  
Cragg nowhere directly tackles this crux of New Testament interpretation, though it 
was well-known long before he wrote The Christian and Other Religion.  His attitude 
to Biblical criticism seems to be to ignore its alleged results while defending its 
legitimacy as method. [cf Edmonds 1982:188]  
 
  On the other hand he is certainly no fundamentalist, as we shall see 
more clearly in chapter 6.  He does not insist on people taking the Christian scriptures 
as their starting-point but recommends a view of 'man as the existential subject of all 
religious meaning', because 'the earth is our common space ship and... the single 
territory of our humanness.' [KC 1977 Other xiii]  His preferred image for religion is 
the hunger experienced by an audience in front of an empty stage, waiting for the play 
to begin and longing that it may meet their hope and yearning for meaning.  For him 
the action which does so is the history of Israel, culminating in the coming of Israel's 
  
 
  
Messiah.  In that total story is a 'theatre for the world'. [ibid 63]  The artistic metaphor 
is apt for the historical drama at the heart of Christianity, and also as an expression of 
the need for internal consistency within each faith. 
What matters is that the point of departure fulfils itself in where it leads.  To end 
authentically is to vindicate one's beginning, and this is what the Christian claims of 
his Old Testament indebtedness. [ibid 51] 
 
  But the corollary is that 'the play's the thing', and one cannot ask, or 
answer, the question 'why this play rather than that?'.  'A particular beginning', as 
Cragg rightly says, 'is inescapable in any religion, as in any philosophy.  One cannot 
start presuppositionless.' [ibid]  At the same time there is no way in which one can 
justify starting-points, or they would of course cease to be starting-points. [cf 
Newbigin 1969:15f, 62f & 1978:190]  One has to know one's starting-point, and begin 
from there, for 'there is no prophecy, honoured or otherwise, without a country of the 
mind.' [KC 1971 Event 19]  What is more there is no possibility of offering a 
hospitality of heart and mind to those of other faiths if one has no home of faith from 
which to offer it. [KC 1968 World 76]   
 
  It is this firm loyalty to the 'home' of Christian faith which is most 
evident in the later of the two books Cragg has published about the Christian theology 
of religion, The Christ and the Faiths. Theology in Cross-Reference (1986).  This 
book carries many of the familiar accents of the previous work about the priority of 
forming relationships over formulating concepts.  'Pluralism does not primarily 
require of our theology hypotheses about its being so.  It awaits a Christian fidelity of 
mind and will in the relationships it entails and offers.' [KC 1986 Christ 10]  But there 
is a new emphasis on the proper Christian 'custody' of the faith which is all the more 
significant when set against the much more negative associations of that custodial 
metaphor in previous writing, which we examine in chapter 4.A. 
The Christ-faith has shaped for its credential to all others a custodial community, a 
house and home from which to pursue the hospitality of God in the homelessness of 
the world. [ibid 343] 
Cragg is clear that Christians cannot contribute anything to dialogue, or properly 
encounter other faiths if they have forgotten, or neglected, the upkeep of their own 
spiritual home, from which loyalty and identity take their meaning and therefore 
encounter becomes possible.  'There is neither point nor loyalty in encounter with 
pluralism if "the salt has lost its savour".  The summons is not met if we forfeit what 
is heeding it.' [ibid 20]  This goes side by side with a plain acknowledgement that the 
ultimate assumptions by which religious communities operate are not open for 
negotiation. [ibid 318]  They are 'given' and carry their own authority, which cannot 
then be subsumed under some other heading.  In any case there is no agreed frame of 
reference. [ibid 338] 
 
  Cragg does not refer to the 'theocentrism', espoused by John Hick and 
some others, whereby it is recommended that the focus of faith should shift in the 
Christian case from the person of Christ to the centrality of the God whom Christ 
confessed. [Hick 1973, 1980]  But it is evident that his whole emphasis on the 
ultimate non-negotiable 'givens' of faith operates against the 'theocentric' proposal.  It 
is certainly theology which is important to him. 
The gospel through and through is about God.  But it is about God in dimensions and 
via indices which are nowhere else reached or read as they are in Jesus as the Christ 
  
 
  
and the Christ as crucified for love of man. [KC 1986 Christ 323] 
Though Cragg rejects the term 'unique' for Christ as hostile in tone, and wants to 
cherish 'overlaps' with other faiths [ibid], there is still a 'nowhere else' about God in 
Christ.  Moreover theism cannot serve as an overarching category, for Buddhism, no 
less than humanism, fails to embrace it. [ibid 253f]   
 
  What Cragg seems to be saying is that there is no theological umbrella 
which can be opened to shelter all the faiths of the world under one scheme of 
thought.  We have to learn to live with religious pluralism in faithfulness to the 
ultimates we have inherited, without relativizing them, and in faithfulness to one 
another, without ignoring or excluding each other.  'Hospitality' is the key metaphor, 
and the Spirit the theological door.  This stance seems unambiguous, but it carries its 
problems with it, as Cragg recognises.  What is the quality and what are the conditions 
of such 'hospitality', which Cragg describes in one place as 'surely the closest of all 
analogies to the meaning of the Gospel'? [KC 1968 World 71]  We come in chapter 5 
to a detailed answer in terms of Cragg's approach to Islam, but in this more general 
inquiry we note his continual stress on loyalty to Christ and openness to others.  We 
are not to possess exclusively, but we are to affirm loyally.  [ibid 76]  When pressed 
for an answer to the 'mystery and burden of the plurality of religions' Cragg has, it 
seems, only two kinds of response, - one in terms of the attitude of the Christian 
believer, and one in terms of the work of the Holy Spirit.  Theologies, in the sense of 
conceptual models of relationship, are not so much redundant as premature [cf 
Bijlefeld's thesis in Carman 1960:40f]: 
Perhaps in the end our situation calls for a capacity to hold together the finality of 
loyalty to Christ and the will to 'concede' the other faiths, without asking for an 
answer how...  We may seem to be concluding that the right theology of pluralism is 
the lack of one.  Hardly so.  What we are saying is that we shall only find it in 
'proceeding' - the very word theology uses of the Holy Spirit. [ibid 83,84  cf KC 1977 
Other 105] 
In the mystery and the burden of the plurality of religions there lies, surely, the 
supreme test of the meaning we intend when we say, 'I believe in the Holy Spirit'. [KC 
1968 World 71] 
 
  The insistent question is of course how one may recognise this 
proceeding of the Spirit, or whether it is simply a catchall term for what, for 
undeclared or even unexamined reasons, elicits one's approval.  Cragg's answer 
emphasises in equal measure the activity and the suffering humility of the Spirit.  God 
is a God who acts unceasingly as the Creator God, and the Spirit accordingly 
is never a sleeping partner of sleeping partners, but always an active spur, enthusing, 
employing, never excluding, the mind and will of men, not purveying ready-made 
answers but enabling responsible decision. [KC 1977 Other 80] 
This is expressed particularly in the 'creative trusteeship' which men are meant to hold 
of the Christian scriptures [KC 1968 World 56], and Cragg spends considerable effort 
in demonstrating how that same principle was at work in the creation of the New 
Testament itself. [ibid ch. 2 - New Testament Universality: Precedents and Open 
Questions]  Christian faith holds indeed to a 'divine "indicative" warranting us to say 
that God is love' [KC 1985 Jesus 192], but this is not intended to mean that we can 
simply state it like a theorem. [KC 1977 Other 84]  Christian language, as Lindbeck 
says, is 'part and parcel of a wider conformity of the self to God', and in consequence  
is 'performative', and states, or denies, itself in action.  For Lindbeck, religious 
  
 
  
utterance 'acquires' propositional truth through the performance which gives it 
credibility.  This saves it from being merely 'intrasystematically' true, ie. true only 
within a given context, true in the sense that Hamlet is Prince of Denmark, but not in 
any sense which could be called absolute or ontological. [Lindbeck 1984:65f] 
 
  Cragg, however, does not lead us into these philosophical realms, but 
prefers to remind us that in the Christian understanding divine self-emptying is the 
continual activity of God 'from the foundation of the world'. [KC 1977 Other 119, cf 
1959 Sandals 87]  It is the 'kenosis of the Spirit', in his favourite phrase from 
Wheeler-Robinson, which calls upon us to recreate in our own time and in our own 
idiom the meaning of the Incarnation, and to encourage others to find their own way 
through the deeper implications of their inherited faiths to the same understanding.  
This way of understanding the activity of the Holy Spirit both ensures a full and eager 
participation of Christians with others in the business of exploring religious faith, and 
also guards Christians against any temptation to arrogance at being in possession of 
truth others have not grasped.  For the Christian story is one which is 'only safe in the 
custody of those for whom every antagonism is an opportunity.  For that, precisely, is 
the heart of the story itself.' [KC 1986 Call 164]  'No one can be in true trusteeship of 
the good news of Bethlehem and serve his trust with arrogance.' [KC 1959 Sandals 
86]  Yet the contrary is so often in evidence, and 'it is not seldom that faith erects a 
dogma where it would better hold a confidence', and religious belief becomes 
fossilized instead of vibrant and creative. [KC 1971 Event 21]  Alternatively, as with 
Judaism, or so Cragg alleges, there comes to be a 'kind of imperialism of the Spirit' 
which insists on the joining of the right party before access to truth can be guaranteed. 
[KC 1968 World 33, cf 1959 Sandals 142]   
 
  We take up this theme again in another context, that of Cragg's 
understanding of the respective natures of truth and power. [see chapter 4]  For the 
moment the question remains as to whether this talk of holding confidence rather than 
erecting dogma is, on reflection, theologically satisfactory, or whether the agnosticism 
about precisely how other faiths may be conceded within a fundamental loyalty to 
Christ does not give too much leeway for error and too little guidance in the Spirit.  
Granted that the Spirit proceeds, is he not also a Spirit of order? (1 Corinthians 14:33) 
 However, this question has large dimensions and cannot be answered simply by the 
presence or absence of codified guidelines.  Positively, the whole manner and style of 
Cragg's treatment of Islamic themes has to form part of the evidence here.  Negatively, 
we have to observe also what he finds unacceptable in Islamic belief and practice and 
why he finds it so.   
  
 
  
Chapter 4 
 
THEMES IN HIS WRITING: TRUTH AND POWER 
 
 
A  The Theme of Custody 
 
  We have seen the emphasis that Cragg places upon 'creative 
trusteeship', as the legacy which the Christian Church receives from the New 
Testament itself. [cf KC 1968 World 56]  The scriptures are not simply there, to be 
assented to, and stored in the mind.  They are to serve as a 'field of precedents' [ibid 
55f, cf KC 1977 Other 80], not only authority but also paradigm for the believer in the 
task of working out how he is to live and communicate his faith.  The Spirit 'proceeds' 
in establishing the relevance of the Christ-event in all the minds which are open to 
him, and in developing all the deeper implications of a particular religious tradition, 
what Cragg in one place calls the 'pro-Christian emphases'. [KC 92:166]  But Cragg, 
like other thinkers, also finds it effective to state his point negatively, and the opposite 
of the dynamic, relational pattern of Christian obedience which he commends is that 
which sees the fulfilment of its responsibilities in terms of guarding the deposit of 
faith, in terms of custody.  The term is meant to imply a rigid, unmoving and 
unimaginative loyalty which intends the refusal of compromise, but also thereby 
refuses adventure and the hopeful, open attitude.  Consequently it is 
backward-looking, static, and potentially stagnant, preferring the cistern to the 
fountain, the still to the running water. [KC 1977 Other 105] 
 
  It is in the context of a discussion of the term 'non-Christian' that Cragg 
introduces the concept of the 'custodian-mind', marked by 'habits of exclusion and 
assertion.' [KC 1968 World 74]  For most of Cragg's writing 'custody' and its variants 
is a term with strong negative connotations, and it is only in his latest work that it is 
used in a more positive sense. [see chapter 3.C & KC 1986 Christ 343]  Noting that 
negative terms like 'non-Christian' fail to reveal anything about the inner content of 
the cultures and faiths so labelled (what about calling Christians 'non-Buddhists'?), 
Cragg dubs such usage as confusing and even treacherous because it 'implies the 
negation of kinship, the exclusion of hope, and perhaps even of the acknowledgement 
of human neighbourhood. [KC 1968 World 74]  Yet he sees that such defensiveness, 
such denial of relationship, appears to those who practise it as loyal necessity, a 
negation in the best of causes, a vigorous and uncompromising defence of what must 
at all costs be defended.  He notes the paradox that religions which exist for surrender, 
for yielding to the ultimate cause, for the sake of the God who is ultimate, are fiercely 
protective and unyielding of the doctrine they enshrine.  This paradox may be 
understood as a tension between the necessity of creed and the necessity of worship.   
Seen from the standpoint of beliefs, faiths appear, substantially, as ends in themselves: 
seen from the perspective of worship they are themselves for ends beyond them. [ibid 
75] 
 
  We have observed the centrality of worship in Cragg's thought, and his 
determination to search out, so that it may be actively encouraged, every sign of 
human turning God-wards, however it may be expressed.  When he considers the 
characteristic temper of the mind which sets itself to consolidate and to protect the 
Godward turning already established, he finds that the tension between creed and 
  
 
  
worship is particularly acute in Christianity.   
Their conjuncture is nowhere more pressing than for Christianity where the 
self-preservation, to which creeds tend, is the very principle which Christ crucified 
refuses and abjures.  So we have, for example, a long doctrinal contention for the 
status of the Incarnate Son; yet that very status in itself consists, not in prestige 
reserved, but glory self-expending.  This is not to say that controversialists had a 
wrong concept to defend, but that their defence had, nevertheless, to do with a freely 
defenceless Christ. [ibid - emphasis added] 
Tillich seems to be saying something very similar in his Christianity and the 
Encounter of the World Religions (1963): 'What is particular in him (Christ) is that he 
crucified the particular in himself for the sake of the universal.' [Hick & 
Hebblethwaite 1980:111]  In Tillich's view this results in a tension between 
'Christianity as a religion and Christianity as the negation of religion' [ibid 110].  
Cragg would not accept Tillich's use of the term 'religion' as contrasted with a secular 
realm, but he would be happy with Tillich's statement that 'the principle of love in him 
(Christ) embraces the cosmos', and that 'with this image... the criteria are given under 
which Christianity must judge itself and, by judging itself, judge also the other 
religions.' [ibid 111] 
 
  The whole of Cragg's passage is very revealing of his theological 
presuppositions.  First we note that there is a universal pattern in religious life - a 
paradox or tension between creed and worship - which is found in its sharpest form in 
Christianity.  The events of Christ's coming, and the life and thought they give rise to, 
are archetypal versions of experiences to be found in less focussed form everywhere.  
By looking at Christ you can make sense of the world.  Rejecting the dialectical 
theology which saw metaphysics as irrelevant to faith, Cragg engages in theology as a 
single debate, where Christians have to take in all possible data.  This is not to be 
thought of as something threatening, for 'Christian theology, like the arch, grows 
stronger through the weight it bears.' [KC 161 pt2:55]   (The arch is a metaphor that 
has lived with Cragg all through his writing career.) [cf KC 1986 Christ 325]  
Secondly, and more explicitly, the crucifixion willingly suffered by Christ makes plain 
a universal truth, that in the presence of God there is no immunity which can be 
claimed, no status which can be preserved and no prestige which can be clung to.  
Islam, or surrender, is always required of us.  I do not mean of course, that this is the 
only meaning of the Cross, or that that is what Cragg supposes.  He is careful not to 
say that Christ contended for a 'principle' of any sort.  Cragg merely says, negatively, 
that Christ refused the principle of self-preservation.  Thirdly, that obedient refusal in 
Christ is the mark of divine glory.  'Jesus, in the flesh, accomplishes the eternal mind, 
just as the poem translates into accessibility the mind of the poet.' [KC 1985 Jesus 
292]  That understanding has somehow to be contended for, in a manner which is 
appropriate to the message itself, which 'performs' the word to be offered [cf Lindbeck 
1984:65], and does not betray it.  The manner of holding one's faith, therefore, matters 
intensely, as we shall see when we come to examine Cragg's dictum 'not whether but 
how'.  For the fourth implication of the passage is that Cragg has succeeded in turning 
the tables on those who argue from positions of entrenched conservatism that their 
opponents are betraying the faith.  For Cragg there may be more betrayal in the way 
that some go about defending the true faith than there is in the apparent failure by 
others to hold fast to it.  We have seen that Cragg also accuses such people of 
confusion of thought, again returning their own accusation. 
 
  
 
  
  Cragg is clearly challenged by Toynbee's thought that Christianity itself 
needs to die in order to live [KC 1977 Other 79], and says, in relation to the tension 
between the guardianship of the faith and the self-surrender the faith prescribes, that 'It 
is urgent not to surrender either side of this paradox.' [KC 1968 World 75]  
Nevertheless it is clear that his own emphasis is consistently to remind us that 
theology is produced to enable authentic worship (as opposed to idolatry), and 
worship is enacted to serve God.  Conversely, it is God who has acted to save human 
beings in Jesus, and they are entrusted with the task of making sense of what has 
happened.  The event is prior to the doctrine, but the doctrine is necessary to keep 
hold of the event, and make it accessible to others.  'Damascus visions can be turned 
into preaching only as they accept to be commended in the form of convictions that 
have a structure of doctrine and community.' [KC 1980 Paul 11]  Consequently there 
should be, as Cragg sees it, a freedom for theological formulation, a sense of 
adventure.  We shall see in chapter 5 how for Cragg soteriology takes precedence over 
ontology, 'the divine energy to save' rather than 'substance metaphors that set 
Christology/theology in the realm of abstract metaphysics.' [KC 92:166] 
 
  Many Muslims would agree with the central thrust of Cragg's thought 
here (though not of course his emphasis on soteriology), finding in the defensive habit 
of mind he criticises what Islam has known as taqlid.  Taqlid means literally 'the 
wearing of a necklace', and is associated also with the ancient Arab practice of 
hanging certain objects around the necks of animals due to be sacrificed at Mecca. 
[EI1 art. 'Taklid']  It came to mean 'clothing with authority', and so complete 
dependence on the ancient authorities of the faith.  In this sense it was the opposite of 
ijtihad, the exercise of independent judgement on matters of law or belief.  It might be 
supposed that attacks on such dependence were more characteristic of modern, or 
'modernist' thinkers, than of classical Islam, but in fact there is a long tradition of 
interpreting certain Qur'anic passages in just this sense.  This suspicion of taqlid stems 
from the opposition Muhammad faced in Mecca from those who alleged that he was 
contravening the customs of their forefathers, and wanted him to adopt their own 
unquestioning obedience to those ancient authorities. [see 2:170, 5:107, 21:53, 43:22f] 
 To the objection 'Nay, we shall follow the ways of our fathers', the Qur'anic reply 
(almost a refrain) is 'What! even though their fathers were void of wisdom and 
guidance?' [2:170] 
 
  Baidawi is only one of the classical commentators who makes a 
vigorous attack on such taqlid.  He comments trenchantly on those who criticised the 
change of qiblah from Jerusalem to Mecca, ('The Fools among the people will say...' - 
2:142f), calling them 
those people who exhibit only little capacity for insight and who depreciate even this 
through their blind acceptance (taqlid) of other views and neglect any examination of 
such views on their own.  Referred to are those among the hypocrites (munafiqun), 
Jews, and pagans, who want to know nothing of the change of the direction of prayer. 
[Gätje 1976:131] 
The unIslamic, pagan character of taqlid is further emphasized in another comment of 
Baidawi, this time on 2:170, but he goes on to make a point about religious obedience 
which somewhat qualifies his sharper language about taqlid: 
This verse was sent down concerning the pagans, who were ordered to follow the 
Qur'an... but who had held instead to the blind acceptance (taqlid) of traditional beliefs 
and practices...  This passage shows that blind acceptance of what is capable of 
  
 
  
individual insight and independent research is to be rejected.  If one follows freely in 
the religion of another and thus has assurance through some kind of proof that he is 
correct, as is the case with the prophets and those who investigate the statements of 
revelation independently, then it is not in fact a matter of blind acceptance, but on the 
contrary one then follows what God has sent down... [ibid 140  In quoting Gätje I 
have omitted the brackets he uses to indicate where his translation becomes 
paraphrase] 
 
  Baidawi here reflects an abiding puzzle in Islam as in all religion.  
Believers are called seriously to investigate what they believe, and not simply to 
accept things 'on trust'.  Yet few have the facilities or perhaps the aptitude to spend the 
necessary time in study and critical reflection, and are thus compelled to rely on other 
people's judgements. [see the discussion in Mahmassani 1961:95-8]  Islam recognises 
this fact in the doctrine of the ijma' or consensus of the believers, and all independent 
judgement has to be exercised within that established consensus.  Since about the end 
of the third Islamic century it has been generally reckoned that the 'gate of ijtihad' was 
closed, and that henceforth there was minimal room for further decision-making, at 
least on points of law.  Religious obedience now consisted of following the decisions 
of one of the recognised madhahib (schools of law), and it was an issue much debated 
as to whether one could change one's allegiance from one madhab to another, much 
less pick and choose among them the judgements which one approved. [EI1 'Taklid']  
As Schacht says, 'combining elements of the doctrine of several schools was 
practically unheard of, because it was the allegiance to the teaching of a common 
master that held the schools together.' [Schacht 1971:14 cf Mahmassani 1961:98]  So 
a form of taqlid was in practice approved, and even prescribed, and the checks to be 
made on the authority accepted became, even with Baidawi, extremely vague - 
'...assurance through some kind of proof.' [see above] 
 
  Mention of the madhahib, however, recalls one critical peculiarity of 
Islam as compared with Christianity, which is the prior significance of law over 
theology.  This is a matter of some complexity since neither term has a precise 
equivalent in Arabic and Islamic usage, but all that is said above about taqlid really 
applies only to the religious law, the shari'ah, the extensive code of behaviour for 
private and public life which was based on the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet 
and elaborated by the jurists.  As Schacht points out, 'there were no recognised 
masters (in the field of theology), comparable with Abu Hanifa, Malik and Shafi'i' 
until Ash'ari and Maturidi well into the third Islamic century, the time of the closing 
of the 'gate of ijtihad.' [Schacht 1971:14]  Taqlid, writes a modern Pakistani scholar, 
'conserved the legal heritage of the first three centuries' [Hasan 1978: 7], but the same 
judgement is not self-evident of theological statement in Islam.  In theology it seems 
that not only was there wide variety and a profusion of doctrinal viewpoints, falling 
only into the most general patterns or schools of thought, but also that theological 
speculation was likely to pass unremarked and uncontrolled by any authority unless it 
carried obvious political implications.  Frequently, however it did just this.  Goldziher 
and Schacht are broadly agreed in tracing the origins of theological dispute in Islam to 
politics, piety and Christian polemics. [Goldziher 1910:68,69,81; Schacht 1971:18]  
Governments could be content to allow the various schools of religious law to grow in 
peace until they had reached the maturity implied in the general adoption of taqlid, as 
noted above.  But theological dispute both arose from and was stimulated by such 
questions as the standing of 'Ali among the first four Caliphs, the issue of whether a 
  
 
  
grave sinner should be obeyed as ruler, and the extent to which human action (and 
inaction) was predetermined by God.  Neither Umayyad nor 'Abbasid rulers could 
remain indifferent to the debate about such questions, and the consequence, at least 
from time to time, was 'massive government interference'. [Schacht 1971:20] 
 
  In such circumstances the mere recommendation to follow in the ways 
of the Prophet and his companions, the prescription of taqlid, seemed inadequate, for 
the issues were new in their sharpness and urgency.  Consequently theologians, 
whatever they thought of Mu'tazilite theology, followed the Mu'tazilite conviction that 
'nazar, the speculative cognition of God, was every person's duty.' [Goldziher 
1910:106]  Taqlid as the unthinking acquiescence in received opinion was to be 
condemned, for  
it was not enough for a Muslim to say that he believed in Allah as the only God and in 
the prophethood of Muhammad, merely on the authority of his teacher, and finally on 
the authority of the founder of his school of theology, but that he must know, that is to 
say, be personally convinced of it himself, even if he does not know all the scholastic 
proofs and distinctions. [Schacht 1971:21] 
 
  These considerations have to be borne carefully in mind when trying to 
compare Cragg's attitude to religious conservatism, coloured by his Christian origins, 
with Islamic notions of taqlid.  Religious law in its Muslim or Jewish form plays 
virtually no part at all in Christian life or thought, and therefore it is very easy to 
misread the whole Islamic debate on the subject of taqlid, since Christians have so 
little familiarity with the kind of circumstances in which it became approved.  
Moreover, since the New Testament is claimed to be, among other things, a radical 
critique of Jewish law it is not to be expected that Christians will find an easy 
understanding of the Muslim version of codified religious guidance.  There is likely to 
be an equivalent Christian misunderstanding about Muslim theology, for what has 
been called the 'Queen of the Sciences' in Christian circles has often been viewed with 
deep suspicion in its Islamic dress.  This is not only because of the political context 
noted above, but also because one  force in the formulation of scholastic theology, or 
kalam, seems to have been the inheritance of Greek philosophy mediated through 
Iraqi and Persian non-Muslims who challenged Islamic beliefs on philosophic 
grounds. [Allard 1965:123f, Watt 1973:243]  Muslim thinkers learnt to reply to their 
interrogators in the same idiom, but also came to use such rationalist arguments in 
debate with other Muslims.  Consequently kalam was attacked as a form of zandaqa 
(heresy), particularly by the followers of Ibn Hanbal. [Watt 1973:186]  It is this 
character of theology in Islam which leads Schacht to describe it as 'essentially 
defensive apologetics', though a similar judgement could easily be made about 
Christian theology. [Schacht 1971:21, 4] 
 
  It has become a truism to say that the genius of Islam is law rather than 
theology.  Gibb said: 'The master science of the Muslim world was law.' [Gibb 1953:7 
cf KC 19:186]  Zaehner said: 'Theology has never plagued Islam to the extent it has 
Christianity.' [Zaehner 1975:169]  Watt has written: 'Jurisprudence was the central 
intellectual discipline in the Islamic world.' [Watt 1973:182]  Certainly the intellectual 
formation even of the Mu'tazilite theologians and men like Ghazali was in the studies 
of shari'ah and tradition.  If one looks for a comparable focus in the Muslim mind to 
Law, it would be tasawwuf rather than kalam. [Schacht 1971:4]  The taqlid of the law 
might be challenged more cogently by the Sufi than the mutakallim.  So the Persian 
  
 
  
poet 'Attar represents famous mystics of Islam grouped around the gibbet of the dying 
Al-Hallaj, and one of them, Shibli, asking him whether his saying 'ana-l haqq/I am the 
Reality' conformed to the Law.  'Attar has Al-Hallaj answering 'You are in taqlid, I in 
tawhid/Unity.' [Massignon 1982:II 384] 
 
  How does Cragg's understanding of religious language and study fit 
with these Islamic realities?  We have to note first of all that the whole of his doctoral 
thesis was devoted to the examination of modern Muslim apologetics contrasted with 
their Christian equivalents, and that he frequently speaks in that context of the 
inadequacy and timidity of Muslim theological thought.  He reckons that the Azhar 
Journal reflects 'a dichotomy of mind in which the final problems of theology remain 
in permanent abeyance', and writes of Muhammad Ali of India that his work was 'not 
so much apology, as the lack of it made virtuous.' [ibid I:296,398]  Later, speaking of 
the maxim that the genius of Islam lies in law rather than in theology, he writes that 'it 
would be truer to say that its strength lies in theology as law...  Law, we may say, is 
religion, and religion is law.' [KC 1969 House 44]  Nevertheless he writes very little 
about Islamic law, and much about the 'renewers' of Islam - men in the vein of 
Muhammad 'Abduh, whom, despite some reservations, he excepts from his general 
strictures on Muslim thinkers.  'Abduh, he thought, showed 'no trace of the impatience 
of theology which sometimes inspires modernism elsewhere', though even he could be 
guilty of a 'spirit of intellectual docility.' [KC 161 pt1:145, 151] 
 
  A lawyer like Schacht will see the significant current development of 
Islam in terms of 'legal modernism', the attempt by modern Muslim nation-states to 
modify classical Islamic law to suit modern conditions.  Cragg, looking at the same 
events, advocates the shifting of the criminal codes of Muslim countries to a civil 
basis: 'What is obvious is that the whole current of modern life, and its tempo, are 
running against both the spirit and the feasibility of the religious legalism of Islam.' 
[ibid pt1:97]  Schacht dismisses 'Abduh as unimportant: 
By contrast, there has been nothing similar in the field of theology; there has been 
only the well-meaning, but anodyne and tame effort of Muhammad 'Abduh (himself a 
progressive thinker in the field of Islamic law), who tried to eliminate from traditional 
Islamic theology those features that seemed to him most incompatible with modern 
thought. [Schacht 1971:22] 
We should note, however, that Iqbal is less easy to ignore as a theological influence 
because of his tremendous reputation in Pakistan.  [cf KC 1984 Muhammad 74f] 
 
  Is Cragg's interest in men like 'Abduh and Iqbal then misplaced?  Or 
perhaps we should ask what it is that interests Cragg, and other western scholars, in 
them?  Is his, and their, focus on Islam misdirected?  Cragg quotes Juvenal's tag quis 
custodit ipsos custodes? in his Thesis, in the context of Christian 'interior 
self-consistency', which is judged to be 'more delicate in the realm of theology than in 
the realm of law or society.' [KC 161 pt2: 106]  Nevertheless it may have been 'Abduh 
who fixed in Cragg's mind the metaphor of custody to describe the entrenched and 
unthinking conservatism both men attack.  'Abduh employs the image in two key 
passages of his Risalat al-Tauhid (translated by Cragg as The Theology of Unity): 
There were in every people custodians of religion concerned with its protection and 
propagation, of which the first prerequisite is expression.  They had, however, little 
recourse to rational judgement in their custody of belief...  Indeed there is an almost 
total contrast between the intellectual cut and thrust of science and the forms of 
  
 
  
religious persuasion and assurance of heart.  Oftentimes religion on the authority of its 
own leaders was the avowed enemy of reason, and all its works. [KC 1966 Unity 30] 
The Qur'an, in contrast, 'spoke to the rational mind and alerted the intelligence.'  In the 
second passage 'Abduh couples his custodian-image with a repudiation of taqlid, 
which is identified as essentially pagan: 
Islam will have no truck with traditionalism, against which it campaigns relentlessly, 
to break its power over men's minds and eradicate its deep-seated influence.  The 
underlying bases of taqlid in the beliefs of the nations have been shattered by Islam. 
In the same cause, it has alerted and aroused the powers of reason, out of long sleep.  
For whenever the rays of truth had penetrated, the temple custodians intervened with 
their jealous forebodings.  'Sleep on, the night is pitch dark, the way is rough and the 
goal distant, and rest is scant and there's poor provision for the road.' [ibid 126] 
The metaphor still served Cragg nineteen years later, when he commended Hasan 
Askari for developing his theological insights from within the discipline of sociology, 
and therefore as one who did not belong to 'the professional dogmatists, with their 
stock in trade of Tafsir, Kalam, and - it may be - Taqlid.  These tend to obscure the 
deeper issues or obfuscate the mind.  Custodians habitually confine their study to 
secure authority and safe precedent.' [KC 1985 Pen 110]   
 
  Why is it that Cragg declines to engage with the legal themes in Islam 
pursued by Schacht and other Western scholars as the acknowledged focus of Islamic 
thought, and avoids also any extended study of the mystics of Islam, even Ghazali?  
Commenting on Gibb's dictum about the most highly developed expression of Islam 
being, because of its practical bent, in law rather than theology, Cragg argues that 'The 
pre-eminence of the Shari'ah, however, is not primarily "the practical bent" of a 
community but the pattern of the divine relationship, both given and received.' [KC 
19:186]  However, we have seen that many Muslims find this way of thought alien.  
Another reason for Cragg's avoidance of the study of shari'ah may lie in his 
preoccupation with contemporary history, and the relationship of religious faith and 
political power.  'Are there,' he asks, 'limits to the competence of power in the care of 
truth?' [KC 1971 Event 24] 
  
 
  
B  Truth in the Custody of Power 
 
 
...the most fundamental question of all religion, namely the relation and the relevance 
of power to truth. [KC 1971 Event 134] 
 
  One of the refrains of Cragg's writing about Islam is the criticism that 
Islam too easily assumes that spiritual truth can survive uncorrupted in the custody of 
human beings exercising political power, or more decidedly, that spiritual truth 
actually needs political patronage.  The 1950 Thesis already bears much evidence of 
this, from the commendation of 'Ali 'Abd-ar-Raziq to the criticism of Indian Islam.  
'Ali 'Abd-ar-Raziq, in the course of arguing that the Caliphate was unnecessary to 
Islam, had claimed that Muhammad's mission was essentially spiritual and not 
political.  Muhammad was never the Head of a State.  Cragg is equally glad of Hasan 
Askari's statement that 'The Prophet of Islam did not create a state.' [KC 1985 Pen 118 
- emphasis original]  Cragg's comment on 'Ali 'Abd-ar-Raziq was: 'Though Muslim 
opinion is slowly and inevitably coming round to the views expressed by 'Ali 
'Abd-ar-Raziq, they were rank heresy when first set down'. [KC 161 pt1:221]  That 
'inevitable coming round' has been slow to happen, however, and raises questions 
about Cragg's interpretation of Islam, especially as similar observations continue to be 
expressed later. [eg KC 1977 Valley 10 n8]  In 1950 he felt that 'Muslim political 
pre-occupations are no solution of Islam's modern secular problem', for 
In the conditions of the modern world, it is difficult to see how any religious force 
within the State can truly fulfil itself, if it is so closely identified with the State, as 
Islam is, and if it is so much bounden for its very life upon the cause of the State...  
Only if its being is independent of political props, if its power lies finally in its 
theological self-respect, can it rightly or safely fulfil its undoubted obligations to the 
State. [ibid pt2:199, 200 - emphasis original] 
 
  At that time he felt that the Islam of the Indian sub-continent was 
characterised by 'an unfortunate political quality to adventures of thought, which 
required a more spiritual detachment.' [ibid pt1:326]  Pakistan, he thought, had 
diverted Indian Muslim attention from more fundamental problems, and he was able 
to quote Cantwell Smith as saying that the movement for Pakistan, as the 'rise of a 
separate Muslim nationalism has postponed the religious crisis.' [ibid pt1:476, cf 
Smith 1943:154]  Pakistan is seen as 'perhaps the crowning evidence of the absence of 
what this Thesis is seeking for in Islam', namely a lively sense of self-criticism issuing 
in a realistic theological apologetic to the modern world. [ibid pt1:478]   
Fundamentally Cragg agrees with Arnold Toynbee that 'all religions finally suffer 
when they accept political patronage', and declares that whereas Muhammad founded 
Islam as a religious force with a political form, 'Too often today Islam presents at least 
the appearance of a political force with a religious form, - an inversion which the 
Prophet himself would hardly have tolerated.' [ibid pt2:80 n1, 201] 
 
  It seems to me that we run into serious problems of definition here, and 
that it is by no means clear what Cragg is really saying.  It is plainly possible simply to 
apply the criticism nearer home and declare that many circumstances of Christian 
history, even to the present day, could equally well be described as religious in form 
but political in substance.  But what does this really mean?  Is there not too easy an 
assumption here of the distinction between religion and politics - an assumption 
  
 
  
characteristic of Western Protestants, especially in the Lutheran tradition, but puzzling 
to Muslims as well as to many other Christians?  We shall want to examine later some 
rare remarks of Cragg about liberation theology in the case of the Mexican Miranda. 
[KC 1984 Muhammad 157,158 & KC 19:184-6,189]  In his advocacy of 'a religious 
ministry to the world of politics' Cragg is ready to admit that 'Christianity has to 
confess with pain both the difficulty of, and failure in, this urgent task and that, 
despite the fact that the Church, by definition and temper, has been so much more 
independent of the political.' [KC 161 pt2:201]  But he does not seem ready to 
reconsider his categories at this point.  There is an uneasy juxtaposition of 
sociological observation and theological judgement continually made in much of this 
early writing which makes the reader ask by what criteria Cragg is interpreting the 
contemporary Muslim world.  Some may recall the classic remarks on the difficulty of 
such interpretation by Clifford Geertz 
The comparative study of religion has always been plagued by this peculiar 
embarrassment: the elusiveness of its subject matter.  The problem is not one of 
constructing definitions of religion.  We have had quite enough of those; their very 
number is a symptom of our malaise.  It is a matter of discovering just what sorts of 
beliefs and practices support what sorts of faith under what sorts of conditions.  Our 
problem, and it grows worse by the day, is not to define religion but to find it. [Geertz 
1971:1] 
 
  The predictable response of some Muslim reviewers of Cragg's books 
has been to complain that he had not accurately 'found' Islam as they understood it, 
particularly on the issue of the political patronage of religion.  (The Muslim response 
to Cragg's writings will concern us further in chapter 6.)  Many Muslims of course 
want to carry the war into the enemy's camp.  Reviewing The Call of the Minaret the 
Pakistani scholar Hamidullah wrote that  
the author's defence of the separation of church and state raises questions not of 
dogmas but of facts.  Christianity wishes to leave unto Caesar what is Caesar's.  In the 
absence of Christian guidance, a Christian ruler will follow not Christ but 
Machiavelli, whereas Islamic guidance to a ruler is as imperative as it is to one who 
prays and fasts. [Hamidullah 1957:247] 
The problem is that the issue of the engagement of religion and politics inescapably 
involves questions of historical interpretation, and historians cannot easily deal in 
broad abstractions like 'Islam' or 'Christianity', except insofar as they are living 
realities in the minds of Muslims, Christians and others.  For most contemporary 
historians it is Muslims and Christians whose acts make history, and not Islam and 
Christianity.  Cragg might demur at this, to point out that Muslims and Christians are 
after all defined by their Islam and their Christianity [KC 1977 Other xiif & KC 1986 
Christ 316 n2], and to that extent it is these great movements of faith which bring 
about the events we call history.  One of his frequent complaints about modern 
Muslim apologetic in the Thesis is the exoneration of Islam.  Muslim writers 
continually plead   
...the perfection of Islam and the defection of Muslims.  If anything is to be criticised 
it is the faithful and never the faith.  The true Islam is incorruptible...  We have 
pointed out how suspicious this argument often looks, the more so when no attempt is 
made to enquire how the faith could be served by, if not in fact produce such 
'believing' delinquency over long periods of its history...  It is much easier to admire 
Islam and to blame Muslims than to suspect Islam and reform Muslims. [KC 161 
pt1:550f] 
  
 
  
 
  There is real cogency in this argument, and especially in the parallel 
drawn with the doctrine that 'the King can do no wrong; it is always his ministers who 
are at fault'.  (One could cite a modern version in which the policies of a particular 
political party are always correct: it is their presentation to the electorate which needs 
to be amended.)  But is Cragg entirely innocent of similar assertions about 
Christianity?  He is entirely ready to admit that in the case of Christianity too 'we must 
recognize what failure implies for the religion so failing and not seek evasive 
exoneration in reprobating its confessors.  For what the confessors are, or are not, is 
part of the record of the religion and some clue to its nature.' [KC 1986 Call 294]  But 
as his argument proceeds it becomes clear that 'Christendom' is not a Christian 
concept [ibid], and that 'Christianity belongs to and inheres in people who believe.  It 
is never coterminous as such with any given society.' [ibid 295]  Consequently 
Christianity can in fact be exonerated from all the ills which its confessors may 
perpetrate, and remain innocent in any judgements delivered by history. 
 
  But is there not a deeper problem about observation (whether historical 
or contemporary) and evaluation, as Geertz has hinted?  Bijlefeld raised in 1959, 
partly in reference to Cragg's work, the need to distinguish between understanding 
religion with the tools of phenomenological science, and evaluating it theologically 
from a Christian (or other) perspective.  One should not therefore, in his view, talk of 
'Christian understanding' or 'theological interpretation' before Islam has been 
thoroughly understood in its own terms.  Bijlefeld thought that this task was still 
largely to be accomplished, and that it was too soon to make judgements about Islam 
being either 'Satanic' or 'pro-' or 'semi-Christian'.  Nor should one draw up lists of 
'common elements' between the two faiths, as though it was firmly established that the 
two religions were talking about the same things.  Though he commended Cragg's 
Operation Reach as 'the best planned attempt in the whole history of Muslim 
evangelism to equip and prepare Christians', he rejected Cragg's argument that the 
God of Christianity and of Islam was the same God, though differing in definition - 
the subject the same but the predicate different.  We did not yet know.  [Carman 1960 
pt1:39-41 & pt2:21,25]  Though some were critical of Bijlefeld's distinction between 
observation and evaluation [eg. Mulder 1960:359], it does seem a useful working 
distinction, even if, as in the natural sciences, it is sometimes next to impossible to 
decide where observation ends and evaluation begins. 
 
  Such a distinction may well make one more critical of typical and 
oft-repeated Craggian references to 'the uninhibited political character and assurance 
of Islam.' [KC 103:181]  These references are evident, as we have seen, in his earliest 
writing - 'the Prophetic office and the claim to power were inseparable' [KC 161 
pt2:273] - and become more sharply phrased in the later, where there is a significant 
tendency to make the hijrah the hinge of Islamic development. [KC 1971 Event 66 & 
KC 1986 Christ 44]  Speaking of Sufism as the product of 'suffering, privation, 
tragedy and the fragility of all things mortal', Cragg continues 
These were precisely the features absent from post-hijrah Islam where they were 
displaced by triumph, success, victory and achievement in martial terms.  Al-Fauz 
al-mubin, 'manifest victory' is the frequent cry of the Medinan Qur'an and... its reading 
of the divine will and way is in terms of the battles of Badr and Uhud, or the 
capitulation of Mecca and the success of Hunain...  The Islamic faith, never in the 
catacombs, was its own empire. [KC 103:180f] 
  
 
  
Muhammad, in other words, was his own Constantine. [KC 1956:256]  The contrast 
with the way of Jesus is of course commonplace in Christian thinking about Islam, but 
it has never been more powerfully stated than by Cragg.  Writing of the third 
temptation of Jesus, which he calls 'the option for power' Cragg says 
Satan has Jesus visualize political empire with its compelling short cuts to the goal 
and, because of these, its inevitable compromise with evil, with brutality and force.  
The supremely Islamic principle with which Jesus refuses this temptation - 'You shall 
worship the Lord your God and Him only shall you serve' - excludes the option of a 
Hijrah, a shift, a diversion into force and, therefore, away from the quiet strength of 
truth and the sure fidelities of love.  There are 'the kingdoms of this world' - to be sure 
- but Messiahship is in them not of them.   Those kingdoms are nationalist, 
competitive, exclusivist, political and coercive.  As such they leave areas of life, 
reaches of humanity and depths of need outside both their range and their capacity, 
and even their achievements generate their contradiction.  At the very centre of Jesus' 
reading of his destiny, in the sort of world the reception of his ministry disclosed, was 
the perception that the Messianic task and the political arm were not compatible. [KC 
1985 Jesus 154 - emphasis original] 
 
  What is the way that Cragg actually understands the career of 
Muhammad at this point of its 'hinge' in the hijrah?  This was the 'supreme decision of 
all religious truth: How does one, how should one, react, in the name of truth, to 
untruth, to denial of that to which we are pledged witnesses?' [KC 127:1:27]  Cragg 
expressly dissociates himself from those who have seen 'a fatal break' at this juncture, 
leading to a decline in integrity and even morality in the personality of Muhammad.  
Goldziher, following Caetani, wrote that 'the change was detrimental to his character.' 
[Goldziher 1910:23]  'It is truer, wrote Cragg,  
to see the whole pre- and post-Hijrah story as a single unity of commitment to a 
mission, received as from God, the means to which developed from word to action, 
from preaching to power, by an inner logic that the 'divine' must necessarily 'succeed'. 
[KC 1984 Muhammad 50] 
This leads him finally to the conclusion that Muhammad was a prophet, and that 
'Christian response to the main theme of his prophethood has surely to be a positive 
acknowledgement of its significance', but at the same time that more than prophecy is 
required if the full measure of the world's evil is to be taken, and our salvation 
achieved. [ibid 140,145]  It may seem that Cragg is taking away with one hand what 
he gives with the other, but he insists that the two judgements belong together.  
Muhammad can only be called to account for the decision of hijrah because his 
original call was genuine and permanent in its significance. [ibid 142f] 
 
  Perhaps the central difference between Cragg and other Christian 
interpreters of Islam at this point is that Cragg recruits Islam itself to this critique of 
Muslim confidence in 'the option for power', with the allegation that it is a 
transgression of the 'supremely Islamic principle' of the worship of God alone, - in fact 
a form of shirk.  It is his profound conviction that there is within the resources of 
Islam the capacity to reach a Christian understanding of creation and history.  So 
Sufism, which as Cragg sees it has flourished among Muslims in spite of this 
power-assurance, can be seen as a kind of corrective to it, a response to the 'non-islam 
of institutional Islam...  Islam had the genius within its own resources of Scripture to 
respond to the exigencies that history presented when the institutions about which it 
had been so sanguine failed to actualise a true vocation under God'. [KC 103:187]  
  
 
  
 
  Nevertheless the clear implication of Cragg's view is that the Hijrah 
itself, and all that it represents in terms of the search for a 'manifest victory' plainly 
visible to doubting human minds, was an aberration from the true vocation of Islam 
and of Muhammad.  Though Cragg may appeal to islam against Islam, he has to carry 
the burden of that judgement in the face both of the scholar of Islam who finds it 
untrue to historical Islam, and of the Muslim scholar who finds it offensively contrary 
to revelation.  For there is no doubt that in Muslim minds the Hijrah carries a deep 
spiritual importance as 'migration in the way of God.' Quoting Surah 4:97, Elkholy 
sets the duty of migration in the context of a chapter on the concept of community in 
Islam: 
When the Muslim is politically oppressed and is unable to change the prevailing 
system, he is religiously required to migrate to any other place, where he has greater 
freedom.  'When those who had done themselves injustice die, the angels will ask 
them: in what were you engaged?  They will say: we were oppressed in the land.  The 
angels will admonish them saying: Wasn't God's globe spacious enough that you 
could have migrated therein?  For this, their resort will be Hell, the worst habitation.' 
[Elkholy 1979:174] 
  Has Cragg's theological evaluation of Islam begun to interfere with his 
observation and understanding of one of its major features at this point?  Muslims will 
certainly reckon that it has.  Khurram Murad, reviewing four introductory books on 
Islam (including Cragg's The House of Islam) entitles his piece 'hira and madina: the 
West's Dilemma'.  (Hira is the name of the cave in which Muhammad first received 
the revelation of the Qur'an, and Madina here represents the stage of his career after 
the hijrah.)  He argues that westerners, including westernised Muslims like Fazlur 
Rahman whose Islam is one of the four books he is reviewing, are incapable of 
understanding Islam because they do not grasp the true significance of prophethood in 
Islam, and therefore adequately acknowledge the prophethood of Muhammad.  (Fazlur 
Rahman is included as one who accepts only its moral and not its legal dimension, 
which seems a very questionable judgement). [Fazlur 1979:19]  Murad writes: 
   Islam cannot be understood unless hira and madina are understood and accorded the 
place they have in Islam...  On hira depends the truth and nature of Muhammad's 
experience of revelation and his claim to prophethood; while madina, often 
represented as a deviation, even a 'flight' from prophethood into politics, defines the 
nature of his mission and the destiny of his people in history.  Hira by itself is 
troublesome enough, but madina seems to make Islam more complex, even 
impossible for a Christian-Western mind to comprehend. [Murad 1981:4] 
 
Murad finds it puzzling that those who have seen the development of Christianity 
from Galilee to Constantine through to the great basilica of St Peter's and beyond 
should find it impossible to portray correctly a similar development in Islam from hira 
to hijrah, with the legal dimensions of religion in madina following the preaching 
mode in makka. [ibid.]  Murad does not actually single out Cragg for particular 
criticism on this point, but clearly regards him with the others as representative of a 
general western failure to come to grips with the full signficance of the Qur'anic 
revelation.  (His judgement on Cragg is in fact mainly favourable: 'in large measure 
Cragg succeeds in the task he has set himself.') [ibid 6]  Murad has focussed attention 
on the Muslim response to this common non-Muslim interpretation of Islam, and 
raised the question of whether it is soundly based.  Not only Christians have made it.  
The great Orientalist Goldziher, a Jew who moved from Orthodoxy to Reform 
  
 
  
Judaism, also shared this view. [Goldziher 1910:24]   
 
  Other Muslim opinion defends Islam either by attacking the Christian 
record for failing to provide the proper guidance to rulers [see Hamidullah above], or 
by alleging an inherent failure in Christianity to represent a complete revelation.  Ibn 
Khaldun criticised Christians for not admitting the duty of jihad, while Ibn Taimiyya 
reckoned that 'the right religion must have in it the guiding Book with the helping 
sword.' [KC 1985 Jesus 300 n 10 - cf KC 1984 Muhammad  33]  'Ali Shari'ati seems 
to belong to the first group in writing that 'Ideal man holds the sword of Caesar in his 
hand and he has the heart of Jesus in his breast.' [quoted in KC 1985 Jesus 52] 
 
  These characteristic Muslim responses give us something of the 
measure of the problem of the political dimension of Islam as a context for Cragg's 
treatment of it.  There are Christian scholars who would in general support his 
strictures on the Muslim confidence about the use of power.  AKS Lambton, in a 
study of the Persian theory of government, notes that 'theoretically the problem of quis 
custodiet custodes did not arise in Islam.  Muslim thinkers in early and medieval 
times, with rare exceptions, disregard the question of power.' [Lambton 1956:5:125]  
It may perhaps be argued that they raised it in other ways.  Other Christian thinkers 
who follow Cragg much of the way have complained that he has allowed the political 
issue to get out of proportion.  Redmond Fitzmaurice has noted that the 'activist' 
Hebrew leaders, men like Moses and David, accounted 'prophets' in Islam, had small 
compunction in resorting to the sword for the defence of God's cause, and that many 
Christian leaders have followed their example. [Fitzmaurice 1984:46]  The point 
raises questions about Cragg's understanding of the relation of the New Testament to 
the Old which we shall need to return to in chapter 7, but also makes one ask how 
Cragg's position differs from pacifism.  'God and coercion', he says, 'do not belong 
together.' [KC 1986 Christ 90]  There is also the question of whether he confuses the 
issue by identifying the political expression of faith almost exclusively with violence 
and forcible coercion.  Does political commitment necessarily involve coercion?  To 
answer more fully the question of his portrayal of the issue of power we need to 
examine his understanding of the way that power is seen to corrupt true religion. 
  
 
  
C  Morality and the Collective 
 
 
  Hendrik Kraemer expressed perhaps the most trenchant criticism of 
Islam during this century when he called it 'a thoroughly secularized theocracy', by 
which he seemed to mean 'religious imperialism'. [Kraemer 1938:223]  'Its real "god" 
is group solidarity', he thought. [ibid 353]  While Cragg, as we have seen, has moved 
some way beyond Kraemer's judgement that Islam is only 'to a certain degree' a 
prophetic religion, [ibid 142] it is legitimate to ask whether his criticism of the 
'power-assurance' of Islam does not simply represent Kraemer's view about Islamic 
idolatry of the umma in a more sophisticated form.  Certainly Cragg complains that 
some contemporary Muslims are correctly interpreted as saying Islamu akbar (Islam is 
great) rather than Allahu akbar (God is great).  Yet the second can never rightly come 
to mean the first. [KC 1985 Jesus 297 cf KC 90:33 & KC 1984 Muhammad 133]  He 
refers to another corruption of religion in the name of Islam when he says that 'There 
can be few attitudes more blasphemous than crying Allahu akbar with a clenched fist. 
 For then we clearly mean: Down with our enemies.  Religious faith, even piety in 
practice, may be a sadly inverted assertion of ourselves.' [KC 90:35 cf KC 1984 
Muhammad 131f]  But this is far from a blanket condemnation, and both the Shi'ite 
and the Sufi forms of Islam are recruited by Cragg for evidence that Islam is by no 
means monolithic even in the consequences of its assumption of political power.  
Despite the vigour of its protest the Party of 'Ali has had to cope with tragedy and 
failure throughout Muslim history. [Ayoub 1978] 
 
  The last quotation indicates that Cragg's fundamental concern is not to 
denigrate Islam, but rather to explore the intrinsic problem of all religion, what he 
once called 'the pride and perjury of all religion, its inherent vocation to possess and 
serve the absolute, and its inevitable temptation to forget that the absolute is not itself.' 
[KC 1971 Event 37]  'Precisely because faiths have to do with ultimacy they falsely 
locate it in themselves.' [KC 1986 Christ 86]  That forgetting, or confusion of 
priorities is a consistent theme throughout his writing, and is often associated with a 
particular quotation from TS Eliot's Murder in the Cathedral: 
Servant of God has chance of greater sin...  
For those who serve the greater cause may make the cause serve them, 
Still doing right: and striving with political men 
May make that cause political. [KC 90:33, cf KC 1959 Sandals 100, KC 1977 Other 
110] 
 
  It is not, as might be supposed from the argument of the preceding 
section, that Cragg espouses a political quietism and regards the world of public 
affairs as necessarily contaminating.  Some Sufi and other mystics may have adopted 
such a line of thought, but Cragg is not of them, and indeed writes little about them.  
The focus of his thought is rather - as we have noted before - the authenticity of 
worship, and therefore the perils that attend it, and the imminence of idolatry at all 
times.  This is not a Kraemerian theme.  True worship Cragg finds most threatened 
not by the refusal to worship but by false worship, by 'the treachery of the 
pseudo-faithful.  Corruptio optimi pessima.' [KC 1977 Other 110]  As he continues 
writing it seems that he finds the focus of that treachery increasingly in the attempt to 
ensure valid worship in the community through the use of political power, with all the 
sanctions of violence and the need for compromise that goes with it.  Above all it is 
  
 
  
this question of the morality of the collective which continually recurs in his later 
writing, and he shows a keen perception of Quranic passages concerning it and a 
particular fondness for writers who themselves reflect an awareness of it - men like 
Fazlur Rahman, Hasan Askari, Kamil Husain and Najib Mahfuz in Islam (all of them 
subjects of The Pen and the Faith, itself a book on Qur'anic exposition), and others 
like Martin Buber and Abraham Heschel among Jewish writers.  The Qur'an itself 
indicates its concern with the  problem in the struggle against the hypocrites 
(munafiqun) and the desert Arabs who, as the Qur'an says, submitted but did not 
believe. [49:14, cf 9:97 & KC 1971 Event 155] 
 
  Kamil Husain provided Cragg's great discovery of a Muslim writer 
who did not deviate from Islamic orthodoxy, and yet was able to delve imaginatively 
not only into the events of Good Friday, but thereby also into the complexities and 
moral evasions characteristic of political power acting in custody of truth and 
innocence.  As Cragg understands Husain's Qaryah Zalimah, which he translated into 
English as City of Wrong 
It is in the circumstances of the Friday when the world, epitomised in Jerusalem under 
Caiaphas and Pilate, was in the throes of its moral encounter with truth and right, 
embodied in Jesus of Nazareth, that the writer finds the heart occasion and the 
essential core of his theme. 
Quoting Buber's Between Man and Man he describes the latter as expressing 'the same 
disquiet about the collective as man's all too frequent plea to justify wrong.' [KC 1959 
City xiv]  There is no doubt that this theme is powerfully expressed in Husain's book. 
 The Mufti of Jerusalem is made to sound Cragg's own warning against Islamu akbar: 
I shall give no more fatwas from now on.  They have misconstrued the ones I gave 
and seek by them to murder a man whose death my conscience cannot approve...  I do 
not wish to be a deceiver of the people or be on their behalf a guarantor of particular 
ideas...  When men of religion adopt the attitudes of politicians it is because they have 
set politics above religion, or rather the politics of religion above religion itself.  And 
that is manifest error.' [ibid 33,34] 
The final phrase, as Cragg points out in a footnote, is very familiar from the Qur'an (fi 
dalilin mubinin - found in 3:164, 6:74, 7:60 and some thirty other passages), and 
refers to 'the state of unbelief and idolatry preceding Islam', but is here extended 'to 
cover the vagaries and obtuseness of men of the true faith and even of the very 
custodians of orthodoxy'. [ibid 214]   
 
  Elsewhere Husain indicates that his own interest in the story as he 
understands it is also, even equally, the uncertainty and vacillation of Jesus' disciples 
on the question of whether to attempt to rescue him from the hands of his captors - an 
attempt which he himself has forbidden them to make.  In an appendix Husain 
outlines his theory, suggested by Freud's Moses and Monotheism, that religious 
groups are powerfully influenced by some formative event in the life of their 
community, as the Jews were by the event of the Exodus, and the Muslims by the 
battle of Badr. [KC 46]  For Christians he identifies the key event in the failure of the 
disciples to rescue Jesus despite Jesus' prohibition.  In a long debate on the matter 
between the disciples the two themes of the book come together.  One disciple is 
opposed to the use of force in any rescue attempt, and argues that religion has to do 
with limits and prohibitions which must be observed.  Another answers: 
- 'This notion of yours is weak to the point of near treachery.  It is open to such 
vacillation that it is almost stupid.  Would not a successful outcome for us be also the 
  
 
  
victory of religion?  What then is the point of your impeding a religious victory in the 
name of religion?' 
- 'I have no desire to perpetrate a crime for the sake of making religion secure.  
Religion has a Lord Who is well able to secure it, and has no need to require a 
transgression on my part in the worthy cause.  Such fantasies are the product of the 
feeble in faith who are half-baked in their religiosity.' 
- 'God makes us factors in the execution of His will.  It is up to us to guard jealously 
the security of religion...  Of course it is permissible to depart from religious 
principles for the sake of defending religion itself.  There is, for example, no 
alternative but to destroy false belief by death, if such false belief is seditious.  
Sedition is a worse evil than killing.' [KC 1959 City 108,109]  
The last sentence is a direct quotation from surah 2:191 (wa'l-fitnah ashaddu min 
al-qatli), and can be answered by the other disciple only in terms of the uncertainty of 
proving heresy compared with the certainty that 'murder is a definite transgression of 
religion which no exegesis can sustain.' [ibid] 
 
  Cragg confesses himself puzzled by the emphasis Husain puts on the 
inability or failure of the disciples to rescue Jesus, and the way he links it with the 
alleged 'besetting mood of Christianity (as) one of self-reproach and an excessive 
pre-occupation with the sense of sin.' [ibid xixf]  Husain himself says that 'The best 
Christian in his most sublime moments is a sad man.' [ibid 224]  The case against 
defending religion with force is powerfully put, but Husain seems to retain a certain 
ambivalence on the point, and in an extensive comment on the nature of conscience 
remarks that 'the main power of conscience being inhibitive and prohibitive it is 
mainly a guide to us in avoiding wrong.  When it acts excessively it can have a 
paralysing effect.' [ibid 222]  It appears therefore that, despite a real sympathy with the 
argument against the disciples rescuing Jesus he concludes that an over-active 
conscience left them with a paralysis of the will which has marked subsequent 
Christian character also. 
 
  The same ambivalence continues into Husain's later work.  In Qaryah 
Zalimah Cragg finds in Husain the recognition that shirk can take many forms, and 
that 'it is possible even for Islam in certain manifestations to displace in men's loyalty 
the very God to whom it witnesses, if it becomes thereby an end in and unto itself.' 
[ibid xviii]  In Al-Wadi Al-Muqaddas, translated by Cragg as The Hallowed Valley, 
Husain identifies this issue, in more philosophic vein, with the problems of large-scale 
collectives: 
The greater the numbers of a community the weaker its sense of guidance and the 
more likely its becoming perverse.  The larger a collective the more prone it is to 
approximate to sheer animal instincts.  The laws that govern mass societies are close 
indeed to those of the jungle. 
Saints and good men do not differ much from politicians and business men when they 
act corporately. 
It is no easy matter to define one's relationship to the community to which one 
belongs.  In its misguidedness it may impose obligations that are altogether wrong.  
Being subject to such an order may bring out hidden virtues within a man, such as 
courage or sincerity or sacrifice.  But the dictates of the collective may be sound and 
in that event one's energy in doing what is due may be quite inadequate and one could 
be parading as sensitivity of conscience a withholding of oneself which is in fact 
either cowardice or self-interest.  People do deceive themselves in ways like these and 
  
 
  
their judgements become disorganised in a confusion of right and wrong, of truth and 
error. [KC 1977 Valley 55,57,61] 
 
In Sandals at the Mosque Cragg had written that 'Plural selves are more prone than 
private ones to miss the duty of losing themselves in what their selfhood serves.' [KC 
1959 Sandals 101]  He was clearly dissatisfied with Husain's analysis of the 
obligations of religion and society.  As early as 1932 in the West Reinhold Niebuhr 
was among the first of those Christian thinkers who questioned the prevalent middle 
class liberal idealism and advocated a shift to the right in theology and the left in 
politics. [Niebuhr 1932]  Cragg never shows much sign of adopting a socialist 
outlook, but his experience of the Palestinian conflict would hardly have encouraged 
him to emulate Husain's retreat from political engagement. [See KC 1982 Jerusalem]  
One reviewer regarded The Hallowed Valley as 'a work which, at times, seems both to 
have intrigued and irritated' its translator. [Fitzgerald 1979:261]    'Maybe,' wrote 
Cragg of Husain, 'we should understand The Hallowed Valley, with his other writings, 
as a call to quietude.' [KC 1977 Valley 7]  In spite of twenty years of friendship, there 
seems in the later book to be a certain distancing on Cragg's part from his previous 
enthusiasm for the author, an emphasis that 'Dr Husain is hardly to be taken as 
representative' and that his is 'a unique perspective on a personal Islam'. [ibid 2]  It is 
true that Husain's 'quietude' extends to an apparent unconcern for the claims to truth of 
credal statements: 'Creeds are good so long as they correspond to your patterns of 
thought...  Beliefs may conflict and contradict each other and yet constitute evidence 
of deep faith.' [ibid 38]  In a criticism that, ironically, some conservative Christians 
have made of Cragg himself Cragg refers to Husain's 
posture (as) almost unique to himself in what we might perhaps call his nonchalance, 
his mild "unassuming assumption" of the case, that does not gird itself for any 
controversy, in hope to obviate it by intelligent neglect.  This irenic temper may be a 
wise strategy in context, but it can hardly be seen as the end of the road or the limit of 
the liability. [ibid 7]  
To serve that liability, Cragg felt, it will be necessary to 'deepen the categories; to 
explore the ultimate sources of evil in the masses and the collectives... and to strive 
without dismay for at least a measure of social justice and a proximate compassion in 
societies as such.' [ibid 9] 
 
  In response, then, to Husain's familiar Islamic characterisation of 
Christians as unduly preoccupied with evil, Cragg like Kraemer calls for a deeper 
grappling with the issue. [Kraemer 1938:218]  But, unlike Kraemer and many others, 
he does not charge Islam itself with superficiality -  'This, religiously speaking, rather 
shallow and superficial religion' [ibid 219] - for there is sufficient depth implicit in the 
call to islam and the avoidance of shirk if only Muslims can be encouraged to explore 
it.  Husain was on the right lines, but, perhaps to Cragg's eventual disappointment, did 
not go far enough.  Indeed the promise, in Christian terms, of City of Wrong in its 
treatment of the events of Good Friday seems to be plainly nullified by one passage in 
the later book.  Speaking about theological differences between members of different 
faiths and the dispute between Christians and Muslims over the crucifixion of Jesus, 
(and somewhat contradicting his earlier remarks about creeds - cf KC 1977 Valley 38) 
he writes: 
If it were merely a contention about a historical happening the situation would be 
easy.  People can differ about events without being sharply divided among 
themselves.  The real issue that divides lies in the fact that Christians believe in 
  
 
  
atonement and redemption...  With us: 'No burden bearer can bear any other's burden.' 
 Thus we cannot find purifying through what we do not believe.  And that is what is 
deeply at stake for us when we deny the crucifixion. [ibid 76] 
 
  But if Husain eventually declined to pursue the issue of Jesus' 
crucifixion there have been a handful of other Muslims  who were prepared to take the 
question further.  Among them was a personal friend of Cragg, Mohamed al-Nowaihi 
of Cairo.  In an address to a mixed audience of Muslims and Christians in Cairo 
Cathedral in 1974, Nowaihi, partly in response to some words of Cragg's own, spoke 
about 'the sheer beauty and nobility of the idea of redemption, not, indeed, as a literal 
fact... but as... a magnificent and uplifting symbol' of human willingness for 
self-sacrifice, and went on to speak about the use of the symbol of the cross in the 
recent work of Arab poets. [Nowaihi 1976:218]  Later in the same address, but 
without linking the two, he went on to interpret surah 36:30 - 'Ah!  Alas for My 
servants!' (ya hasratan 'ala'l-ibad!) as expressing God's sorrow and regret over the 
reception which met all his messengers. [ibid 221]  Cragg, while questioning 
Nowaihi's exegesis, welcomed the alertness to the inner Qur'anic meaning that it 
demonstrated. [KC 19:191f]  Kamil Husain, he must have felt, was not after all 
destined to be unique among Muslims. 
  
 
  
D  God's Omnipotence: The Sacred and the Secular 
 
 
  The questions that remain about Cragg's understanding of Truth and 
Power in Islam concern the nature of God's omnipotence and what this means for the 
human handling of the divine demands on human society.  In a rare personal 
confession Cragg, after detailing much common ground with Islam, admits that 
'Broadly my discomfort about the Qur'an is its view of divine omnipotence.' [KC 
89:202]  Much of his argument turns on the divine involvement with humanity to 
which God has committed himself by the very logic of creation, the kenosis (or 
freely-willed divine self-limitation) implicit in it by the decision to let man be free 
either to offer his islam to God or to withhold it. [ibid 200]  We have already seen 
how this theme is developed in his writing in chapter 2.  The implications of this 
understanding, however, are crucial for his attitude to Islam.  Rejecting the dictum of 
Dorothee Soelle that 'There is no way to combine omnipotence with love' [ibid 202], 
Cragg asks if there is not to be found 'a more resourceful divine response' to the 
problems of human recalcitrance and evil than the threats and warnings of judgement 
to come. [ibid 204]  He sees, of course, such a response as involving the participation 
of the human in Jesus, and indeed, if Muslims would see it properly, in a different way 
in Muhammad also.  For Muslims this would be limiting God, but 'The Christian 
Gospel sees almightiness precisely where Islam excludes it.' [ibid 205f]   
 
  Asking then if the whole question may be said to 'matter', since Kamil 
Husain, for one, would reckon that the significance of creeds lies in the purified lives 
of those who hold them, Cragg answers with what appears to be his final judgement 
on Islam. 
If we have an ultimately repressive theism, we shall have repressive society.  It 
matters what is transcendently enthroned...  And Islam has been the most 
power-assured of all faiths, the most frank and uninhibited in its confidence that state 
and law and rule can effectuate genuine religion.  Its calendar dates, significantly, not 
from a founder's birth, nor from a Book's being mediated into time, but from a state's 
inauguration. [ibid 206] 
It is worth noting at this point that Cragg is supported by a historian of Islam.  AKS 
Lambton, in an article already referred to on the theory of Persian government, claims 
that 
(Islamic) medieval theory... because of the absence of a dualism between 'Church' and 
State, and because of its assumption of perfection and perfectibility in the ruler, led 
inescapably to despotism...  This in effect meant that the State belonged to the latest 
despot who usurped it. [Lambton 1956:6:146] 
In similar manner Cragg roundly rejects the 'perverse pleading' for an absolute 
'Islamic' God whose acts need no inquiry and no justification made by RC Zaehner at 
the end of his life. [Zaehner 1975 & KC 80] 
 
  Cragg refuses to commend the inscrutable, as he hears Zaehner doing, 
or to enthrone repression, which he identifies as the danger of Islam, as of other 
religious establishments.  The question that remains, however, is how Cragg perceives 
the corporate dimension of human obedience to God's summons within society.  In 
rejecting the 'repressive theism' of Islam has he taken the measure either of the failure 
of Christian grappling with the same issues, or of the possibility that his understanding 
of Islam is to some degree 'contaminated' by his western vantage-point and its 
  
 
  
economic and political vested interests?  Cragg briefly rehearses the latter thesis as 
developed in the writings of Edward Said, but concludes, with some justice, that 
vested interests can be found on all sides. [KC 1986 Call 196f cf Said 1978]  On the 
former issue he is ready to admit the folly of views prevalent in Christian West in the 
1960s, and their 'criminally sanguine' notion of a secular future, views he attempted to 
rebut at the time in Christianity in World Perspective. [KC 1986 Christ 85 & n 17]  
But since he does not deal with shari'ah in his writings, his response to this issue is 
mainly theoretical, and centres on the issue of human freedom.  'God and coercion do 
not belong together.' 
Take the issue of 'sacred' and 'secular'.  The 'sacred' has to concede the distinction, and 
with it the autonomy of human life, or else there is nothing to be 'sanctified'.  This 
autonomy which, distorted, means the 'secular' unhallowed, can only be so hallowed, 
not by domination but by consent...  The more any truth or right is coercive the less it 
is religious. [KC 1986 Christ 90]    
But 'there is no separation of realms', for the whole man, personal and political, is 
made in God's image and responsible to him.  So the problem is transcended in the 
divine patience, or included in the human tragedy.  We have yet to see whether this 
constitutes a proper reckoning with the significance of Islam. 
  
 
  
Chapter 5 
 
THE THEOLOGICAL GOAL: CHRISTIAN MISSION TO ISLAM 
 
 
A  Cragg's Missionary Inheritance 
 
  Where does Cragg stand in terms of his missionary inheritance?  And 
how does he understand himself in the flow of that history?  Two biographical articles 
breathe a warm affection for Temple Gairdner and Constance Padwick, CMS 
missionaries in Egypt and the Middle East, and the second the biographer of the first. 
[KC 92, KC 66 & Padwick 1929]  Of Temple Gairdner Cragg's attitude is almost of 
homage: 
For the present writer it is a work of piety to reflect on a personality whose biography, 
as almost lyrically written by Constance Padwick, played a large part in his own 
beginnings and continuing from Oxford to Cairo. [KC 92:164] 
Padwick he knew personally, and corresponded with, having access also to letters she 
exchanged with Louis Massignon. [KC 66:33f,37]  Her biography of Gairdner was of 
key importance in providing the 'emotional fire' to Cragg's life as an undergraduate, 
and her article on the ancient glories of the North African Church he read at a critical 
moment after his arrival in Beirut. [Personal conversation 5.11.80  See Padwick 1938] 
 
  It was the combination in both these personalities of a long and costly 
personal engagement with Muslims and their world, and a resolute intention to 
understand Islam at depth that moved Cragg to admire and to emulate them.  Both 
spent the major part of their adult lives in the Middle East, attaining formidable 
competence in Arabic, and both were deeply rooted in the life of the Church.  Both 
had made a significant contribution to Islamic studies, Gairdner in his translation of 
Ghazali's Mishkat al-Anwar, and Padwick with her Muslim Devotions. A Study of 
Prayer-Manuals in Common Use. [Gairdner 1924 & Padwick 1961]  It was Duncan 
Black Macdonald who had urged Gairdner into serious Islamic study [Padwick 
1929:204], and Constance Padwick whose study of Muslim prayer seems to have 
impressed Cragg as 'a gesture of imagination inspired by one faith towards the inner 
genius of another.' [KC 66:35]  Here was the inner heart of so much Muslim worship 
laid bare; here were the instincts of that heart which called for a Christian initiative in 
response. 
 
  We have noted the importance for Cragg of the theological theme and 
the daily reality of relationships, between God and man, and between Christian and 
Muslim.  We have seen too the centrality of worship for him.  What Gairdner and 
particularly Padwick seem to have left with him was the further logical step of 
Christian 'hospitality' to the worshipping Muslim world, not merely in terms of 
meeting with people, and so accepting Muslim hospitality, but in the demanding 
hospitality of the Christian mind to the true intentions, the inner heart of Islam itself.  
Padwick in particular held together 'the Christian conviction and the Islamic 
hospitality.' [ibid 36, cf her Call to Istanbul 1958]  By making the theme of hospitality 
a key element in his approach to Islam Cragg makes it plain that he is not prepared to 
follow the dual method of observation while suspending judgement, followed by 
evaluation according to carefully stated Christian criteria. [see chapter 4.B]  That 
would be too much like making God an academic topic, 'a blasphemous, and indeed 
  
 
  
also a ludicrous impossibility.' [KC 1959 Sandals 68] 
It is supposed in some quarters that no faith can be sympathetically studied except in a 
neutrality, or abeyance, of belief.  (Padwick) is a signal disproof of this assumption.  
All that she wrote, she wrote out of a profound, and missionary, commitment to Christ 
as Christianity receives Him.  Yet she attained a patient kinship with Muslim norms 
and themes and made their world her own. [KC 66:35] 
 
  There is an affective, emotional content to this kind of language which 
presumes that conviction can relate directly to conviction, without the intermediate 
epoche, the temporary setting aside of personal beliefs so as to enable an allegedly 
more reliable, because objective and dispassionate assessment.  'Hospitality' assumes a 
face-to-face relationship in which both the participants are themselves, sharing a home 
with others.  This is clearly not the language of assessment and evaluation.  In fact any 
cool and distant assessment is forgotten in the encounter, or rather is itself absorbed in 
an appeal to the other to share the deepest things of heart and mind together.  The 
result is that writing in this vein always becomes a kind of preaching.  This may 
account for the widely divergent estimates of Cragg's books given by different Muslim 
readers. [see chapter 6]  It is not easy to remain indifferent when the sermon reaches 
its climax.  The hearer is sure to be drawn into either approval or hostility.  Nor is the 
preacher, caught up in his message, primarily concerned to evaluate the precise 
spiritual condition of his hearers, except as is necessary more effectively to move 
them in heart and mind to a new realisation of God.  And in the execution of that task 
many possible but needless judgements may safely  be left to God.  Cragg is not 
inclined to apologize for this manner of approach, with its uncompromising Christian 
discipleship: 
It may be that Christian commitment, with its concern for the significance of God and 
humankind, is a surer context for the study of Islam than the academicism that knows 
only how to analyze and not how to worship. [KC 1986 Call vii] 
 
  Consequently Cragg can feel confident that he is not touched by the 
accusation of an incomplete or inauthentic relationship with Muslims, in which his 
friendships are based upon the avoidance of controversial topics or corrupted by the 
attempt to win the other to his Christian cause.  If the metaphor of preaching leaves 
that impression it needs to be balanced again with the theme of hospitality.  It is not 
accidental that in his tribute to her Cragg links Constance Padwick with Louis 
Massignon, for the great French Islamicist claimed to have  been converted to an adult 
Christian faith through the rescuing hospitality of Muslims and the strange influence 
of the long-dead Sufi martyr Al-Hallaj.  Massignon told Padwick that his first prayer 
was in Muslim Arabic. [KC 66:37]  Here was a man who used as a daily personal 
discipline the three prayers of Abraham; for Isaac, representing the Jews, for Ishmael, 
representing the Muslims, and for Sodom and Gomorrah, whose sin he identified as a 
failure in hospitality (Genesis 19), representing the Christians. [Massignon 1935]  
There is no doubt that Massignon felt keenly the historic failure of Christians to offer 
any kind of hospitality to Muslims, and that both Padwick and Cragg came to share 
that view.  They did not, however, share his very Catholic concept of badaliyya, or 
substitution, whereby Christians offered prayer and received the Mass on behalf of 
Muslims, so making up in the self-offering of the Church what was lacking in Islam. 
 
  Cragg's approach was different, though no less theological in its 
implications.  Hospitality he describes as 'surely the closest of all analogies to the 
  
 
  
meaning of the Gospel.' [KC 1968 World 71]    Christian existence he thinks of as a 
'divine hospitality within the world.' [KC 86:17]  The language of hospitality is always 
in his mind:   'Are we not ourselves the guests of God in Christ?' [KC 149:269]  But 
his reflections take a more inward, and psychological turn.  Cragg has clearly thought 
much about the inner dynamic of the emotional life of the Christian representative 
among other faiths.  We saw that theologically he is inclined to trust in the 
'proceeding' of the Spirit without attempting to define at all closely how that may be 
recognised. [chapter 3.C]  Ethically, or pastorally, he is inclined to rely in a similar 
way on 'the reasons of the heart', without waiting for more explicit arguments.  
Writing of Constance Padwick's great collection of Muslim prayer-manuals and the 
qualities of mind and personality which were necessary to win them from booksellers 
whose piety sometimes made them unwilling to sell such works to a non-Muslim, he 
says   
There is the yearning to 'belong' with the other party in genuine openness of soul and 
reverence of heart, even before the dogmatic prohibitions or communal restraints have 
been fully handled.  The heart has its instincts which may not wait for sanctions it has 
somehow left behind.  Yet within the transaction there is also an abiding loyalty, 
refined perhaps, but no less secure, because it has ventured beyond its traditional 
moorings and moved without specific leave from its institutions of authority. [KC 
66:36] 
 
  It should not be thought that Cragg, who is after all an Anglican 
bishop, is careless of authority, or happy for the whim of religion to be indulged 
wherever it might lead.  Alive to God, his anthology of Muslim and Christian prayer, 
has a 55-page introduction in justification of the exercise and of the common worship 
it anticipates and hopes to serve.  If the themes of preaching and hospitality both 
suggest the unguardedness and emotion of enthusiasm rather than a carefully 
disciplined approach, there must be added from Cragg's stock vocabulary the 
metaphor of embassy.  To be a 'resident alien' (a phrase which, like 'the kenosis of the 
Spirit', he attributes to Wheeler-Robinson [KC 66:34]), is one description of the 
missionary, and suggests the extensive adjustment of mind and manner required to be 
at home in a faith not one's own.  There is a 'country of the mind' to be explored and 
inhabited. [KC 1971 Event 19]  But further, the Christian in that country is in a 
representative capacity, and must learn to speak the local language so as to be 
understood.  Protesting against the 'strongly domestic accent', the dogmatic Western 
character of contemporary Christianity, Cragg pleads for  
a much more total, and willing, acceptance of a world perspective... of continuing 
cultural pluralism... and so, in turn, of genuine theological and spiritual 'embassy', 
representing Christ but in full residential capacity, with credentials that, for all their 
authority, are subject to local presentation. [KC 1968 World 198] 
We shall see how the necessity of 'local presentation' can affect ecclesiastical policy, 
for example towards the administration of baptism to Muslim converts. [KC 1986 
Call 315f] 
 
  Cragg has gone much further than Paul's original use of the theme of 
embassy in 2 Corinthians 5:20, though the message of reconciliation remains at the 
heart of his use of it.  For much of his thinking and writing focusses on the resources 
within the faith and culture where the Christian ambassador is resident by which the 
Christian message may be cogently expressed in terms comprehensible to the 'local' 
people.  So an Islamic 'language' becomes available to the Christian missionary 
  
 
  
whereby he may speak of Christ.  Described in this way there is really nothing very 
new or startling in Cragg's programme, though Orthodox Christians would have 
strong reservations about his ideas about a human, as distinct from a divine kenosis.  
The missionary vocation and method are, of course, instantly recognisable.  Cragg 
himself would argue further that its precedents go back to the New Testament itself, 
and were practised, if not elucidated, by Paul.  One of his chapters in Christianity in 
World Perspective is entitled: 'New Testament Universality: Precedents and Open 
Questions.'  Though there can be no compromise on essentials [KC 1986 Call 219], 
the theme of reconciliation, and the Pauline spirit, are everywhere apparent in Cragg's 
writing.  Writing of the 'harsh world' of Islam, he says 
Yet the harshness has to be transcended, for much of it is well intentioned.  And in 
any event the story to be told is only safe in the custody of those for whom every 
antagonism is an opportunity.  For that, precisely, is the heart of the story itself. [ibid 
164] 
 
  It would not be right to suggest that all the influence and learning that 
Cragg anticipates as a result of this Christian spiritual embassy is to be one way, that 
only Muslims will change.  The introduction to his classic book, The Call of the 
Minaret, makes clear that the book is intended to be a call for Christians, not merely to 
talk about one for Muslims: 
Its title tells what it would constitute, as well as what it would describe.  And the one 
because of the other.  Can we so become aware of Islam as to enter into all its 
implications for the Christian? [ibid x] 
It is difficult, however, to summarize the full extent of these implications as Cragg 
sees them.  Apart from the necessity for a world perspective which we have already 
noted, and a willingness to perceive the Spirit 'proceeding' into all kinds of 
unexpected places beyond the cultural world of the Mediterranean basin, the chief 
implication for the Christian seems to be a willingness to loosen the rigidity of his 
doctrinal vocabulary, because the encounter with Islam has led him to a greater depth 
in the grasp of his own faith, and so to discover a greater inventiveness and flexibility 
in expressing it.  Speaking of the common Muslim belief that Jesus has been 
improperly 'Hellenised' in the westward expansion of the Church Cragg asks whether 
Islam may not 'now be seen as presenting to us in characteristically simple form the 
perennial question about Jesus?' [KC 1985 Jesus 14]  Islam presents a radical 
challenge in its 'alternative Jesus' to conventional Christian categories.  But apart from 
the opportunity for new sympathies, and strenuous thought, does the Christian take 
anything from Islam for himself, as new?  Cragg would probably answer No, if by 
'new' is meant anything in contrast, or addition, to the Good News of God in Christ.  
But we have not thereby gone beyond the reach of the Gospel, for properly 
understood, all the central themes of Islam, islam itself, shirk and the rest, are 
involved in the inner intention of all Godward faiths. [KC 1986 Christ 12]   
 
  It is clear by now that in directing his approach to Islam under the 
metaphor of embassy Cragg intends a mission not merely to Muslims but to Islam, to 
that country of the mind where he has found such fascination.  Here is something new 
in the missionary inheritance, though Cragg would never claim sole credit for it: 
If there is legitimate point in the distinction between Christian mission to Muslims 
intending their conversion, and a Christian mission to Islam intending a relevance to 
its mind and society, it was a distinction hardly operative in Christian awareness in 
Gairdner's generation. [KC 92:165] 
  
 
  
The distinction, however, was very early in Cragg's mind.  He wrote in his thesis of 
the debt of witness owed by the Christian Church to Islam, a debt which 'may perhaps 
best be discharged in an attempt to help Islam to a more critical awareness of itself - 
an objective, which, in turn, may require serious modifications in the evangelistic 
approach.' [KC 161 pt1:22 - see section C]  As previously noted, his aim was to 
examine contemporary Muslim apologetic writing as Muslims struggled to come to 
terms with the modern world, and to set it side by side with the equivalent efforts of 
Christian thinkers over a much longer period of parallel engagement. 
Our study has shown that Muslim reaction to the intellectual summons of the time is 
still largely in the defensive stage.  It must one day pass... into a stage more concerned 
to unlearn and less to justify, more ready to seek and less to suspect.  Such a 
development is to be anticipated by all that we can deduce from modern religious 
history in general.  As and when that stage arrives, Christianity, already doctrinally 
and historically qualified, should equip and discipline itself to be also spiritually 
qualified, as the handmaid of Muslim intellectual activity. [ibid pt2:279] 
 
  This in sum is what Cragg means by 'the mission to Islam'.  It is built 
on the parallel confidence that 'if Christianity be as it is claimed the tests that time and 
change impose on any faith will pre-dispose it (Islam) Christwards.' [ibid pt1:23]  The 
Church must strive to mediate to Muslims the relevance of its own theological 
experience in the modern world, in the hope that the necessary realism of apology will 
achieve from within Islam what controversy conducted by Christians from without 
had failed to produce, namely, the 'Muslim discovery of Christ'. [ibid pt1:562f]  For 
'Islam in Christian minds must always be the object of a policy of hope.' [ibid pt1:32] 
 
  The hopes of 1950 were not abandoned.  Thirty years later Cragg was 
writing of 'the Islamic reasons for being Christian', and calling for a Christian study of 
the Qur'an in which we 'maximize legitimately all its deeply pro-Christian emphases.' 
[KC 92:166]  We should note that in 1950 he reckoned that another fifty years would 
be required before the 'problems under review' could be assessed in an adequate 
perspective. [KC 161:pt1:33]  Meanwhile Cragg has continued his study of those 
Muslims who have attempted an apologetic stance to the modern world in such books 
as City of Wrong, Counsels in Contemporary Islam, the Theology of Unity, A Passage 
to France, The Hallowed Valley, and The Pen and the Faith.  He has  made some of 
their work available to the English-speaking world, including of course 
English-speaking Muslims, through translation.  He has also made a particular study 
of Muslim prayer and devotional writing, and of the Qur'an, in Alive to God, the 
Event of the Qur'an, The Mind of the Qur'an, and The Wisdom of the Sufis.  In 
chapter 6 we shall see in greater detail how he has handled this material.  Here we 
need to note the way in which he enables the 'maximizing' of the 'pro-Christian 
emphases' of the Qur'an and other literature of Islam by avoiding the traditional 
controversies.  In fact it does amount to a form of abeyance, or epoche, but without 
the religious 'neutrality' he finds objectionable in those terms: 
The I'jaz of the Qur'an... is then the form by which Muslim conviction possesses its 
relevance.  The outsider then can take it pragmatically in this way without holding it 
credally.  In doing so he will differ from, and with, orthodoxy, but only about the form 
in which orthodoxy receives the significance he aims to share and, indeed, to revere. 
[KC 1971 Event 21] 
 
  The alert Muslim may want to ask how this differs from the contrasting 
  
 
  
ways in which Muslims and Christians receive the significance of Christ, and indeed 
revere him.  But Cragg's theological aim is not to do away with controversy, but to 
refine it so that it focusses on the points he believes are ultimately at issue.  The old 
battlegrounds of the status of the Qur'an and of Christ can happily be abandoned for a 
more fundamental debate about the nature of God and his liability for our salvation. 
[cf chapter 2.E]  Here he believes himself to be entirely at one with Gairdner, who 
believed that 'Christian mission had decisive "quarrel" with Islam, which irenic 
sensitivity must refine but could in no way loyally evade.' [KC 92:165f]  The old 
controversy has then become a 'loyal controversy', loyal both to the Gospel and to the 
deepest meaning of Islam itself. [KC 22:280, 281  cf KC 90:20]  For the proper 
abandonment of the polemics of the past should not mean that we refuse to recognise 
a much older and more basic dispute still - the controversy that God has with his 
world.  In one place Cragg describes the initial prophetic experience of Muhammad as 
a realisation that he himself was being commissioned to be an 'agent of the eternal 
contention of God with the city and its world.' [KC 1971 Event 32]   
 
  But Cragg generally prefers the more conciliatory language of 
'clarification', and especially of 'retrieval'.  Writing as editor of The Muslim World 
about Muslim understanding of the death of Christ Cragg maintained that  
the service of this journal is patiently devoted to the tasks and stimulus of such essays 
in clarification.  There is still too much in Islamic disqualification of Christianity 
which has mistaken both the Christian thing and its own Quranic document. [KC 
158:82] 
The theme of 'retrieval' requires a section to itself. 
  
 
  
B  The Concept of Retrieval 
 
 
The positive implications for the faith of the Christian within Islamic theology are 
significant and must, at all costs be imaginatively and loyally retrieved. [KC 17:195] 
 
  In the highly revealing article about the 'legacy' of Temple Gairdner 
Cragg embodies much of his missionary theology in two seminal sentences.  Referring 
to the 'enmities and asperities' of the nineteenth century Christian response to Islam, 
he continues 
May it not be a still more authentic relation to Islam of a suffering Christian theology 
to refuse to concede that Islam is impervious on its own terms to the theological 
relevance of the cross?  Have we sufficiently rescued the implications in the firm 
Quranic doctrine of creation? [KC 92:166 - emphasis original] 
There are at least three concepts of real novelty here, expressed in the phrases 
'suffering Christian theology'; 'sufficiently rescued the implications'; and 'on its own 
terms'. 
 
  The conjunction of 'suffering' and 'theology' is hardly new in Christian 
thought, but it normally takes some such form as 'a theology of suffering'.  I think, 
however, that we can be confident that Cragg is being characteristically precise with 
his words, and means more than this here; that he intended something other, though 
not less, than a straight objective genitive.  Can theology itself be said to suffer - not 
merely in the conventional sense that some missing element or some incoherence 
renders it defective (as in 'his theology suffers from...'), but in the sense that it 
experiences pain and adversity?  Cragg, as so often, is extending the boundaries of the 
English language at this point, and the neologism may appeal or not.  It gives an 
invaluable clue, however, to the character of his intellectual mission to Islam, his 
pursuit of the relevance of Christian theology to its mind and heart. [ibid 165]  Not 
only must Christian theology not be 'secluded' [KC 1959 Sandals 21], it must take the 
full weight of the Islamic understanding of God and the world and its critique of 
Christianity, and conceding all its force, reach a deeper logic and a profounder 
analysis of the human situation and God's answer to it.  It must 'suffer', as Bushnell 
taught that God through his Holy Spirit continues to suffer as he indwells us. [KC 
127:1:20  cf ch 1 B] 
   
  Cragg's method can be illustrated by a simple comparison.  Many 
Christians have wanted to argue with what they regard as the severe limitation placed 
on the significance of Jesus by his Islamic status as a prophet, and books with such 
titles as Jesus. A Prophet of Islam have been answered by others such as Jesus. More 
than a Prophet. [Rahim 1979 & Wootton 1982]  Such Christian books are generally 
silent about the status of Muhammad, to the added resentment of Muslims.  Cragg in 
contrast is prepared to concede the status of prophet to Muhammad, while asking if 
prophethood, either on the Christian or the Muslim model, is adequate to achieve what 
needs to be achieved in relation to 'man's inward remaking'.[KC 1959 Sandals 77]   
Take, for example, Jesus' reported phrase about John the Baptist: 'Yea, I say unto you, 
and more than a prophet.'  On Quranic grounds one cannot speak of anything 'more' 
than prophets in divine dealing with the human world.  In the divine education of 
humanity prophets are all we have and their guidance all we need...  On such an 
understanding, Jesus' words have a strange ring.  For they hint at other dimensions 
  
 
  
entailed by prophethood itself... depths of travail and tragedy where behaviour might 
speak with a deeper eloquence than words. [KC 1985 Jesus 27 cf KC 1984 
Muhammad 125f] 
In this passage Cragg correctly makes the phrase 'more than a prophet' describe John 
the Baptist, rather than Jesus, but more importantly questions the whole Islamic 
concept of prophethood, inviting Muslims to a 'radical readiness for new frontiers of 
thought' [ibid] about God's provision for the world.  It may be argued that Islam does 
in practice know God as offering more than merely a 'divine education of humanity' 
which is the real target of Cragg's criticism here.  Do not millions of Muslims look to 
Muhammad and the saints for intercession?  We must take up Cragg's lacunae in 
interpreting Islam in chapter 6.  Here we note simply the attempt by Cragg to face the 
full force of Islam.  In so doing he aims to make his theology consonant with the story 
of travail and tragedy that shapes it, and to arrive at a 'suffering Christian theology', 
enacting the self-surrender that the faith prescribes even in the arena of its thought 
about other, rival, interpretations of God and the world. [cf chapter 4.A]  There are 
close analogies here with a colourful passage in Gairdner's early book The Reproach 
of Islam (1909), quoted by Padwick in her influential biography: 
Why must we for ever renounce all the favourable conditions, giving, like the Scottish 
King at Flodden, all the advantages to the opponent?  Why must we strive always up 
the hill, the wind and the rain for ever driving in our faces; ever, ever conceding, 
never, never receiving the handicap and the odds!...  If Islam's forces are indeed 
nature,the world and the flesh, then Islam has left us one weapon in taking away all 
the others - it has abandoned to us the Sword of the Spirit - The Spirit of Jesus is the 
only asset of the Church. [Padwick 1929:184f  emphasis original - cf Gairdner 
1909:325,326] 
 
  Cragg undoubtedly believes that by handling themes common to 
Christianity and Islam in this way he is 'rescuing their implications'. [see above]  
Prophecy, for example, being the forthtelling of the divine word, 'exists to bring and 
bring home the divine imperative...', to instruct and subdue the human mastery over 
the created order to conform to the pattern God intended.  The question, for Cragg, 
then arises: 
Should there, on prophecy's own showing, be something more than prophecy?  Does 
law, by prohibition and injunction, make good its own intention?  Or must there be 
dimensions to divine sovereignty greater than those of 'education' and 'command'? 
[KC 1984 Muhammad 125, 126] 
This is Cragg's method of Retrieval, or the rescue of an ancient and fruitless 
controversy by initiating, and so requiring a more theological handling of its terms.  It 
may be said that he has merely shifted the ground of the controversy, and that to argue 
that there should be something more than prophecy 'on prophecy's own showing', is 
merely tendentious.  We must examine the validity of the method shortly, but further 
examples will serve to clarify the issues involved.  
 
  A similar intervention to that on the question of prophethood has 
produced some movement in the deadlocked argument about the death of Jesus.  
Berating the 'rather supine' assumption [KC 158:81] that the Qur'an totally negates the 
Christian account of the crucifixion, Cragg sets about explaining that, on either New 
Testament or Quranic reckoning, the Jews intended to execute Christ and thought that 
they were doing so.  In both Scriptures, therefore, the human response to the Sermon 
on the Mount and the rest of Jesus' teaching is the intention to crucify the preacher. 
  
 
  
[KC 1959 City xiiif, KC 1985 Jesus 167f, and several other places]  Moreover, claims 
Cragg, the very rescue of Jesus from the Cross which the Qur'an is understood to 
teach, argues his unwillingness to rescue himself by compromise or abandonment of 
his task, and so his willingness to go through with the suffering it entailed. [KC 1985 
Jesus 168]  Considered then as man's will, and as the will of Jesus, the Cross was an 
actuality. 
 
  The question that remains is the will of God, and what historically 
happened.  Some Muslims are prepared to say that this cannot be known.  'Christ,' 
says the Indian Muslim philosopher Vahiduddin, 'is a mystery which unfolds itself at 
different levels, and the termination of his earthly career on a fatefuly Friday in 
Jerusalem is equally wrapped in mystery.' [Vahiduddin 1986:182 cf Yusuf 'Ali 1975, 
commentary on 4:157, 158; Kamil Husain in KC 1959 City 222]   All these Muslims 
do, however, firmly reject the Christian doctrine of redemption built upon the event 
alleged.  But this procedure enables Cragg to shift the whole focus of the debate about 
the Cross away from the logjam of disagreement about what actually happened to the 
question of what we may expect from God in his active mercy to the world.  The 
discussion about redemption can itself be redeemed from futility by focussing on the 
reception given to God's message in the person of his messenger, and asking what 
God may be expected to do about it.  Cragg has given away nothing of Christian truth 
in this procedure.  Nor has he pretended there is agreement where there is none.  But 
his concentration on genuine areas of agreement throws into sharper focus the real 
area of disagreement, and so the 'quarrel' is refined. [see section A] 
 
  These two illustrations give some indication of what is meant by Cragg 
to be involved in his term 'The Call to Retrieval', which is the title of a critical chapter 
in his seminal book The Call of the Minaret.  The rise of Islam was due in part to the 
failure of the Church in the past [cf Gairdner 1909:53 & passim], 'a failure in love, in 
purity, and in fervor, a failure of the spirit.' 
It is for these reasons that the call of the minaret must always seem to Christians a call 
to retrieval.  They yearn to undo the alienation and to make amends for the past by as 
full a restitution as they can achieve of the Christ to whom Islam is a stranger... All 
that the minaret both says and fails to say is included in this call to retrieval as the 
listening Christian hears it. [KC 1986 Call 220] 
The chapter continues with detailed references to what Cragg describes as the Muslim 
jahiliyya/darkness or ignorance about Christ and Christianity, running through such 
representative Muslim writers as Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Ali and Muhammad 
Husain Haykal, as well as outlining the views of the Ahmadiyya, despite their rather 
unrepresentative character. [ibid 221-227]  Some would dispute Cragg's use of the 
word 'jahiliyya' at this point, arguing that the gulf between the Jesus of the New 
Testament and the Jesus of the Qur'an has been much overestimated.  So Raïsänen 
argues, focussing on Luke's account and attacking Cragg's assumption of the 
inadequacy of the portrait of Jesus in the Qur'an. [Raïsänen 1980:122]  Again we note 
Cragg's conservatism in Biblical studies compared to New Testament scholars like 
Raïsänen.  But as Cragg sees it, the need for 'retrieval' is made most evident by the 
Quranic picture of Jesus, 'sadly attenuated' and 'emasculated' as he finds it. [KC 1986 
Call 235]  But 'the loss of Christ necessarily argues a delinquent Christianity' [ibid 
236], and there is no problem in finding such a thing, from seventh century 
ecclesiastical disputes and poisoned theological controversies, through the Crusades to 
the corrupting influence of the 'Christian' West on Muslim lands today. 
  
 
  
 
  In The Call of the Minaret the discussion of Christian and Muslim 
theology then continues under the heading of 'The Call to Interpretation' (Ch. 10), but 
that chapter itself begins with the quotation 'Rescue a word... discover a universe', and 
it seems appropriate to discuss the whole thrust of Cragg's missionary theology under 
this concept of 'retrieval', complemented with such words as 'rescue' and 'restitution', 
with which it obviously belongs.  For 'let it be clear that the retrieval is not territorial.  
Christianity is not a territorial expression.  The retrieval is spiritual.  It aims not to 
have the map more Christian but Christ more widely known.' [ibid 230]  'There can be 
no ultimate territorial expression of the Gospel.  Rather it creates its own 
interpenetrating community... whose badge is the new heart and suffering.' [KC 1959 
Sandals 37]   
 
  The spiritual character of this retrieval is not limited to the correction 
of the Muslim understanding of Christ, as though what was required was merely a 
flow of more accurate information in the Muslim world about the true nature of 
Christianity, and the establishment of better personal and communal relationships 
between Christians and Muslims, important though that is.  Properly understood, 
retrieval is the task of God himself in relation to the creation which has gone awry.  
His creation has to be made good, and the work begun in it completed.  As Cragg sees 
it, Islam in its origins was part of that task of restoration, and not an interruption or a 
subversion of it.  So he is able to set aside even the limitations of the Qur'an about 
Christ, and the 'antagonisms' thus incurred, and plead that the Qur'an should be 
primarily seen as a mission to retrieve idolaters for a true worship...  The living 
context is Arabian paganism, where prophetic duty must be done, in order that the 
undivided Lordship may prevail and so islam come to pass. [KC 1971 Event 15,16] 
Idolaters must be retrieved, or rescued, and their God-given energies turned to creative 
use through the right human and divine mastery over them, through islam.  The 
problem with historical Islam is that this retrieval has not happened because those 
energies, become evil, have been fought with their own weapons.  Writing about the 
expectation of Islam for manifest success, Cragg says that  
the evil must be mastered, but mastered in terms other than its own.  For these have a 
way of perpetuating the deeper antipathies and even confirming them.  Then there is a 
toughening, rather than a retrieving, of the inner wrongness.  Or the success 
hypothesis leaves its full task unaccomplished, and perhaps also unknown. [ibid 174] 
 
  This understanding of God's task of retrieval suggests a Christian 
attempt to retrieve the Qur'an in particular, to 'rescue all its implications', from 
Christian ignorance and inattention as much as from Muslim misunderstanding.  And 
not merely the Qur'an.  We need to pursue, says Cragg, the Quranic 'potential towards 
a New Testament situation.'  As we do so, we find that the message of the Qur'an is 
bound up with the faithfulness of the messenger in proclaiming it.  He is 'veritably 
prophet.  To that degree the message becomes the messenger.' [KC 1986 Christ 64]  
Here Cragg has gone way beyond Gairdner, and developed the thinking of Padwick in 
a Christian recognition of the central figure of Islam, a retrieval of Muhammad for 
Christian understanding, and, in a measure, admiration.  For it was Padwick who 
wrote: 'No one can estimate the power of Islam as a religion who does not take into 
account the love at the heart of it for this figure (Muhammad).' [Padwick 1961:145] 
 
  We are now in a better position to understand what Cragg means by 
  
 
  
saying that we must 'refuse to concede that Islam is impervious on its own terms to the 
theological relevance of the cross'. [KC 92:166]  For Cragg has attempted to take 
Islam with full seriousness and complete acknowledgement of its primary theological 
thrust as part of God's retrieval of the world.  For Cragg Islam is not essentially a 
social and political question, or a religious and humanitarian one.  Nor is it a problem 
in the growth of the Church.  It is above all a theological issue, at the heart of the 
missio Dei.  Being so, its imperviousness in principle cannot be allowed.  But to 
search out its implications and its potential is the task of those called to be partners in 
God's redemptive activity.  Their work may involve concentrating on minority voices 
within Islam, and those who speak, for example about the Qur'an, 'in other terms than 
those of traditional belief.' [KC 1986 Christ 61]  Such voices are vital for the 
mediation of Christian understanding to Muslim consciousness.  Moreover their 
existence argues what Cragg would describe as a self-correcting mechanism within 
Islam.  Sufism is a case in point.  The emergence and endurance of Sufism in spite of 
all the 'power-assurance' of Islam that militated against it, meant, says Cragg, that it 
had to 'abandon the formula whereby Jihad is externally directed...  That it did so 
bespeaks the resources of religion to generate their own corrective even from the most 
unlikely setting.' [KC 103:181]  In a manner reminiscent of Massignon Cragg refers 
boldly to 'the ways of the Holy Spirit in the fertility of Islam within itself, its capacity 
to produce from within its own resources the antidote by which its own characteristic 
ethos could be queried and even transformed.'  So early Sufism in particular was 'a 
conscious response to what we may well call the non-islam of institutional Islam.' 
[ibid 186,187]   
 
  It will be questioned whether Cragg is right in his assessment that 
Sufism was a corrective and not an aberration from institutional Islam, as many, both 
Christian and Muslim have claimed.  Furthermore it may be objected that many Sufis, 
eg the Sanusiyya, did not at all reject the 'external direction of jihad', but carried their 
mysticism into battle.  The larger question of the exploitation of minority and 
numerically unrepresentative viewpoints from within Islam must occupy us in chapter 
 6, in considering his criteria of interpretation.  Here it may be said simply that his 
principle of retrieval in a sense bypasses the issue of what is representative or 
characteristic of Islam in finding a means of Christian affirmation of its theological 
authenticity. 
  
 
  
C  The Mission to Islam in Action 
 
 
It is 'the flesh' in St John's sense, that becomes the point of Divine-human translation.  
Continually then the bearers of the Word must bring their treasure and the ken of men 
together.  Their task is to carry God's meaning into men's minds and hearts, that it may 
win their wills to obedience.  All the resources of the Holy Spirit, working in us 
humility and fidelity, imagination and zeal, wait upon this task. [KC 1959 Sandals 95] 
If the mission to Islam is to be conceived in terms of residence, hospitality, embassy 
and the translation referred to above (cf 5.A), what is its final goal?  And what are the 
detailed conditions under which the missioner works, and the intermediate decisions 
he needs to make along the way?  And has Cragg, as some have said, demanded too 
much of him? 
 
  There can be no doubt that Cragg regards the goal of mission to Islam 
to be a recognition by Muslims of Jesus as the Christ of God, as Christians understand 
that term.  His opening words as editor of The Muslim World make the issue quite 
clear: 
Too long the news of God in Christ has been greeted with incredulity.  It is news of 
God to which, in God's name, minds have been closed.  How shall those truths find 
entrance into hearts where their exclusion has been regarded as a first duty toward the 
God whom they concern? [KC 131:1f] 
The language, it should be noted, is the language of persuasion, almost of courtship, 
not the military vocabulary so often used in Christian missionary circles.  Cragg 
knows he is dealing with profound theological issues, which can only be taken in their 
own seriousness.  Consequently the ultimacy of Islamic conviction has to be met with 
a like appeal to what finally matters.  Cragg is quite willing to be provocative in order 
to make the point, by using what for some involved in inter-faith dialogue is the 
offensive term 'conversionist'.  He does not think, as many do, that good relationships 
between people of different faiths preclude the possibility of and desire for conversion 
to faith in Christ.  'The Christian gospel is conversionist through and through.  The 
singular Christ (Cragg's context here is Hinduism) requires the soul-seeking Church.' 
[KC 1986 Christ 17]  'The Gospel of Jesus and the Christian faith with it are 
inherently conversionist.  "Except you be converted..." were his words even to those 
of high religious esteem.' [KC 1985 Jesus 10]  It is evident that the hospitality which 
we have already expounded from Cragg's early writings, is 'an ardent hospitality' [KC 
1986 Christ 17] which, like all love, looks for response, above all in baptism and 
membership of the family of the Church. [ibid] 
 
  We saw however that in his thesis Cragg foresaw 'serious 
modifications in the evangelistic approach', which would be required because of the 
Christian attempt 'to help Islam to a more critical awareness of itself.' [KC 161 pt1:22] 
 Perhaps the most far-reaching proposal of this kind is the suggestion at the end of The 
Call of the Minaret that in Muslim society the individual is not necessarily 'the 
appropriate unit of baptism'. [KC 1986 Call 317]  While denying neither the costliness 
of true Christian discipleship nor the right of every new Christian believer to claim 
baptism, Cragg insists that 
it would be wrong to administer baptism as a seal of individual confession, without 
regard to how the form was understood in the community we are also calling into 
discipleship.  The baptism of the one cannot be in disconnection with the evangelizing 
  
 
  
of the many. [ibid 316] 
The point here is that the baptism of Muslims is commonly understood in the Muslim 
world as a kind of treason, because of the strong national and communal ties 
associated with Islam.  'Faith,' says Khurshid Ahmad, 'is not just like an overcoat 
which one may put on and put off as one likes.  It is also the foundation of the state.  
Change of loyalty in faith has implications for loyalty to the state.' [KC 78:448]  
Somehow it must be conveyed to the Muslim community that the baptism of one of its 
members does not rob it of a servant, a friend and a fellow-citizen.  What Cragg seems 
to be advocating here is not secret belief but some kind of catechumenate, or 
unbaptised probationary status, in which Muslim believers in Christ can share with 
one another in the new meaning they have found, and fill their continued practice of 
prayer and fasting with the vitality of that new understanding.  This sort of group may 
become a living answer to the question: 'How can we demonstrate that to become a 
Christian is to remain responsible in some sense for "Muslim" citizenship?' [KC 1986 
Call 318] 
 
  There is no thought here that less responsibility will devolve upon the 
Church than in the normal case of converts baptised singly.  Cragg rather envisages a 
closer sharing of the cost.  He refers to Paul's discussion about the eating of meat in 
pagan contexts to suggest that if a liberty of that sort may be properly foregone for the 
sake of 'the weaker brethren' whose consciences may be scandalised, cannot the same 
principle apply to refraining from urging baptism on new believers so that their 
brethren in Islam may not be scandalised. 
 
  There are a number of complex issues involved here which Cragg does 
not take up either in the original edition of The Call of the Minaret or in the second, 
revised one.  In a footnote he quotes a contrary opinion from Stephen Neill, writing in 
1955 before the publication of his own book, but denies that his proposal is affected 
by Neill's objections to the encouragement of secret belief. [KC 1986 Call 340 n8]  
(Neill had maintained that the record of history showed that secret belief led 
inevitably to compromise and the still-birth of any Christian movement. [Neill 
1955:179f])  But Cragg does not spell out precisely how he envisages such 
'catachumens' remaining within the Muslim community, since their new faith would 
be in no way concealed.  Nor does the enigmatic reference to 'forms of prayer and 
fasting that will be invaded by new liberty and new meaning' [ibid 318] make clear 
whether these are the prescribed forms of Islam continued by the new believers with a 
different understanding, or whether they will devise new forms for themselves and 
practise them without Muslims, or perhaps baptised Christians, participating.  It seems 
from later work that he does not envisage them joining in salat. 'Christians will not 
share the ritual...'  He discusses the whole issue briefly in this one later publication, 
but the only new element is a suggestion of the danger that the demand of baptism 
might become equivalent to the 'Judaizing' circumcision for Gentiles criticised by Paul 
in Galatians. [KC 17:202,205f]  Cragg's whole proposal here is tentative, and he 
seems to be reserving his own final position with phrases like, 'it is argued that...', 'its 
advocates insist...', though we are never told who these people are. 
 
  It is curious that Cragg has not developed the discussion which he 
started in The Call of the Minaret.  Phil Parshall, an American missionary with long 
experience in Bangladesh, has taken up many of the issues rehearsed above, and 
others too, in a book entitled New Paths in Muslim Evangelism. Evangelical 
  
 
  
Approaches to Contextualization.  In a chapter called 'Problematic Christian Practices' 
and under the heading 'Delayed Baptism' Parshall quotes at length from this passage 
of The Call of the Minaret, but he cannot quote any further contributions of Cragg's to 
the debate. [Parshall 1980:192]  Yet Parshall himself refers to many other writings 
which indicate that this has been a most lively and controversial discussion among 
missionaries, which has raised questions about the use of the term 'Christian', the 
appropriate day of worship (whether Sunday or Friday in Muslim lands), the need for 
ordained and salaried ministry, and the nature of the church building, among many 
other issues. [ibid 157-197 cf Parshall 1975, McCurry 1979] 
 
  Some conclusions can, however, be drawn from the brief pages in 
which Cragg debates the issue.  Clearly he rejects the 'baptism at all costs' school of 
missionary thought, in which converts to Christian faith are regarded as brands 
plucked from the fire of destruction.  What must be done 'at all costs' is rather the 
retrieval of the Christian implications of Islamic theology. [KC 17:195]  There is 
something further at stake merely than the salvation of the individual believer.  The 
corollary to this is of course that Islam cannot be viewed as a 'fire of destruction'.  
Rather, Muslims are also those 'for whom Christ died' [KC 1986 Call 319 - emphasis 
original], though they have not yet recognised the fact.  The Atonement is universal in 
its reach, and it is therefore appropriate to consider the effect of baptism upon those 
who do not receive it.  The mission is to the whole community of Islam and not 
merely to individual Muslims within that community.  Human relationships must not 
be unnecessarily jeopardised for the sake of dogma, when a willingness to remain 
visibly part of the community could convey the true meaning of that dogma to those in 
the community inherently suspicious of it.  For theology in the end is all about 
relationships, man with man as well as man with God.  If asked to substantiate this 
proposal from the New Testament Cragg would reply that the Pauline passages about 
eating meat already referred to (1 Corinthians 8, Romans 14) indicated just such a 
message.  Paul also said 'Christ sent me, not to baptize, but to preach'. (1 Corinthians 
1:17) [ibid 316 & KC 17:205]  Another remarkable citation is from Hebrews 11:40: 
Nor must we have too Western an idea of what response to Christ is going to mean for 
those who hear us.  If we have the right to say of the patriarchs, 'They without us shall 
not be made perfect', surely Easterners have the right to say it to us. [KC 1986 Call 
320] 
The connection between Patriarchs and 'Easterners', by whom Cragg must mean 
Muslims, is unexpected and problematic, though it is obviously suggested by the idea 
of Islam, like the Old Testament, being a praeparatio evangelica.  It is not of course an 
exact parallel unless it is accepted that Islam is the fulfilment of Christianity.  
However the plain implication must be that God who has 'provided some better thing 
for us' is active in the lives of Muslims as he was in the lives of the heroes of Old 
Testament faith celebrated in the earlier part of Hebrews 11.   
 
  What doctrine of the Church and salvation does this imply?  Cragg 
echoes the warning of those who have claimed that the traditional practice of 
administering isolated, individual baptism is, in the Muslim context, too 'impatient' a 
way. [ibid 316]  There is evidence too, that he has feared the 'impatience' of the 
convert desiring baptism, especially when that convert, as in the case of Daud Rahbar 
in the spring of 1958, might have served as a highly congenial and influential Muslim 
partner in dialogue.  Recalling the incident Rahbar himself writes that Cragg 
was startled by my request for baptism...  He had started counting on me as a liberal 
  
 
  
participant in the dialogue between Christians and Muslims.  (He said:) 'I was hoping 
you would take part in the dialogue as a Muslim.'  The request for baptism was too 
sudden for his ears. [KC 20:347] 
The sudden conversion to Christianity of a major Muslim intellectual threw Cragg 
into momentary confusion, as he himself admits. [Personal conversation 15.10.86]  He 
was later to refer to Rahbar's spiritual and theological pilgrimage to Christian faith in 
considerable detail, and with obvious and intense interest, as well as contributing the 
Foreward to Rahbar's autobiography. [KC 17:193-208; KC 20:i-vi] 
 
  Perhaps his uncertainty in this case, amply resolved later, was whether 
Rahbar had in fact thought through his proposed step, so that it might be 'not wholly 
one of abandonment but of deeper fidelity...  Let people, so to speak, persuade 
themselves that Christ is their own logic.' [KC 17:199]  Cragg's proposals outlined 
above about delaying baptism for those living in the heart of Muslim communities 
should not be understood as arguing an unconcern for the individual, as though the 
mission to Islam should overtake the spiritual needs of the single Muslim.  On the 
contrary, he is anxious about the self-accusation of treachery to which that convert is 
liable who has not identified the genuine continuity between his old faith and his new. 
 He may face 'a deep inner feeling of having forsaken one's past and somehow 
disowned one's community.' [ibid 204] 
 
  This searching out of the proper continuity between Muslim and 
Christian faith is a matter of careful exploration, where the head and the heart work 
together in assessing the new evidence of God's mercy to man.  Characteristically 
Cragg calls for patience and hope in a situation where long controversy and 
inter-communal hostility have made mutual comprehension extremely difficult.  
Cragg's is a long-term view of the mission to Islam, rather than one which emphasizes 
the lostness of each Muslim soul and the dire necessity of saving him.  A paper for a 
missionary conference begins typically with the New Testament phrase '"The God of 
patience and hope..."'  Yet it would be mistaken to assume that there is no intensity or 
passion fuelling the cool and even manner.  Writing for the same audience of the 
'Christian criteria for God' revealed in Jesus, he continues 
But it would be pointless to seek to bring those wondrous predicates of our faith if 
they did not in truth belong to Allah of Islam.  What matters urgently is that they are 
not yet understood of him.  It is that urgency which makes evangelism. [KC 
13:196,198] 
It is important to grasp the turn of the argument here.  Evangelism is not merely 
necessary and important, but urgent.  (The title of the conference concerned was 'The 
1978 North American Conference on Muslim Evangelization'.)  But the reason for its 
urgency is not the common evangelical assumption of the lostness of Muslim 
millions, but precisely the kinship and nearness of Muslim thought and experience to 
that of Christians.  'God, then, the subject of all theology is one.' [ibid 198]  If that 
were not the case there would be no point in mission, because there would be no 
possibility of conveying meaning where no relevant prior experience or thought 
existed, and no continuity was possible.  This is the heart of Cragg's objection to 
Kraemer's theme of the 'discontinuity' of the Gospel and other faiths. [KC 1968 World 
77-79 cf KC 161 pt2:35f]  It bears close relationship also with his criticism of Islamic 
doctrines of revelation for assuming that the less a thing is man's, the more it is God's. 
[KC 127:2:10 - see chapter 2.A] 
 
  
 
  
  In Cragg's understanding then, mission depends on the possibility of 
communication, which itself assumes a relationship, and at least a potential kinship.  
The urgency of mission lies not in the lostness of unbelievers but in the tragedy of 
broken and unfulfilled relationships, man with man and man with God.  Christians 
have to bear the pain of watching Islam dismiss Bethlehem and Calvary 'as 
"association" in the sense of idolatry!  Here is the tragady that spurs all our study and 
must fire all our witness.' [ibid 2:12] 
 
  With such thinking informing his whole concept of mission, it is 
natural that Cragg has felt obliged not to limit himself to enunciating general 
principles, but to make serious and sustained efforts to spell out the detailed 
implications of his understanding of Islam and of mission to every kind of Christian 
disciple.  Some scholars have complained that his style of writing demands great 
effort from the reader: 'This is no bed-time reading...  Cragg is just not that easy for 
most people' [Martyn 1960:49]:  'His own language is not always easy' [Daniel 
1986:861]: 'His compact sentences demand sustained attention'. [Fitzmaurice 
1984:47]  Nevertheless  he has been at pains to write not only lengthy books and 
articles in learned periodicals, but also several series of small pamphlets published by 
the Near East Christian Council (since 1974 re-formed with the addition of the 
Orthodox churches as the Middle East Council of Churches), articles in publications 
intended for the general Christian reader interested in Mission, and even occasional 
contributions at the level of the English parish church magazine, where no kind of 
previous knowledge of Islam could be assumed. [KC 116,117 etc]  It is in these 
shorter and more occasional publications that we might expect to find the full 
implications of his approach revealed as he responds to daily events and to the 
pressures of the Muslim world on its Christian 'resident alien.' 
 
  When we turn to these publications, however, we find them 
unremittingly theological.  Willem Bijlefeld regarded Operation Reach as 'the best 
planned attempt in the whole history of Muslim evangelism to equip and prepare a 
wide range of Christians for communication with Muslims' [Carman 1960:42], but it 
must be said that as much is demanded of the reader in these 32-page pamphlets as 
from Cragg's full-length books.  Much of the material in the 27 double issues of 
Operation Reach was in fact incorporated into later books, particularly The Dome and 
the Rock, whose introduction explains their genesis and raison d'être: 
...some fifty outlines on Islamic topics... were an effort after a surer and fuller 
Christian relationship to the common world of today...  They presuppose the general 
political and social situation but do not spell it out.  Their theme is directly theological 
and 'religious'...  Thus the reader will find here neither special erudition in the 
intricacies of the Islamic heritage, nor topical reporting on its current vicissitudes.  
What he may find is a means of potential discoveries of service in truth and initiative 
in ministry. [KC 1964 Dome 5 - cf notice of Dome in KC 128:10:15] 
 
 
  Many of these studies were written during periods of travel, and during 
a political climate of Nasserite Arab nationalism following Suez in 1956 which 
created hazardous conditions for a British traveller.  Some of his journeys must have 
entailed considerable courage.  The dedication page of the Dome of the Rock speaks 
of 'much hospitality from Jerusalem round about unto Casablanca, Kano, Khartoum, 
Calcutta and Istanbul'.  The consequence is that at times he is almost completely 
  
 
  
'bookless', and unable to give detailed references. [KC 127: 2:26].  More rarely, the 
dedicated reader is surprised by a delightful (though entirely appropriate) aside, as in 
one passage on Sufi attempts to deal with the sin of self-preoccupation: 
Just as ordinary mental concentration demands firm control of the senses lest we be 
distracted, (Some Nigerian youngsters have just been playing soldiers outside the 
window where this is being prepared in Kano.)  (But be they exonerated from all its 
inadequacies.) so in the coming to know God we must abate ourselves.  The scholar 
must be disciplined to one objective study: so the soul. [ibid 3:11] 
 
  Despite occasional 'booklessness' Cragg is still able to recommend 
substantial further reading in advice where interesting personal reaction to other 
authors on Islam also emerges.  Cantwell Smith's Islam in Modern History is 
described as 'an incisive, thorough and brilliant analysis of its theme.  Some readers 
may find the style of writing a little taxing.' [ibid 3:31]  Operation Reach maintains a 
steady series of meditations on Christian themes with constant references to Islamic 
parallels, doctrines, customs and proverbs, which any serious student of Islam would 
find illuminating.  The later series of pamphlets, Emmaus Furlongs, the short-lived 
The Mind of Christ, and Grace Cup generally contain less Islamic material, perhaps 
because Cragg was not in those years daily immersed in an Islamic society.  Political 
references, no doubt for good reasons, are rare.  An exception is the issue of Grace 
Cup which reflects in November 1982 on the 'new Palestinian dispersal both of bodies 
and of hopes', brought about by the Israeli operation in Lebanon of that summer. [KC 
130:16]  One of the questions suggested for discussion at the end of the paper (Cragg's 
invariable custom) reveals how deeply he felt the tragedy of the total situation: 
'Great hatred, little room, maimed me at the start, 
 I bear, from my mother's womb, a fanatic heart.' 
How, in your view, do these words of an Irish poet apply to the legacies of bitterness 
in the Middle East?  What is to be done about such 'maiming from the womb' and 'the 
fanatic heart'? [KC 130:15] 
So much of Cragg is in those few lines: the love of poetry, the feeling for pathos, the 
ability to connect diverse situations in the one human tragedy, the academic manner, 
the sense of hostility and antagonism as moments of opportunity, the concern with 
relationship and underlying attitude rather than the details of policy and statecraft. 
 
  In general it must be said that these publications demand a 
considerable grasp of the English language, and a constant, serious and deep 
engagement with Christian themes and Muslim friends and society if they are to be 
made real use of.  It is not that Cragg is incapable of a lighter touch.  He can quote 
from the lyrics of John Lennon [KC 130:17;2], or compile brief biographies of people 
to be commemorated in an Anglican Calendar for the Episcopal Church in Jerusalem 
and the Middle East. [KC 130:10]  He can reminisce, reflectively, about the history of 
the Anglican Church in the Middle East. [KC 130:19]  But he does not embark on 
attempts at a prophetic interpretation of current events in the Muslim world such as 
Samuel Zwemer delighted in offering in his editorials in The Muslim World. [Lamb 
1981:3-12]  It must be conceded that close comment on political affairs from 
1957-1962 (the years of Operation Reach) and subsequently could have prevented any 
wide circulation of the papers and conceivably endangered their recipients.  
Nevertheless the difficulty which some have experienced in reading Cragg's work 
must lend substance to the charge that his missionary 'method' demands too much 
intellectual activity of the ordinary mortal - at least in the form in which it is 
  
 
  
commonly presented. [cf one reaction in KC 13:205]  It frequently happens, as we 
shall see, that Cragg is not properly understood. 
 
  
 
  
Chapter 6 
 
THE QUESTION OF CRITERIA IN INTERPRETING ISLAM 
 
 
A  How the reviewers see him 
 
  Cragg's work has not passed without criticism.  It is understandable, 
though to Cragg no doubt disappointing, that many Muslim reviewers of his books 
regard his work as simply a more sophisticated attack on Islam than the traditional 
missionary approach.  The Palestinian Muslim scholar and educationist AL Tibawi 
wrote of The Dome and the Rock that  
A guide for Christian missionary work among Muslims might have been a more 
appropriate title for this discursive work...  like the rest of this author's contributions, 
(it) is evidence rather of changed tactics than of changed objectives.  Like his more 
bigoted and less informed predecessors, he still wants to change the Muslim view of 
Islam as a step to an acceptance not merely of Jesus but of Christ...  Nowhere does he 
serve his cause less than when he persists in reading Christian meaning into Islamic 
ideas.  Ends justify the means: by 'exploring Islam' he seeks to 'arouse and inform a 
Muslim discovery of Christ'...  'Islam has halted at a half-way house', the author says.  
He hopes to succeed, where centuries of Christian missionary effort have failed, in 
taking Islam to the end of the road. [Tibawi 1968:120] 
The Pakistani scholar Hamidullah is no less abrasive in reviewing The Call of the 
Minaret: 
This book gives a new look to Christian polemics against Islam, and presents a 
sugar-coated pill...  Mr Cragg has judged it necessary to de-Zwemerize the activities 
of the Hartford Theological Seminary.  The method is charming...  The style is rather 
that of easy classroom talk: the same thing is repeated again and again. [Hamidullah 
1957:245] 
 
  We shall note the criticism of repetitiveness again.  At times the 
hostility of these reviewers leads them to misunderstand what Cragg is actually 
saying.  Hamidullah criticises Cragg for asserting 'that the rigid monotheism of Islam 
reflects vast expanses of the desert and the majestic sun.' [ibid]  But Cragg wrote: 
'Islam was not of desert origin, despite the persisting illusion which calls its rigid 
monotheism a reflection of desert vastness and the majestic sun.' [KC 1986 Call 68]  
Hamidullah reveals similar misunderstandings of Cragg's meaning on the questions of 
translations of the Qur'an and Muslim beliefs about the Trinity. [Hamidullah 
1957:248]  In similar vein Isma'il al-Faruqi, reviewing Alive to God, states that Cragg 
'falsely accused Islam of Apartheid', of a total unwillingness to be ecumenical in faith. 
 Yet the term does not appear in the passage Faruqi cites, nor does Cragg in this book 
ever couple the word 'religious' with 'apartheid', though Faruqi calls the phrase a 
'felicitous' coinage by Cragg. [Faruqi 1975:266,265].  Cragg only uses the word 
'apartheid' twice in the book. 
 
  The most antagonistic reviewer of Cragg's writing is the American 
Jewish convert to Islam, Maryam Jameelah, a close associate of the neo-conservative 
Pakistani leader Abu'l-'Ala Maududi.  Jameelah regards Cragg as 'among the most 
thoughtful missionary scholars of our day', and thinks his books worth 23 pages of 
refutation in her Islam and Orientalism, where he is the second scholar to receive her 
  
 
  
attention, after Philip Hitti.  Others to be dealt with were Goitein, Cantwell Smith, 
Nadav Safran and Freeland Abbott.  Some of her complaints seem difficult to 
understand except on the assumption of an all embracing hostility to any Christian 
interpretation of Islam.  Thus she alleges that 'the most striking characteristic of Dr 
Cragg's works is their moral poverty', and refers later to 'the spiritual poverty of these 
writings.' [Jameelah 1971:22,38]  Elsewhere in her books Muslim scholars are treated 
with the same wildly inappropriate criticism, should they be modernist in theology.  
So the blind Egyptian scholar Taha Husain's autobiography Al-Ayyam, is referred to 
as 'a modern Arabic classic overflowing with sentimentality and self-pity', and his 
book on pre-Islamic poetry is said to allege 'wholesale forgery' by the 'ulema'. 
[Jameelah 1968:140,141]  Albert Hourani represents a very different viewpoint on 
Taha Husain, calling him a 'considerable artist'. [Hourani 1962:326  cf KC 1965 
Counsels 87f] 
 
  Jameelah is not, therefore, very reliable as a critic, and she seems 
incapable of understanding one of Cragg's major theses, the distinction between islam 
and Islam. [Jameelah 1971:27]  Nevertheless her significance lies in the fact that she 
can represent the strength of conservative Muslim reaction to Cragg, and the scale of 
the antipathy to be overcome from certain Islamic quarters.  Cragg has not succeeded 
in communicating to this custodial mind.  Jameelah has in addition two criticisms of 
Cragg which need to be taken seriously.  The first relates to the vexed question of the 
interpretation of history.  Writing of the ills of Christian history Jameelah says: 
Dr Cragg thinks that merely to condemn such events as the Crusades as fundamentally 
un-Christian is sufficient to disentangle himself from any responsibility for them.  He 
does not seem to appreciate the fact that these evils were merely the natural fruits of 
the tree...  Since Christianity has... had nothing but contempt for the religious law as 
spiritually useless, this means that there is no divine guidance for the Christian in his 
collective life, therefore politics...(etc) are guided by opportunism and expediency. 
[ibid 18f] 
As the point is expressed it seems at first very unjust to Cragg, who spares no effort to 
acknowledge the Crusades as 'a piece of Christian history unworthy of the name and 
treasonable to the cause of Christ.'[KC 1986 Call 238]  He rebukes any 'attitude of 
superior criticism of the Crusaders', and calls on Christians to become involved in the 
'correction of the past', and the retrieval of its tragic mistakes.  His whole theme here 
is of Retrieval. [ibid 241]  But a suspicion lingers, because, to use his own words 
rebuking the Muslim apologists which we have already remarked on: 'We have noted 
repeatedly the distinction which liberals make between the perfection of Islam and the 
defection of Muslims.  If anything is to be criticised it is the faithful and never the 
faith.' [KC 161 pt1:550 see chapter 4.B]  But is Cragg, and perhaps any committed 
believer reviewing the history of his own religious group, not open to the same 
accusation? 
 
  In Cragg's case there is an additional complication.  We have already 
seen how Jameelah's fundamental point about the alleged Christian inability to 
provide guidance for political life was also made by Hamidullah. [chapter 4.B]  There 
we were examining the theological basis from which Cragg works.  Here the issue is 
the way he interprets Islam.  Cragg regards Islam as essentially superficial over sin, 
and content to apply external remedies, identified with the law.  
Does God undertake on behalf of our need no more than the giving of the law which 
identifies our failure? [KC 140:218] 
  
 
  
When... man as he is in his rebellious self-assertion has defied our rules and laws and 
traditions, is the only answer redoubled exhortation, intensified sermonizing, renewed 
sanctions of warning and appeals of Paradise?...  Must the diagnosis of the wrongness 
of society always be external? [KC 1959 Sandals 130,131] 
 
  The comparison of any two religious traditions is always likely to 
proceed with the pure ideals of one's own side being held up in contrast to the shabby 
realities of the other.  Cragg of course is never guilty of anything so crude as that.  But 
there is clearly the danger of a complete mismatch between Christianity and Islam if 
one is regarded as providing only unavailing, external remedies to human problems 
while the other is credited with the custody of the true, because inward and spiritual, 
solution.  Since this is very broadly Cragg's position, he does seem to lay himself open 
to the suggestion that he is judging Islam by its external history but Christianity by its 
inner spirit.  Jameelah herself actually does something very similar, for she sees 
authentic Islam as constantly being rescued from unworthy Muslims by the 
mujaddids/reformers. [Jameelah 1971:19]  This is of course part of the pattern of 
polemic writing, but it is difficult altogether to expunge it from one's work and mind.  
It seems at least that Cragg has not completely succeeded in doing so. 
 
  Jameelah's other criticism is of selectivity in Cragg's choice of 
representative Muslims.  She complains that Kamil Husain, by whom he sets such 
store, is unknown in the Muslim world outside Egypt, and that he would have been 
quite unknown outside his native land if Cragg had not translated his City of Wrong.  
She has a similar complaint that a pamphlet written by Yusuf 'Ali and cited by Cragg 
had been out of print and unobtainable years before. [ibid 23]  The complaint about 
Christian history as opposed to Islamic, and the complaint about selectivity in giving 
voice to spokesmen for Islam belong, of course, together, and raise in acute form the 
issue of Cragg's interpretation of Islam.  One way of articulating the issue would be to 
ask: Is Kamil Husain (who can stand here for all the other Muslim authors whom 
Cragg favours) genuinely representative of Islam?  And if he cannot be said to 
represent the mainstream of opinion in Islam, the custodial mind, can he be thought of 
as representative of a sensitive, creative, minority who remain faithful to the true spirit 
of Islam?  And who is qualified to make such a judgement?  The answer to this 
question takes us into the critical question of inter-faith hermeneutics, which we 
consider particularly in the next section. 
 
  Not all Muslim authors regard Cragg's work in such a critical light.  
The Indian Muslim quarterly Islamic Culture has carried a number of appreciative 
reviews of his books, one of which (by Asaf AA Fyzee) judged, in relation to Cragg's 
The House of Islam as one of a series of studies of different religions, that 'No better 
man could be selected to deal with Islam in the English speaking world; and the result 
is a very perceptive and thought-provoking volume.' [Fyzee 1976:48] It is worth 
noting that Maryam Jameelah selects Asaf Fyzee as one of her targets for attack in her 
Islam and Modernism. [Jameelah 1968:75-83. cf KC 1965 Counsels 136-8]  Syed 
Vahiduddin, one of the principal reviewers for Islamic Culture, reckons that Cragg's 
books 
are marked by a sincere attempt to understand the spiritual content of Islam.  His 
views need not always be ours and we have sometimes differed from him on his 
interpretation of certain specific aspects of Islam.  But whatever he says deserves to be 
heard with respect and to be thought about. [Vahiduddin 1977:70] 
  
 
  
 
  Vahiduddin is an Indian Muslim philosopher trained in Germany, and, 
unlike many of Cragg's other Muslim critics, is fully competent linguistically, 
theologically and especially philosophically to assess his work.  His family has strong 
links with Sufism.  His writings, moreover, reveal several important points of 
agreement with Cragg.  He shares, it seems, at least one of Cragg's deepest 
convictions about Islam, that it lacks any real contemporary theology.  In spite of the 
traditional Muslim unease about theology's association with philosophy (cf chapter 
4.A), Vahiduddin is prepared to say that 'In fact there is no living Islamic theology 
today at all.' [Vahiduddin 1970:66]  On The Event of the Qur'an he wrote:  'Works 
such as these have an importance for Muslims which they cannot overestimate.  They 
may at last shake them in their dogmatic complacency and force them to develop a 
critical self-awareness which has been sadly lacking hitherto.' [Vahiduddin 1973:178] 
 He believes Muslims would benefit by taking a keen interest in the ferment of 
Christian theology - precisely Cragg's argument in the thesis. [Vahiduddin 1986:59]  
He also has a serious place for suffering in his understanding of theology, and though 
remaining Islamically orthodox about the death of Christ, writes: 
What greater ignominy and disgrace could there be than which Christ suffered.  But 
here it is that Christ appears in all His glory, and the world and all that it stands for is 
exposed in all its vanity...  What strikes me most, is not the suffering through which 
he passes but his triumph through suffering. [ibid 185] 
With this he shares something of Cragg's own misgivings about arguments in which 
religious truth is regarded as confirmed by worldly success: 
Success in history is by no means a decisive criterion for judging events.  It is rather 
modern man, whose ultimate concern is earthly success, who places a disproportionate 
emphasis on history as a judge of events. [ibid 63] 
 
  With such evident common ground between himself and Cragg, the 
criticisms Vahiduddin makes of Cragg are all the more telling.  'The Mind of the 
Qur'an,' he says 
has all the qualities and limitations of the writer's earlier works.  Eloquent in 
exposition, rich in information and clever in argument as the distinguished scholar is, 
he is often tempted to oversimplify issues and become unnecessarily repetitive in his 
critical observations.  However, even though one may disagree with his conclusions 
and feel unhappy at his approach to the Qur'an situation it is still a joy to read his 
elegantly written works. [Vahiduddin 1974:62] 
Vahiduddin finds both repetitiveness and oversimplification in the treatment of 
Islamic 'militancy', which he believes Cragg allows to overshadow everything else in 
'the personal religion as envisaged in the Qur'an.'  Vahiduddin is provoked to ask: 'Is it 
really so exceptionally Qur'anic to think that Truth shall prevail and that adversity 
must be transitional?' [Vahiduddin 1973:177]  'Are we given to understand that 
religion can only be authentic in its sense of failure and God-forsakenness?' 
[Vahiduddin 1980:244]  Fazlur Rahman made a similar complaint that Western 
writers seemed incapable of understanding why Muhammad attacked the Meccans by 
force. 
They say they fail to understand the Prophet at this juncture: how can a preacher 
become pugnacious?  We must confess we fail to understand this failure, prejudice 
apart, except on the hypothesis that so addicted are these writers to pathetic tales of 
sorrow, failure, frustration and crucifixion that the very idea of success in this sphere 
seems to them abhorrent. [Fazlur 1979:19] 
  
 
  
Vahiduddin felt that in introductory material like Islam and the Muslim Cragg's 
assumptions about the Prophet's 'quest for success' was allowed to falsify his account 
of the origins of Shi'ism [Vahiduddin 1980:244], just as his books on the Qur'an were 
dominated by the sense of the failure of the Qur'an to reckon with the tragic quality in 
man. [Vahiduddin 1974:59]  He is uneasy too with Cragg's handling of the theme of 
forgiveness and how the 'divine response is in no way pledged' in Islam, and the 
contention that in Islam no comparison may be allowed between human and divine 
forgiveness.  Vahiduddin finds this seriously oversimplified, ignoring the theological 
and metaphysical problems involved. [ibid. 60,61]  Cragg's demands on God in terms 
of liability for man, man's power to 'impugn God' call forth the term 'Promethean' 
from Vahiduddin: 
However Promethean a man may aspire to be, he must not forget the dust he is in his 
alienation from his source...  How has then the awareness of Man's tragic quality 
suddenly left our writer and a 'pagan' sense of man's defiance taken hold of him? [ibid 
60] 
He is clearly uneasy that Cragg in The Privilege of Man is tempted to give too much 
ground before the 'secularist onslaught', and contrasts him unfavourably in this respect 
with Catholic thinkers, though he does not develop the comparison in detail. 
[Vahiduddin 1970:67f] 
 
  These are shrewd and perceptive criticisms, some of which we have 
anticipated earlier in this work, and some which must be taken up in a final 
assessment of Cragg in chapter 8.  But it is interesting that the charge of 
'Christianising' Islam is not among them.  Tibawi, as we saw, seemed angered that 
Cragg 'persists in reading Christian meaning into Islamic ideas.'  Others, Christians 
like Marshall Hodgson and Charles J Adams among them, have made similar 
criticisms.  Hodgson, from a Quaker background, acknowledges both the value and 
the problems posed by scholastic pre-commitment, but is essentially opposed to the 
approach taken by the apologists to another faith.  'A view of Islam as a Christianity 
manqué, or the reverse, however elegantly formulated, must be received with great 
scepticism.' [Hodgson 1974:29]  He seems to be saying that faiths are simply 
different.  In a similar way Henry Victor has said that 'the quest of Cragg is a quest for 
Christian Islamics rather than for the Islam of the people who are Muslims.' [Victor 
1984:13]  Cragg has felt bound to reply to the accusation. [KC 1984 Muhammad 12]  
Accused of failing to respect the genuine 'otherness' and autonomy of Islam, he 
responds with the conviction that the differences between faiths exist within a human 
race which is essentially the same.  Christian witness must demonstrate 'the utmost 
respect for such autonomy.  But it will also be a refusal to allow that the autonomies 
of religions have other than one humanity.' [ibid 123] 
It is one thing - a necessary one - to avoid 'Christianizing' what is properly and 
vigorously distinctive in Islam.  It is another to conclude that, therefore, the disparate 
faiths are incommunicado...  Doing so would effectively terminate all relationship.  
Each would then be left in impenetrable self-congratulation or delusion. [ibid 12,13] 
This seems to be very much Vahiduddin's own view, and though he notes in his 
reviews of Cragg's books that at times there is a certain failure in 'methodological 
detachment from (his) own tradition' [Vahiduddin 1973:177], he is not threatened or 
surprised by it, because each person has to make his own response to the demands he 
perceives from God on his understanding and obedience. 
The Christian accent which is discernible everywhere does not detract in any way 
from the value of his contribution, but rather enhances it as the authentic expression of 
  
 
  
a profound personal commitment. [Vahiduddin 1970:68] 
 
  If Muslims are divided about whether Cragg 'Christianises' Islam, so 
too are Christians.  The Iranian bishop HB Dehqani-Tafti made a vigorous defence of 
Cragg from the charge. [Dehqani-Tafti 1965:209]  For Norman Daniel 'he is merely 
quicker than most to recognise (usually across the barrier of unfamiliar concepts) the 
real points of resemblance, often in unexpected places.' [Daniel 1986:861]  Since 
Daniel's seminal work was in the documentation of Christian misunderstanding and 
defamation of Islam, this is a considerable tribute.  But has Daniel been led astray by 
his appreciation of Cragg's determination to speak positively and not negatively about 
Islam?  Albert Hourani, reviewing Sandals at the Mosque, felt that 'From sheer desire 
to be fair, to put the case for Islam at its strongest, he does sometimes seem to come 
near to reading Christian meanings into Islamic concepts.'  'Is there room', asks 
Hourani doubtfully, 'for... an ideal Islam which has a Christian soul but nevertheless is 
not Christianity?' [Hourani 1960:129]  Cragg has no doubts: 
It may happen that the Christian endeavour to understand Islam to the full will result 
in Christian expositions of Islam that many actual Muslims would not recognize as 
familiar...  But there is nothing surprising in this possibility: nor inappropriate.  To see 
anything through Christian eyes is to see it in the light of Christ, and from the 
standpoint of 'the God of hope' revealed in Christ. [KC 1959 Sandals 90] 
Bijlefeld, quoting this, calls it 'one of those stimulating and provoking passages in 
Kenneth Cragg's writings, a passage which immediately appeals to some as much as it 
antagonizes others.'  He does not tell us his own reaction, but Cragg clearly does not 
fall into the category of the unreflecting 'Christianisers of Islam' cited in Bijlefeld's 
article. [Bijlefeld 1967:174]  But neither Bijlefeld nor Cragg explore in any depth the 
question of how one judges when a Christian exposition of Islam is inappropriate.  
Cragg simply says: 'What matters is that the exposition should be seen on reflection to 
have conveyed a true picture.' [KC 1959 Sandals 90]  But the question of who is 
qualified to reflect accurately remains. 
 
  We have already raised the question of the separation, which Cragg 
appears to reject, of 'scientific' observation of the life and texts of another faith, from 
the theological evaluation of it.  If we concentrate on the textual study alone, leaving 
aside the history and contemporary life for the moment, it may be that certain 
discussions in another academic discipline will help to throw the issues into sharper 
focus. 
  
 
  
B  Techniques of Interpretation 
 
 
The criticism of 'Christianising' Islam is a crucial issue in any assessment of Cragg's 
work, but few of those who have voiced it have explained in any detail what they 
mean.  It is also noticeable that his critics contradict each other in the way they frame 
the accusation.  Muslims criticising Cragg for 'Christianising' Islam generally accuse 
him of a fundamental lack of sympathy for Islam and of attacking it on unreasonable 
grounds. [eg Tibawi 1968:120]  Christians criticising Cragg for 'Christianising' Islam, 
on the contrary, tend to accuse him of an unrealistically sympathetic account of it 
which does not do justice to its real difference from Christianity. [eg Victor 1984:17]  
The latter is the view of Harry Partin, who, in his review of  Christianity in World 
Perspective, was unusually explicit about what he meant by the term 'Christianising': 
This reviewer has the uneasy feeling that Dr Cragg gives a somewhat Christianized 
reading of other religious faiths.  In other words, that the author's view of the 'core of 
their seriousness' is not necessarily that of adherents of the religious community.  This 
suggests that one ought more properly to begin with Jewish, Muslim, etc, expressions 
of religious self-understanding.  If one proceeds as Cragg does he is able, having 
formulated 'Christian' questions in interpreting the religions, to give Christian 
'answers'.  Does one really 'concede' the other faiths until he has fully granted their 
distinctiveness?  This 'concession' is inhibited by, as it turns out, Cragg's praeparatio 
evangelica position.  He writes that: 
there is truth enough, within Christian premises, in seeing a 'preparation' for Christian 
faith in the meaning of other religions, provided we see that they have the right not to 
view it that way, and provided we explore and serve this understanding of ours with a 
properly sensitive humility. 
One ought to begin with the proviso rather than the proposition, for the latter enables 
the author to evade the full measure of the dilemma. [Partin 1969:333f] 
 
  The criticism is worth full quotation because it is well formulated and 
carries potential damage to Cragg's whole enterprise.  Zaehner is one who has pointed 
out that different faiths actually ask different questions and are concerned with 
different issues. [Zaehner 1958:16-20]  Later, in ideas which resemble Cragg's 
understanding of the working of the Spirit in other faiths, he spoke of a kind of 
self-correcting mechanism whereby faiths in their development quietly shed 
embarrassing elements and borrow or develop new elements for which a need is felt.  
Judaism and Islam in their 'Semitic transcendentalism' develop a mystical tradition, 
and Hinduism and Buddhism in their 'Indian immanentism' find room for a social 
conscience. [Zaehner 1974:13f, cf KC 103:181,185]  In an article written at the very 
end of his life, however, Zaehner seemed to be recommending Islam as a purer 
monotheism than Christianity, and he and Cragg decisively parted company. [Zaehner 
1975, cf KC 80]  The disagreement of these two Christian scholars throws into even 
sharper relief the real question of how any interpreter of a faith other than his own is 
to proceed, and indeed, how we understand the process of interpretation itself. 
 
  Hermeneutical theory, developed as philosophical reflection on the 
procedures used equally in literature, theology and law, has traditionally spoken of 
three tasks; the task of understanding, the task of explaining, and the task of applying 
the interpretation.  Some used the terminology of 'subtilitas intelligendi, subtilitas 
explicandi, and subtilitas applicandi', where the 'subtilitas' was a word deliberately 
  
 
  
used to avoid the suggestion of 'method', since it was rather 'a talent that requires a 
particular finesse of mind.' [Gadamer 1979:274]  Much of what follows here is 
dependent on Gadamer's book Truth and Method, and it has been pointed out that the 
use of the word 'method' in the title is ironical, since Gadamer's argument is that there 
is no method which can simply be 'applied' in hermeneutics. [Thiselton 1980:293] 
 
  The third task, of application, tends to attract less attention than the 
other two, in spite of the fact that in both law and theology the purpose of 
understanding is the application of that understanding to a particular concrete 
situation.  Consequently the interest focussed on the other two tasks has tended to 
create an artificial distinction between them and to obscure their real inner unity.  For 
as Gadamer and his many followers see it, understanding is not a separate process 
which is followed, once completed, by explanation, but rather understanding itself 
begins with an attempt at explanation, which will generally be discarded in favour of a 
better, because a more satisfying and coherent explanation, accounting for a larger 
range of phenomena.  Hence  
A person who is trying to understand a text is always performing an act of projecting.  
He projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial 
meaning emerges in the text.  Again, the latter emerges only because he is reading the 
text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. [Gadamer 1979:236] 
Gadamer calls this kind of expectation a 'prejudice', attempting to rescue that word 
from its negative associations and endow it with a more neutral sense.  
Naturally,however, he is concerned to warn that 'the important thing is to be aware of 
one's own bias.' [ibid 238]  'How, asks Gadamer, 'can we break the spell of our own 
fore-meanings?' (or prejudices). [ibid 237]  His answer seems to be that the problem 
cannot be solved in advance. 
(The interpreter) is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make 
understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to 
misunderstandings. [ibid 263] 
Nevertheless Gadamer is clear that interpretation cannot be limited to a reproduction 
of the original meaning in the historical context in which the text arose. 
Not occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author.  That 
is why understanding is not merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as 
well...  (In contrast to the beliefs of the Romantics) Time is no longer primarily a gulf 
to be bridged, because it separates...  This was, rather, the naive assumption of 
historicism, namely that we must set ourselves within the spirit of the age, and think 
with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and thus advance towards historical 
objectivity.  In fact the important thing is to recognise the distance in time as a 
positive and productive possibility of understanding. [ibid 264] 
 
  The work of Gadamer, and the thinking of other philosophers like 
Dilthey, who aimed to understand his author better than he understood himself, and 
Heidegger, who spoke about the 'word-event' which changed history, obviously carry 
great significance for the question of Cragg's techniques of interpretation. [Richardson 
& Bowden  1983 'Hermeneutics']  We begin to see that what appear in analysis to be 
the two procedures of observing and then evaluating are not necessarily two 
procedures at all.  It is clear therefore that the charge of reading Christian meaning 
into Islamic concepts is by no means a straightforward issue, if the 'fore-meanings' or 
'prejudices' of a particular tradition of thought are inevitably and properly a 
considerable element in the interpretation of a text.  How is any reader supposed to 
  
 
  
eliminate his own 'fore-meanings' from his understanding of the text?  The older, 
naive understanding of objectivity supposed that only the historical context of the text 
itself was significant and not that of the interpreter, and that the latter had only to 
immerse himself in the data of the text and its world to arrive at its 'objective' 
meaning.  The grappling with that data cannot, indeed, be sidestepped, but theological 
interpretation, like all hermeneutics, has much more in common with art than with 
science.  As Thiselton says, following (and quoting) Gadamer: 
The work of art can never be reduced to the level of the consciousness of any one 
individual in history, but always transcends it.  For it may yet disclose 'something 
more' to subsequent generations.  'The experience of art acknowledges that it cannot 
present the perfect truth of what it experiences in terms of final knowledge...  There 
is... no final exhaustion of what lies in a work of art.' [Thiselton 1980:296f] 
 
  Gadamer and especially Thiselton's work is focussed on Christian 
theological language, and does not consider the case of theological language being 
interpreted outside the community which formulates it or holds it sacred, except in the 
case of Christian interpretation of the Old Testament.  Clearly within the relevant 
community tradition can act as a filter both to eliminate inappropriate interpretation 
and to refine what is of permanent value.  Is it then a disqualification for interpreting 
Islam that Cragg does not belong to the community of Islam?  If it be judged that it is, 
then we are faced with a proposition which would disallow the work of almost all 
Western scholars on Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist traditions, not to mention massive 
achievements by historians, anthropologists and literary critics. 
 
  In the view of hermeneutics developed by Gadamer and Thiselton the 
distinction characteristic of phenomenological religious studies between 
understanding and evaluation begins to break down.  (Gadamer talks about 
'explanation' rather than 'evaluation', but the terms are obviously very closely related 
in hermeneutics.)  A third process, that of application, emerges as part of the 
interpreter's task.  All this seems to cohere well with Cragg's own approach, which, as 
we have seen, rejects the concept of study of another faith 'in a neutrality, or abeyance, 
of belief' [chapter 5.A], and continually stresses the 'due relationships' to be developed 
between Christian and Muslim individuals and communities.  Few, perhaps, have 
done more in the attempt to 'apply' a Christian interpretation of Islam.  Secondly, 
Gadamer's analysis (broadly accepted by Thiselton) of the processes of 'understanding' 
and 'explanation' seems to legitimate the bringing of Christian questions to Islamic 
material, at least in the first instance, and until they are shown to be inappropriate.  No 
mind can become a tabula rasa on which Islamic data may be imprinted for 
subsequent explanation or evaluation by external criteria, for the process of 
understanding simply does not work that way.   
 
  Thirdly, if the meaning of a text goes beyond its author, and acquires, 
as it were, a 'career', as Paul Ricoeur calls it, of its own [Richardson & Bowden 1983: 
'Hermeneutics', 'Structuralism'], then can that career be shaped not only by the 
religious community which holds the text precious but also by outsiders?  If literary 
criticism is the model here it would seem that the only qualification for the interpreter 
is a serious engagement with the text itself.  Just such an engagement with the text 
seems to be sought by the Qur'an itself: 'Do they not then earnestly seek to understand 
the Qur'an, or are their hearts locked up by them?' [47:24 cf KC 1984 Muhammad 
119f]  Such 'permission' to interpret can be strengthened into positive invitation if 
  
 
  
another insight of Gadamer's be developed in a particular way.  In his view, the 
historical distance between the composition of the text and the time of the interpreter 
is not a liability but an asset, for time reveals more of the meaning of a great work, 
which is never finally exhausted.  Gadamer presupposes a continuity of community 
among the interpreters, who develop their own tradition.  But if historical distance can 
become an asset in this way, is it possible that a sympathetic outsider to the tradition 
may also turn that cultural and communal 'distance' into an asset?  Can the tradition 
itself be fostered and refined by those who are not ideologically and existentially 
committed to the community shaping, and shaped by the tradition?  Cragg's contention 
is that it can. 
The belief of these chapters is that the Qur'an is truly open to more than its formal 
community of institutional allegiance.  Given the quality of sympathy that keeps them 
always in mind, there may well be a capacity of penetration that is the better for its 
being the outsider's search. [KC 1971 Event 20] 
Cragg argues that non-Muslim interpretation of the Qur'an can set aside certain 
Muslim attitudes and traditions of exegesis which in his opinion 'have in part 
obscured and impeded its fullest relevance.' [ibid]  But this freedom from the 
restrictions of Muslim interpretation has to be accompanied by a serious engagement 
with the text at the heart of the tradition, and a genuine respect for the community 
which lives by it.  'A scholarship,' says Cragg, 'that exempts itself from the patient 
toils of due relationships is liable to forfeit in real intellectual achievement what it 
may attempt in bare analysis.' [ibid]   
 
 Here Cragg is following a well-respected modern hermeneutical insight in 
emphasizing the significance of the personal and historical context of the interpreter, 
but how far such 'patient toils' should or can extend will be a matter for much debate.  
We have already noted a certain impatience with the classical tradition of exegesis on 
the part of Cragg, and this is echoed in the passage under discussion when he refers to 
it as 'an intricate and tedious subject.' [ibid]  If Cragg aims to develop and refine the 
Islamic, here specifically the Qur'anic, tradition by passing it through the filter of a 
Christian mind, is that filter adequately hospitable to all the potential material, and 
will the final residue be recognisable as Islam?  We have seen that both Muslims and 
Christians are divided in their judgement.  We may also question whether Cragg has 
been able to abide by his own principles when it comes to faiths and 
faith-communities other than Islam.  His approach to these form the material of 
chapter 7. 
 
  Two warnings also seem to emerge from theoretical studies of 
hermeneutics.  One concerns the temptation to aim at a premature reconciliation, or 
'fusion of horizons', between the interpreter and his text.  Thiselton quotes Ebeling on 
the danger as seen by Christians in relation to Biblical studies: 
According to Luther, the word of God always comes as adversarius noster, our 
adversary.  It does not simply confirm and strengthen us in what we think we are, and 
in what we wish to be taken for...  This is the way, the only way, in which the word 
draws us into concord and peace with God. [Thiselton 1980:319] 
The text must not merely 'mirror back' the thoughts and attitudes of the interpeter to 
him.  It is arguable that this is actually less of a danger in interpreting a strange text 
from outside one's own community  - eg. for a Christian reading the Qur'an, or a 
Muslim reading the Bible - than for the 'native' reading his own text, when its 
familiarity may suggest to him only ideas already in his mind.   
  
 
  
 
  The second warning, drawn especially from the work of Wittgenstein 
[Thiselton 1980:379-385], concerns the danger of developing a private language 
which is not publicly intelligible, which does not therefore serve the function of 
language at all.  Wittgenstein used the analogy of words for colour to emphasize the 
necessity of regularity in human speech for mutual intelligibility.  'A child must learn 
the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour.' [ibid 381]  The 
point at issue in hermeneutics is whether terms with a particular history and common 
use are being used in a special and idiosyncratic way which is not merely novel but 
actually inaccessible to ordinary readers and listeners.  Here Cragg's treatment of 
Islamic themes may be more vulnerable.  We have noted his distaste for fixed 
dogmatic statements, and  we have seen some dissatisfaction with his clarity of 
expression, though others have delighted in his 'elegantly written works'.  But it is 
time to turn from these general considerations to see whether he does in fact avoid 
these dangers, and finds a valid way of interpreting the 'text' of Islam starting from 
Christian premisses.  It is proper to begin with his treatment of the Qur'an. 
  
 
  
C  Cragg's Interpretation of the Qur'an 
 
 
  More than in any other faith, interpretation of the foundation document 
of Islam is central to any understanding of the religious life and thought of Muslims.  
Cragg calls the intense preoccupation of Muslims with their scripture 'perhaps the 
largest and most sustained expression of what might be called documentary faith.' 
[KC 1971 Event 13]  He is deeply conscious that, in Kraemer's words, 'The foundation 
of Islam is not, The Word became flesh.  It is, The Word became book.' [Kraemer 
1938:217f]  But unlike Kraemer he does not believe that in the Qur'an 'the whole 
drama of salvation between God and the world... is entirely absent', or that the relation 
between God and man that characterizes Islam is 'strangely eventless.' [ibid 218f]  On 
the contrary it is precisely the 'event of the Qur'an' in the encounter of Muhammad 
with his native Arab paganism which gives Cragg the title of a major book on the 
Qur'an, and impels him to search for the sense of that event for Christians. [The Event 
of the Qur'an 1971]   
 
  The opening pages of the book make clear the intention of his Quranic 
exegesis.  He addresses his writing primarily to a Christian, rather than an academic or 
a Muslim audience, as is made clear by the explanation of 'our silence here on Old and 
New Testament matters.'  But unlike some other Christian writers on the Qur'an he 
intends to examine the 'pagan direction of Muhammad's calling and of the Qur'an' [KC 
1971 Event 15], in a whole-hearted recognition that the vocation and therefore 
significance of Muhammad was in the first instance not to Islam's monotheistic 
precursors Judaism and Christianity, but to the polytheism of Mecca and the Quraish.  
It was 'a mission to retrieve idolaters for a true worship.' [ibid]  So the age-old 
controversy between Islam and Christianity is not here in mind.  Rather there is a 
definite assurance of 'the deep relevance of the Qur'an to contemporary man...  Our 
purpose is to take the measure, in its own context, of a phenomenon which bears 
urgently upon our own age.' [ibid 16]  The Qur'an is religiously significant for the 
contemporary world irrespective of its relationship with the Biblical record, and even 
apart from its current meaning for the lives of Muslims.     
 
  The intention of Cragg then is to take the Qur'an in its own 
significance, 'to reflect on the book within itself and assemble its own implications 
about the nature of what happened in its genesis as a religious experience'. [ibid 18]  If 
Cragg is accused of reading Christian meanings into the Qur'an, he is certainly not 
guilty of doing so in the style of Basetti-Sani, for whom the 'mother of cities' is 
Jerusalem rather than Mecca, the 'people of the Book' are rabbis and scribes rather 
than Jews and Christians, and the Night of Destiny of surah 97 is Christmas Eve. 
[Basetti-Sani 1977: 120,139,153]  Cragg and Basetti-Sani may be agreed that the 
Qur'an records 'the progress of a religious experience', and even that it needs to be 
read with a 'Christian key', but they differ fundamentally about how that key is to be 
used. [ibid 27,36]  Basetti-Sani's belief is that Islam was intended to be a 
'catechumenate for the sons of Ishmael', and that, partly through Christian negligence 
and hostility, its development was arrested, and there was no-one to help it 'continue 
on the right path to the house of the Father'. [ibid 32]  Basetti-Sani's 'Christian key' 
really involves a view of Islam as a 'Deuteronomic religion', needing 'development 
and enrichment' [ibid 30], not quite a Christian heresy, but only to be properly 
understood within the framework of the full-blown Catholic faith. 
  
 
  
 
  Basetti-Sani's approach to Islam is not unique, but rather forms part of 
a tradition which stretches back into the nineteenth century with scholars like Forster, 
Carlyle, FD Maurice and Bosworth Smith and continues into this century with those 
scholars like Asin Palacios and Margaret Smith who saw the origins of Sufism in 
Christianity.  Bijlefeld notes more recent examples in di Matteo [di Matteo 1938] and 
Ledit. [Ledit 1952] [Bijlefeld 1967:176] 
 
    Basetti-Sani's understanding depends upon accepting the Qur'an as 
revelation: 'Let us suppose that the Koran is actually a revealed book...' [Basetti-Sani 
1977:39]  Cragg, on the other hand, while fully acknowledging the status of the 
Qur'an for Muslims, and noting, in a way that Basetti-Sani does not, the way its use 
shapes their lives, is able to sidestep the issue of the status of the Qur'an for those 
outside the Islamic community.  What ever the answer to that ontological question, it 
still carries real existential significance as a document addressed to humanity.  It is 
evident here that Cragg has a more developed and discriminating natural theology 
than either the Reformed theologian Kraemer or the Franciscan Basetti-Sani.  The 
latter seems to have aimed, in Gadamer's language, at a 'fusion of horizons' which 
turns out to be altogether premature, ignoring the proper objectivity of the Quranic 
text. 
 
  Cragg handles the Qur'an essentially as literature recording religious 
experience.  Islamic revelation, he says, is fourfold: 'the prophetic, the literary, the 
political and the spiritual', but there is little doubt that it is religion as art which more 
than anything engages his attention in the Qur'an.  'Throughout we have to do with 
revelation as literature and with literature as revelation.' [KC 1971 Event 13]  In order 
to demonstrate the parallels he begins the first chapter of The Event of the Qur'an with 
an eight-line quotation from Wordsworth's Prelude.  He wants to rescue the 
understanding of Muhammad's call to Prophethood from 'the prose of historians' and 
'the terms of dogma', by the provocation of a poet's sensibility to dream and vision. 
[ibid 25]    Other books begin in similar fashion: Alive to God with Measure for 
Measure, The Privilege of Man with Ernest Hemingway, Christianity in World 
Perspective with a Northumberland ballad, and The Christ and the Faiths with Wilfred 
Owen.  After a few pages of The Event of the Qur'an Henry Vaughan is pressed into 
service 'to register the mood' of the early surahs, and Cragg is talking of 'the rugged 
native Semitic genius that speaks in the Qur'an.' [ibid 31,35]  For in spite of the 
Qur'an's own passionate declaration that there was no connection between the words 
given to Muhammad and those of the poets and professional soothsayers, Cragg 
insists that 
the Qur'an, in its power and quality, is a thing of surpassing poetical worth, and... its 
genesis must be understood in terms of literary inspiration.  The mystery of its origins 
cannot be fathomed without sounding the depths of language. [ibid 41] 
The depths of language are symbolised for Cragg in the mystical letters, the Arabic 
letters which prefix many of the surahs of the Qur'an, and which have defied 
innumerable attempts to interpret them. [ibid 50f] 
 
  We have seen how the artistic theme, in the form of drama, is for 
Cragg the controlling image of theological understanding, and that the Biblical story is 
a 'theatre for the world'. [chapter 3.C]  Here we must ask how appropriate the literary 
or artistic model of interpretation is for dealing with the Qur'an.  True, the Islamic 
  
 
  
assessment of the Qur'an emphasizes continually its i'jaz or 'matchlessness', the 
miracle of its incomparability.  (see surahs 28:49, 17:90, 11:16, 10:39)  'Abduh wrote:  
The mighty Book was vindicated (before the Meccans) as being speech par 
excellence, and its judgements superior to all others.  Is not the appearance of such a 
book, from the lips of an illiterate man, the greatest miracle and clearest evidence that 
it is not of human origin? [KC 1966 Unity 119] 
But Cragg is always reluctant to admit that things are in any literal sense 
incomparable, whether they be the Qur'an or Kraemer's 'Biblical realism', and he 
cannot resist linking the theme of Quranic 'matchlessness' with a couplet of Dryden's 
about the inimitable magic of Shakespeare. [ibid 42]  We might expect some Muslim 
reaction to this treatment, and Vahiduddin takes up the point.  In a very irenic manner 
he wants to quarrel with Cragg's claim that 'It may be doubted whether, in the last 
analysis, prophecy has ever been other than poetic and poetry, at its truest, ever other 
than prophetic.' [ibid 45]  For Vahiduddin 
if the Qur'an is taken to be poetry and appreciated mainly as such it will remain 
nothing but poetry and will lose the revelationary character which it claims.  It will, 
therefore, not allow the quality of its expression to eclipse its transcendental reference. 
[Vahiduddin 1973:175] 
 
  Vahiduddin has a related criticism which is more vigorously expressed. 
 Towards the end of his book Cragg draws attention to medieval estimates of 
Muhammad which abandoned the picture of an illiterate prophet simply receiving the 
scripture totally from above, for assessments which credited him with superlative 
qualities of reason and spirit, and, by implication, natural capacity for contributing, at 
least, to the formulation of the Arabic text of the Qur'an.  In pursuit again of 
relatedness, and to avoid the suggestion of literal incomparability, Cragg notes that  
The way was then open for men of reason to hold the significance of the Qur'an in 
easy relation with the activities of reason in other spheres of culture and history...  
This allowed the great names, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and the rest, to be in some 
sense conjoined with the Quranic ultimacy of truth. [KC 1971 Event 184] 
Cragg does not go beyond this general description to specify whom he means, but he 
must be referring to the Mu'tazilite thinkers and those philosophical commentators on 
the Qur'an whose approach to the Qur'an equating revelation and reason was 
condemned by the ijma'/consensus of the Islamic community, led by the Ash'arites. 
[Fazlur 1979:90]  Whatever his precise meaning the passage triggers an explosion in 
Vahiduddin the professional philosopher: 
It drives one really to despair to see a man of the writer's religious sensitivity hailing 
the efforts to 'conjoin', in whatever sense it may be, the charismatic figures of the 
prophetic religion with the great means of philosophical speculation.  If this process of 
assimilation is allowed to drift, the claims of other great names may well be pressed 
and Islam will be hard put to it in finding a place in its category of unmentioned 
prophets for many an associate member. [Vahiduddin 1973:178] 
 
  It is plain that for Vahiduddin there must be a clear and unambiguous 
distinction between such things as poetry and philosophy, and the transcendent 
dimension of revelation.  He fears that the Qur'an will come to be regarded as 'nothing 
but poetry'.  Cragg, however, would expand the categories and blur the distinctions.  
Admitting that 'all parallels in this exciting sphere are treacherous', Cragg uses Blake 
as his model for the inspiration which also gripped Muhammad in an 'unpredictable, 
and even uncontrolled, eruption in heart and pen together, in their strange community.' 
  
 
  
 For like all poetry, 'the Qur'an is understood to say what it says in an inseparable 
identity with how it says it.' [KC 1971 Event 47, 46 - emphasis original]  Here Cragg 
is at one with other Western writers who see revelation primarily in literary terms.  
Paul Ricoeur, reflecting on Biblical models, asks whether we do not 
too often and too quickly think of a will that submits and not enough of an 
imagination that opens itself?...  For what are the poem of the Exodus and the poem of 
the Resurrection... addressed to if not to our imagination rather than our obedience?... 
 If this is true, we must say that the imagination is that part of ourselves that responds 
to the text as a Poem, and that alone can encounter revelation no longer as an 
unacceptable pretension, but a nonviolent appeal. [Ricoeur 1981:117] 
 
  Cragg's handling of this theme is itself a flowing passage of great 
power and originality [chapter 2 of The Event of the Qur'an: 'A Luminous Arabic 
Language'], as befits his fascination with words and his sense of their mystery.  But 
one short paragraph exposes the limitations of the poetic model in his hands, and at 
the same time enables us to see once again how hard Cragg finds it to muster 
imaginative sympathy for Muhammad's later career.   
The poetic prophecy passed into phases of argumentative and political 'prophecy', 
where prose was the more accordant form.  Deliverances turned into directives, 
ordinances and documents of law and community...  Muslim faith sees an 
undifferentiated status of authority throughout.  But the feel and fervour of the Qur'an, 
by the literary criteria, are evidence enough that there is a transition, a change of key.  
It is clearly in the poetry, where it lives in its strength, that we must locate the 
essential meaning of 'an Arabic Qur'an.' [KC 1971 Event 49] 
Prophecy for Cragg cannot be political, and so the word must be used in inverted 
commas for the later Quranic material.  Although he will not talk, as others have, 
about a marked deterioration in the character of Muhammad in the Medinan years, it 
is only because 'that is probably too simple, mistaking a symptom for its source.' [KC 
1986 Call 85]  So the literary hermeneutic applied to the Qur'an confirms what Cragg 
believes on other grounds, that 'later development... did not sustain the pattern of these 
beginnings.' [KC 1971 Event 49]  He conveys the sense of a decline in the whole 
response of Muhammad to his prophetic vocation.  Yet one is bound to ask whether 
the model of 'poetry' is adequate here, since definition of the term is notoriously 
difficult.  Certainly the Qur'an does not fit the definition of Arabic poetry, having 
neither regular rhymes nor strophes, and being marked rather by assonance and 
disjointedness both in the earlier and the later passages.  Bell and Watt's judgement is 
that it is more fruitful to look for 'didactic rather than poetic or artistic forms' in the 
Qur'an. [Bell & Watt 1970:69,75] 
 
  Cragg's characteristic judgement on the later Qur'an does not, however, 
inhibit him from detailing the colour and eloquence of the Quranic language of 
metaphor in such chapters as 'The Landscape of the Hijaz', and 'Markets of the City' , 
drawing his material from every part of the Qur'an.  When he turns to what might be 
called Quranic theology in The Mind of the Qur'an we find the same recognition of 
the capacity of the Qur'an to reflect things of the earth as signs and settings of God's 
gracious provision and the continual reminder of himself. (see especially chapter 9 
'The Sacramental Earth')  Cragg, of course, is well aware that the stress on literary 
excellence in the Qur'an implies 'an active human factor'.  He quotes Sayyid Qutb of 
the Muslim Brotherhood using such expressions as 'allegory is often employed', and 
'the intended musical effect', in a way that, though Qutb would refute it, imputes the 
  
 
  
normal human process of creativity to the 'artistry' of the Qur'an.  As Cragg 
comments: 'Were such a partnership of the divine Spirit and the human self to be 
conceded in respect of artistry, a like partnership in respect of content could hardly be 
excluded.' [KC 1985 Pen 56,57]   
 
  Elsewhere Cragg is similarly anxious to find Muslims acknowledging 
the historical setting of Quranic revelation, and not, as so often, reluctant to pursue the 
full implications of the asbab al-nuzul or 'occasions of sending-down.'  (Jansen notes 
Suyuti (died AD 1505) discouraging such study and comments on the paucity of 
modern Egyptian books on the subject. [Jansen 1974:2])   Cragg admits that classical 
motivation was to avoid an antiquarian attitude to the Qur'an, and a determination to 
assert its living relevance, but alleges that the result has been an insensitivity to the 
history involved. 
 
  In such ways Cragg might well be regarded by some as subversive of 
Muslim attitudes to the Qur'an.  Occasionally the reader senses a distaste born perhaps 
of an over-spiritual approach to scripture.  Writing of the 'markets of the city' and the 
Quranic metaphors drawn from commerce, Cragg comments that 
the religious and the human... fit all too readily into the commercial criteria.  The 
robust assurance of the metaphors is never in doubt nor their fitness for the issues.  It 
is this, perhaps, more than any other consideration, which measures how deeply the 
ethos of Mecca penetrated the Islamic world...  Morality itself may be seen as a 
transaction in profit...  Unbelief is the bad bargain. [KC 1971 Event 107] 
Yet one may find a very similar emphasis on the lips of Jesus in the Gospels, where 
prudential motives and financial imagery have their place in ensuring people's entry to 
the Kingdom. (eg Matthew 13:44-46, Luke 14:28, 16:9)   
 
   Occasionally Cragg is conscious of the temptation to 'a private 
exegesis'. [ibid 134]  But does this amount to a 'Christianising' of the Qur'an?  Does he 
attempt a 'fusion of horizons' between Quranic revelation and Christian faith, or 
relapse into a 'private language' of interpretation which no-one else can share?  As far 
as his interpretation of the Qur'an is concerned, and this after all is the focus of his 
major attention in no less than five books, it is difficult to find him guilty.  He is too 
deferential to standard Muslim exegesis, too diffident (though always immensely 
fertile) about his own understanding of a text, too aware of the impropriety, as an 
outsider, of proposing something which goes against the grain of Muslim sentiment or 
doctrine, and above all too critical of what he sees as the fundamental 
'power-assurance' of Islam, and so of the Qur'an, to mistake its message for his own 
understanding of Christianity.  Basetti-Sani might well be so accused, but it is 
noticeable that Muslim reviewers of his books on the Qur'an do not so accuse Cragg.  
Where he is vulnerable to criticism is not so much in the style or substance of the 
interpretation of the Qur'an which he gives, as in the areas which he does not touch.  
His quintessence of the Qur'an, hallowed, he believes by long Muslim tradition, 
consists of surahs 1, 112, 113 and 114. [ibid 73]  Others would have preferred surah 2 
as 'the Qur'an in little', but as already observed, Cragg's choice is significant in 
emphasizing the oracular, 'poetic' Qur'an in preference to the prosaic, prescriptive one. 
 In his books on the Qur'an Cragg does not attempt exegetical comment on the 
directions for prayer, fasting or pilgrimage, marriage and family or economic life.  
Fazlur Rahman, by contrast, deals with the Qur'an under the themes of God, Man as 
Individual, Man in Society, Nature, Prophethood and Revelation, Eschatology, Satan 
  
 
  
and Evil, and the Emergence of the Muslim Community. [Fazlur 1980]  Jomier's 
themes are comparable: the nature of the Qur'an, Mecca, 'Hymnes au Dieu Créateur', 
Adam, Abraham, the Prophets, Jesus, the Muslim Community, and Reason and 
Persuasion. [Jomier 1978] 
 
  Cragg's Qur'an is then an intense call of God to a human race in crisis, 
calling it into responsive relationship with himself, and through that relationship into 
gratitude and responsibility for the whole created order, and a keen awareness of its 
beauty and coherence.  It asserts no merely arbitrary divinity or scheme of obedience, 
but gathers everything into one overarching unity of purpose, in which Islam itself and 
the Prophet of Islam are only instruments to secure submission to the divine claim.  In 
principle religion itself is subordinated to God as all in all, and, as Cragg sees it, this 
is something strikingly relevant for modern minds. 
The Islamic trust of the greatness of God... is surely rightly seen as the ally, even the 
anticipation, of the current charge that much religion is not really about God, but 
about comfort, or illusion, or security, or cultural identity and that the God of a true 
worship is, and ought to be, greater than all these. [KC 1973 Mind 140] 
Here again is Cragg's theme that every protest against religion is in effect a cry for 
more adequate religion.  The grounds for such a conviction can be found at least as far 
back as Amos ('I hate, I spurn your pilgrim-feasts...' 5:21), but Cragg has been able to 
recruit the Qur'an itself to promote it.  As he sees it, the Qur'an is not the charter for 
obscurantism that some in the West presume, but a document of urgent importance for 
contemporary man.  This is particularly evident in the emphasis he perceives in the 
Qur'an both upon the istighna' or attempt at independence of God, and the proper 
dominion of man over the world as khalifa, already discussed in chapter 2. 
 
  Cragg has then retrieved the Qur'an for Christian attention not merely 
as a document of Muslims, to be studied and valued as a phenomenon belonging to 
Islamic life and community, but as a call addressed to all humanity.  The advantage of 
his psychological distance from the Muslim community is that it makes this universal 
relevance of the Qur'an all the more convincing.  In terms of the hermeneutical 
discussion of our previous section we may say that Cragg's cultural and communal 
distance from the text has become an asset to him as an interpreter.  However, it is as 
a document of theology, prophecy and poetry that Cragg presents it.  There is an 
instructive contrast here with Fazlur Rahman, who also complains of the misreading 
of the Qur'an in the classical period, but in terms of a failure to establish Islamic law 
on 'a systematic intellectual working out of the sociomoral values of the Qur'an.'  'A 
vibrant and revolutionary religious document... was buried under the debris of 
grammar and rhetoric.' [Fazlur 1982:29,36]  The significance of the Qur'an to this 
modern Muslim is then quite distinct from its signficance for Cragg, as Cragg himself 
recognises in his essay on Fazlur Rahman, where he refers to  
his insistent view of the Qur'an as wholly 'functional', a Book which has to do, not 
with personal devotion and the inner life of the human spirit, but with a concrete 
programme for a socio-political order in human society....  The Qur'an must be read 
and pondered as a living campaign for a just and ethical socio-political order on earth, 
a campaign intelligently reproduced in every generation by its light. [KC 1985 Pen 
91,103] 
For Cragg such concepts set all kinds of alarm bells ringing about the use of power in 
the service of religion, as we saw in chapter 4. 
 
  
 
  
  Cragg himself, however, acknowledges that 'we are only at the 
beginning of this kind of reading of the Qur'an outside its own community.' [KC 1973 
Mind 194]  There is clearly more to be done, and the gaps in his own account of the 
Qur'an seem to point to a very powerful, but also very particular and personal vision 
of Islam. 
  
 
  
D  How Cragg anthologises Islam 
 
 
  No one scholar can attempt to do original work in the whole range of 
Islamic studies, or make a genuinely new contribution to more than a very small field. 
 But the one who sets out to interpret Islam, or any other faith, to those who do not 
share it, is under some obligation to convey the whole range and thrust of the faith, 
not as he would have it be, but as it is.  We have noted that some doubt on this score 
arises with Cragg's handling of the Qur'an.  How does the rest of his work rate in the 
completeness of its account of Islam? 
 
  We noted that Cragg's initial interest was in the modernists of Islam.  
This interest has been sustained especially through the translation of works from 
'Abduh, Kamil Husain and Taha Husain, and the examination of eight modern Muslim 
writers in The Pen and the Faith (though these were contemporary writers rather than 
'modernists' in any ideological sense).  An earlier and broader survey was contained in 
Counsels in Contemporary Islam.  Four books have dealt with the general theme of 
the Christian understanding of other faiths (Christianity in World Perspective, the 
Privilege of Man, the Christian and Other Religion, and The Christ and the Faiths), 
and six have aimed to foster Christian understanding and responsibility towards Islam 
(The Call of the Minaret, Sandals at the Mosque, The Event of the Qur'an, The Mind 
of the Qur'an, Muhammad and the Christian, and Jesus and the Muslim).  One book 
was an anthology of Sufi writers, and one a collection of Christian and Muslim 
prayers.  Another book (to be examined in more detail in chapter 7) dealt with the 
theological and political issues arising from the State of Israel. 
 
  In none of these can the reader reasonably expect a total treatment of 
Islam.  In writing for a Christian audience it may be right to indulge in an 'intelligent 
neglect... in respect of the Qur'an's more desolating areas' [KC 92:166], for the aim is 
not to render a complete account - whatever may be meant by that - but to enable a 
new kind of relationship, both to the faith and to the people.  Here, to be sure, 'the goal 
of study is an open country of relationship.' [KC 1971 Event 187]  Nor should we 
expect a total abeyance of personal judgement in writings designed for a general rather 
than a specific audience.  Nevertheless the purpose of three of Cragg's book-length 
publications seem to require the broadest and least idiosyncratic view of Islam which 
the author can present.  These are the two anthologies The House of Islam and Islam 
from Within (with Marston Speight), both written for a series called The Religious 
Life of Man, and the university student textbook Islam and the Muslim, written for the 
Open University.   
 
  The House of Islam has chapters entitled, 'Lord of the Worlds', 
Muhammad and the Rasuliyyah, Qur'an, Law, Liturgy, Ummah and Questions of 
Time - the last dealing with questions of historical and contemporary issues rather 
than eschatology.  There is a useful Table of Dates, a glossary and bibliography.  
Although the Christian vocation of relationship with Muslims cannot be assumed 
from the readers of these publications, Cragg still wants to put the personal before the 
academic, and chapter one begins with the words: 'To enter into Islam it is better to go 
to the mosque than to reach for the dictionary.' [KC 1969  House 5]  It seems also that 
he still wants to present Islam with the accent on contemporary issues and on those 
thinkers within Islam whom he sees as responding most appropriately to them.  The 
  
 
  
bibliography, arranged according to the chapter headings, contains surprisingly few 
Muslim authors, although some have naturally been introduced in the text itself.  Out 
of 51 titles listed only nine are by Muslims, who include Fazlur Rahman, SH Nasr and 
AAA Fyzee. 
 
  In this 1969 publication there is no real attempt to present conservative 
or revivalist Islam, with its accent on shari'ah and eschatology.  A brief reference to 
the Muslim Brotherhood elicits the judgement that the 'intractability of the human 
world to the religious ideal seems to many Muslims today to require a more modest 
philosophy about the actualization of Islam in the contemporary world.' [ibid 94]  That 
'modesty' has not been much in evidence in the intervening years when Muslims of 
radical mind have made their mark all over the Muslim world, notably in Iran.  A 
second edition in 1975 added some new titles to the bibliography (two by Muslims), 
and a stronger historical element, but in the updated text the shattering of Pakistani 
unity in 1971 is taken as proof of the judgements of the earlier edition.  'The mood of 
disillusion, or at least of greater realism, is unmistakable.' [2nd ed. 113] 
 
  Islam from Within was produced in 1980 as a companion anthology to 
the above, again in a series of comparable publications.  In this book Cragg made the 
selections on the Qur'an, Worship and Religion, Art and Architecture, Mystics and 
Saints and Contemporary Issues.  Cragg's co-author Marston Speight was responsible 
for Tradition, Law and Theology. [KC 1980 Within xiv]  The opportunity is taken 
here to underline the hospitality theme implied in the title of the companion volume 
[ibid], and in contrast to the rather orientalist bibliographies of that work, the only 
non-Muslims quoted here are Rudyard Kipling, Alan Villiers and Lawrence Durrell, 
in descriptions of Muslims at worship.  Here too Maududi and Sayyid Qutb find a 
place, but otherwise the interpretation is as before, with the unexpectd addition of the 
chapter on art and architecture.  The comment of a conservative Muslim on the text is 
instructive.  Noting that 'the anthologists' own understanding, preferences, priorities, 
even inner dispositions' are an integral part of the anthology, Khurram Murad 
complains particularly about the absence of any treatment of 'The Hereafter, al-Akhira' 
either in the extracts from the Qur'an or elsewhere.  'An outsider who is not allowed a 
full glimpse of it will find it difficult to receive a true understanding of Islam.'  We 
noted a similar gap in Cragg's treatment of the Qur'an compared with that of Fazlur 
Rahman in the last section.  Murad is uneasy that Tradition and Law together rate only 
forty pages, while Mystics and Saints receive thirty-five, and Contemporary Issues 
forty.  Readers, he feels, have not been allowed to hear the contributors speak without 
intrusive, even impatient comment.  It is not difficult to see where the anthologists' 
sympathies lie. [Murad 1982:4-7] 
 
  Islam and the Muslim, together with its companion section in  Man's 
Religious Quest. A Reader, are comparable texts published in 1978 for the Open 
University and its students.  The two texts are intended to be used in close 
conjunction.  In the brief space available in the Reader there is little room for more 
than Qur'anic passages, several pages of meditations on the Beautiful Names by 
Ghazali, and brief sections on Hadith, Law, Mysticism and a contemporary statement 
on Islam (a conservative view from the Islamic Council of Europe).  The ninety pages 
of Islam and the Muslim broadly follow the divisions of the previous books, but with 
particular sections on pilgrimage and Islamic sects.  Familar patterns emerge: an early 
section distinguishes between Islam and islam [KC 1978 Islam 5]; the Hijrah is the 
  
 
  
'hinge of the Muslim story' [ibid 18], by which Muhammad made 'the transition from 
prophethood to rulership' [ibid 22]; the shari'ah is introduced as 'the imperative mood 
in Islam' [ibid 49], and Shi'ite Islam under the title 'the mystery of suffering'. [ibid 64] 
 
  'It is understandable', writes Vahiduddin reviewing this work, 'that the 
recurrent themes of the writer's critique of Islamic consciousness should not fail to 
appear in the little manual, though marginally and as if by the way.' [Vahiduddin 
1980:243]  Cragg's writing is in fact remarkably consistent, and the demands made 
upon him by publishers testify to the acceptibility of his work as an interpreter of 
Islam for the general public as well as for those who share his Christian commitment. 
 The criticisms made of the one are to be made equally of the other.   
 
  One has to question, in relation to these anthologies, why the gaps 
occur, and whether the neglect is in fact 'intelligent'. [KC 92:166]  The Psalmists' 
attitude to the Torah of Israel might have been one way of appreciating the 
comparable Muslim understanding of shari'ah.  Scholars like Goldziher and Gibb 
seem to have been more ready to see the Muslim theological mind operating in that 
framework of detailed guidance about daily affairs.  Anderson, who shares Cragg's 
conservative evangelical origins, has been widely respected and consulted by Muslims 
for his knowledge of Muslim law.  Similarly with kalam/Islamic philosophy, readings 
in Aquinas or other Christian scholastic writers would have revealed close affinities 
with 'Asharite texts.  The eschatological dimension can easily be found in Christian 
writers.   
 
  Such considerations suggest that Cragg's silences in respect of Islam 
reflect reservations and unease in wider areas, and in expressions of Christian faith 
where he does not feel at home.  To the wider areas we must now turn. 
  
 
  
Chapter 7 
 
VOCATIONS BEYOND ISLAM 
 
 
A  Encountering Judaism 
 
  Having looked extensively at Cragg's understanding of Islam as his 
major contribution to the Christian interpretation of other faiths, we have to see also 
how the principles in operation there are available for use in relation to faiths other 
than Islam.  Cragg's engagement with Islam has been so broad in scope and long in 
years that it has naturally left little room for engagement with other faiths.  However 
he has given us certain writings which range outside Islam, and reveal a concern 
particularly for Judaism and for Buddhist thought.   
 
  It is inevitable that a Christian theologian, particularly from a tradition 
which prides itself on its faithfulness to Biblical norms, should be brought to engage 
in some way with Judaism.  This will be all the more so in one who has lived in Beirut 
and Jerusalem, and seen the conflict in Lebanon between Maronite and Muslim over 
the establishment of the state of Israel with his own eyes.  What may be asked is 
whether, given the general state of Muslim/Jewish relations, such a man as Cragg can 
set aside his Muslim sympathies and see the Jewish experience for what it is, or 
whether the whole nature of his approach to Islam disqualifies him from making or 
even commending a parallel approach to Judaism.  Is the character of his theological 
method, formed in the crucible of Islam, capable of adaptation to the other Semitic 
faith? 
 
  Cragg's major writing about Judaism is contained in The Privilege of 
Man (1968), a book about the doctrine of man in the three Biblical faiths, in This Year 
in Jerusalem (1982), a book about Israel and Palestine, and in a major section of The 
Christ and the Faiths (1986) under the title of 'Messiah and Jewry'.  As we read these 
publications certain familiar accents are at once apparent.  There is the search for 
common ground even, and especially within the most controverted issues of theology. 
 In Islam this is seen in the way Cragg handles the crucifixion of Jesus, where he 
stresses the intention to crucify, which Muslims do not deny. [see chapter 5.B]  With 
Judaism the most vexed issue is the coming of the Messiah: has he or not?  Again 
Cragg looks for the common ground, but his touch seems less sure here, and the 
argument slighter.  He fixes on the fact that the Messianic hope, however understood, 
has sustained Jewish identity in their long history and given its very name to 
Christianity.  This he sums up in the phrase 'He that was to come', which Christians 
will gladly refer to Jesus, and Jews, while of course rejecting its application to Jesus, 
may also accept as an expression of their historic hope. [KC 1986 Christ 97]  'He that 
was to come', however, does not seem a phrase calculated arouse Jewish enthusiasm, 
since its immediately obvious meaning fits Christian assumptions too well.  Cragg 
might have done better to emphasize the future coming of Jesus the Messiah, as in the 
remarkable German radio debate between Hans Küng and Pinchas Lapide, in which 
the Orthodox rabbi declared: 
Professor Küng, you are waiting for the parousia; with you too the fullness of 
redemption is still in the future; I await its coming, but the second coming is also a 
coming.  If the Messiah comes and then turns out to be Jesus of Nazareth, I would say 
  
 
  
that I do not know of any Jew in this world who would have anything against it.  Thus 
a legitimate awaiting of his advent or second coming - and the distinction here is 
really secondary - would not only be our common expectation of salvation, but in the 
meantime would enable both of us to concentrate on what can be known. [Küng & 
Lapide 1977:43] 
Lapide is by no means typical of Jewish thinkers, as his more recent book The 
Resurrection of Jesus. A Jewish Perspective shows.  (In this he argues for the historic 
reality of Jesus' Resurrection, but against his being the Messiah or divine. [Lapide 
1984])  But such considerations have not generally worried Cragg in his search for the 
'creative minority' in a community of faith.  In this theological crux Lapide's handling 
of the issue seems both more pertinent and more incisive than Cragg's, though the 
method is the same.  The nearest Cragg approaches to Lapide's argument is the 
suggestion that 'Jesus was Messiah-designate as well as Messiah-actual' and pointed to 
a future still to be fulfilled. [KC 1986 Christ 116] 
 
   Cragg is compelled to take this question of fulfilment further in 
answer to the Jewish claim that the Messiah cannot have come and redeemed the 
world, as Christians claim, since it (and they) remain so manifestly unredeemed. [ibid 
113ff]  Cragg acknowledges the force of the Jewish argument and the pain of Jewish 
history behind it, but calls Christians and Jews to a realism which rejects both the 
romanticism of which Jews accuse Christians and the despair which sees only a world 
of unredeemed evil.  Christians who know themselves to be redeemed 'must in turn 
become redeemers', taking up their cross. [ibid 115]  But Cragg offers more than an 
ethical and existential answer, though his talk about 'the redemptive principle' might 
be read exclusively in those terms. [ibid]  There is a fact - the cross - on which hope 
can be based.  He notes the Exodus as the great fact of the past which has justified the 
continuing hope of the present and future for Jews, and asks whether the cross of 
God's Messiah might not properly be a similar factual basis for continuing hope.  
'Such faith does not romanticize away the unredeemedness of the world but reads it as 
the measure of the Messiah there had to be.' [ibid 117]  The parallel with the Exodus 
comes of course from Luke 9:31, and 1 Corinthians 5:7, but one might have expected 
a greater stress on the Resurrection as an integral part of it. 
 
  Other familiar accents are also heard.  There is the emphasis on the 
powerlessness of the prophets; the ministry of Jesus 'heading into crisis'; the sin of the 
world expressed in the 'collective mechanisms of obduracy, timidity, prejudice or 
folly'; 'how in any and every evil situation love must suffer'; and the welcome to 
'critical scholarship alive' to the pressures of communities on it. [ibid 
101,106,108,109,111]     
 
  We have seen how with Islam Cragg's ultimate critical focus rests on 
the allegation of the 'power-assurance', the political aspiration of the faith-community 
in the name of God.  This central trait reflects negatively for Cragg on the character of 
the God whom Muslims worship.  With Judaism there is a similar central focus, that 
of 'peoplehood' (or sometimes 'Moses and peoplehood'). [KC 1985 Jesus 287]  Cragg 
points to the conjunctions characteristic of all three Semitic faiths: ' God and...'  'God 
and his Prophet' in Islam; 'God and his Christ' in Christianity; 'God and his People' in 
Judaism. [KC 1986 Christ 121]  In Judaism, Cragg maintains, the division between 
Jew and Gentile is central.  Despite Jewish talk about universalism, and some 
embarrassment, Jews are different in their own eyes.  'Conceptually and practically, 
  
 
  
the otherness exists and is decisive'. [ibid 123]  But the 'otherness', he complains, is 
not merely the 'antiseptic' otherness of salt, which must preserve its saltness if it is to 
do its job of preservation.  In this case the job would be that of preserving the proper 
humanity of the world by a necessary Jewish distinctiveness, following the will of 
God as revealed to the Jewish people.  But this particular 'otherness' fails its antiseptic 
role and becomes also a rejection of non-Jewish humanity.  This tragically invites an 
answering rejection. 
 
  This is not merely an ethnic distinction between Jews and others: 
It is a unilateral dissociation from all others who, by that dissociation alone, are 
denominated 'Gentiles'.  Is there any other corporate self-consciousness which requires 
the whole human family to be defined by a single contradistinction? [ibid 127 
emphasis original] 
Yet Cragg himself goes on to instance just such comparable 'contradistinctions', in the 
ideology of apartheid and the 'Russianism' of Ivan the Terrible and Dostoevsky.  Here 
too are chosen peoples, in their own eyes.  But these, he claims, wore Biblical dress 
and justified themselves from the Scriptures because they were generated, 'however 
distortedly', from Judaic conviction.  It was the Jewish nation that 'originated 
exceptionality'. [ibid 135]  But can it really be said that all forms of racial and ethnic 
exclusivism must be laid ultimately at the Jewish door?  Cragg comes close to saying 
so, yet there are surely many examples which owe nothing to historic Jewish or 
Biblical influences.  Cragg retrieves the accusation, half-made, by examples from 
Ben-Gurion and others of a secularized sense of Jewish chosenness in which it is the 
people who choose God, and so their destiny, rather than the passive case.  Such a 
vocation could be adopted by any virile and self-confident group of people.  Cragg 
cites Dow Marmur's 'painful book', Beyond Survival. Reflections on the future of 
Judaism [Marmur 1982], to suggest that in contrast to the secular version, or the 
preferable 'open peoplehood' concept of the Church, the exclusive 
peoplehood-by-birth conviction of Judaism leads only to neurosis and 
self-pre-occupation. [KC 1986 Christ 139f] 
 
  Breiner observed this emphasis on ethnicity as the clue to Judaism in 
The Privilege of Man [p 54f], and commented of the author that 'despite a remarkably 
sympathetic Christian response to Judaism... (the reference) remains a good example 
of how deeply entrenched this attitude to Judaism is in Christian thinking.' [Breiner 
1985]  Yet there are certainly Jewish voices which explicitly disavow any 
fundamental distinction from the rest of humanity.  Rabbi Norman Solomon asks 
pointedly 
Is it really too much for Jews to expect Christians to meet them as normal human 
beings rather than as peculiar theological objects?...  Surely the foundation of 
prejudice lies in looking at the other as something different in some deep way from 
everybody else. [Solomon 1985:69f  Emphasis original] 
Why are such voices not given more centrality in Cragg's critique of Judaism?  The 
answer may be the Islamic view of Jewish exclusivism which takes its authority from 
the Qur'an (62:6): 'Say (O Muhammad): O ye that are Jews!  If ye claim that ye are 
favoured of Allah apart from (all) mankind, then long for death if ye are truthful.' 
(Pickthall translation)  Surah 2:94-96 expresses the same sentiment, with the 
explanation that these people do not desire to die and be with God, as his sincere 
friends would, because of their sins.  They are in fact the most greedy of all for the 
things of life.  When to this age-old interpretation of the Jewish people's character is 
  
 
  
added the contemporary conflict over Israel and Palestine the result is a view on 
Judaism that Cragg must have found hard to ignore.  For the Palestinians can be seen 
as living evidence of the consequences of Jewish exclusivism. 
 
  Cragg has devoted an entire book to the historical reality of Israel, the 
astonishing triumph of its achievement and the tragedy of its effects on the Middle 
East as a whole and the Palestinians in particular, whereby 'homecoming means 
displacement.' [KC 1982 Jerusalem 89f]  All Cragg's eloquence in registering the 
tragic paradox of the human situation are deployed in telling the story of Israel up to 
1980.  In particular he notes how the very success of the Israelis, combined with the 
conviction of their own uniqueness, tended to blind them to the lessons their own 
history held for people in the situation that the Palestinians were now reduced to. 
A Jewish analysis which misses the power of despair and the tenacity of the powerless 
is strangely negligent of its own long history and of the land-fidelity behind its own 
success...  It would be odd to imagine that Palestinians would forget in three decades 
what Jews remembered for eighteen centuries. [ibid 58,59] 
He sees both Arab and Jew locked in absolutist interpretations of their historical 
situation which allow no shades of grey and no admission of guilt except from the 
enemy.  'History itself is not rightly told unless it makes absolute reports of 
denunciation and legitimacy.' [ibid 94]  In a typical approach to the 'mind' behind the 
attitudes Cragg recommends the need for a sense of the ironical, and regrets that 
Arabic appears to have no word for 'paradox'. [ibid 95]  (The dictionaries give tanaqud 
zahiri or literally 'outward contradiction'.) 
 
  However it is Judaism that, from Cragg's account of it, abounds in 
paradox.  Zionism springs 'from a deep reading of the Jewish past' but results only in 
'another cycle of the same haunting paradox.' [KC 1986 Christ 152]  For the people 
that is intended to be different, and different because they are to be a blessing to the 
nations, wants to be a nation like all other nations, with passports and frontiers and 
guns to protect them.  If Auschwitz and Oxford, representing the extreme Jewish 
experiences of persecution and assimilation, both menaced Judaism [ibid 151, cf 
Marmur 1982:36], security seemed to lie in a national refuge which dispossessed 
another innocent people and made them refugees in their turn.  Cragg tells in some 
detail the story of the heroism and the tragedy of the Zionist achievement of Israel, not 
omitting the moral ambiguity of the 'ratchet' process, whereby political and military 
decisions regretted by Israelis of more tender conscience nevertheless become, once 
successful, the starting-point for new advances. [KC 1982 Jerusalem 28,30]  He is 
clear that the Arabs, by political and military ineptitude, were their own worst 
enemies, but insists that 'minority status for Palestinians was basic to the whole 
Zionist ideal'. [ibid 53]  Both Palestinians and Israelis must abandon the comforting 
myth of their own innocence.  His prescription is twofold: a mutual recognition by 
Palestinians of the reality and permanence of the Jewish state, and by Jews of the 
legitimate peoplehood and consequent civil rights of the Palestinian people.   
If Israel is to avail for Jewry's fulfilment as Zion, the Palestinian case and cause must 
be able to rise to the human quality and the tragic realism which will allow that 
fulfilment.  If that is to be, Israel, for its part, must share that tragic realism and offer 
human community to those whose consent alone can save her from jeopardy and 
frustration. [ibid 163] 
 
  This Year in Jerusalem was published only a matter of months before 
  
 
  
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which can have done nothing to reconcile 
Cragg to the Israeli refusal to admit Palestinian opponents to 'the human community'. 
[cf KC 130:16]  As already suggested, this probably underlies the focus on Jewish 
exclusivism in his recent writing.  But it seems to have had another effect also.  The 
Christ and the Faiths, for the first time in Cragg's immense literary output, questions 
Christian use of parts of the Old Testament, especially in worship.  Even in the New 
Testament passages like Luke 1:68-79, the Benedictus of the Anglican liturgy, have 
been an embarrassment to Arab Christians of the Middle East ever since 1948. [BCC 
1982:91] 
There is, for Arab Christians, an almost unbearable ambiguity in singing: 'Blessed be 
the Lord God of Israel...'  Israelis themselves are not agreed about him and if his 
'visiting and redeeming his people' has to be read in terms of contemporary Palestinian 
history, how is he to be called 'blessed'? [KC 1986 Christ 334] 
But the problem is not simply an Arab and Middle Eastern one, though no doubt 
Cragg was first alerted to it there.  The effect of the use of many of the psalms and 
much Old Testament history in many national churches' worship has been, he claims, 
to feed the  
tendency to recruit God... and ally his providence to their designs.  Even the loveliest 
of psalms have this sad ambivalence.  There is scarcely one rich vade mecum of the 
heart before God which may not link its piety with enmity and its praise with its 
animadversions about others as foes. [ibid 331] 
The effect is to accentuate 'ethnic, political, even tribal, pride' at the expense of the 
true meaning of the Church accessible to all, or even to identify the two. [ibid]  Cragg 
makes clear that he is not advocating an abandonment of the Canon of Scripture, but 
asking how it is to be used.  Has the Church 'too readily assumed the unity of its 
double-testamented Bible?' [ibid 134]  Christians who describe themselves as 
'Bible-believing' and who can see no evil in Israeli policies because the Jewish state is 
the fulfilment of prophecy are a case in point. [ibid 334 cf Chapman 1983:180f]]  We 
must return to Cragg's discusssion of the Canon in a later section. 
 
  Exclusivism then, is a many-facetted thing, but in Cragg's 
understanding deeply characteristic of historic and contemporary Judaism, and deeply 
disturbing.  His later writing no longer uses terms like 'spiritual imperialism', which 
can be found in some of the earlier.  In Sandals at the Mosque he wrote that 'The 
making of proselytes to Judaism was a kind of spiritual imperialism in that the central 
announcement was an offer of naturalization into Jewry.' [KC 1959 Sandals 142], and 
in Christianity in World Perspective: 
The opening up of the faith in Christ, on equal terms, to Gentile as well as Jew was 
the abandonment of a kind of imperialism of the Spirit by which Jewry, despite its 
magnificent potential universalism, interpreted election as a human privacy of its own 
and made accession to truth a sort of naturalization to itself. [KC 1968 World 33] 
The older language of supersession and displacement of the Jewish people by the 
Church, 'the new Israel', has also been refined, though it still appears in the revised 
edition of The Call of the Minaret. [KC 1956 Call1:244 = KC 1986 Call2:218]  But it 
is a refinement and not an essential change.  In some respects his language becomes 
sharper.  Cragg is clearly ill at ease with certain responses to the Holocaust, notably 
the 'passionate partisanship with Jewry' of some Christians like Rosemary Ruether.  
Her saying: 'Anti-Judaism is the left hand of Christology' is vigorously rejected along 
with similar statements from others as 'wild and facile dicta... quite wanting in the 
discipline of either spiritual perception or intelligent scholarship.' [KC 1986 Christ 
  
 
  
158]  The attempt in some Jewish circles to equate anti-Judaism and anti-Zionism, so 
that hostility to Zionism is understood as enmity to all Jews, is also roundly dismissed 
as 'either stupid or malicious', given the extent of Jewish reservations about Zionism 
both historic and even contemporary. [ibid 159] 
 
  With regard to the alleged anti-Judaism of the New Testament Cragg is 
prepared to agree that the Gospel of John in particular is plainly influenced by 'a living 
situation of prolonged and bitter strain', but that Paul's behaviour in raising the 
collection for Jerusalem, and even the 'tortured logic' of Romans 9 - 11, effectively 
refutes Ruether's accusation of New Testament 'diabolizing' of Jews. [ibid 160]  In 
equally unambiguous terms he rejects the theory, elaborated by James Parkes and 
others, of two covenants, whereby Jews and Christians have parallel, but essentially 
unrelated, relationships with God, the Jews by birth and race, the Christians by choice 
and adherence.  By such an interpretation the New Testament and Christianity itself is 
forced into a highly artificial position, and the rejection of the Jew may even be 
reinforced by the perpetuation of the category of 'Gentile'. [ibid 164]   
 
  In place of any theory of two covenants Cragg turns rather to the sense 
of divine pathos found in the writings of Rabbi Abraham Heschel, and his feeling, 
developed through a study of the prophets, for the 'divine earnestness about our life.' 
[ibid 167]  Here is common ground indeed, but Cragg does not stop to explore it in 
detail.  One can only presume that, given greater scope, he would urge on Jews the 
same 'divine liability' as he recommends to Muslims, and with similar effect.  
 
  It is entirely understandable that his writings on Judaism do not reflect 
the same grasp of communal sentiment as his writings on Islam, and appear to be 
based more on reading than encounter.  It seems dubious, for example, that he has 
fully appreciated the defensiveness Jews feel about Israel, and the consequent 
equation of anti-Zionism with anti-Judaism.  In the light of left-wing student attacks 
on British university Jewish Societies for alleged 'racism', it seems unwarranted to say 
that the equation is 'either stupid or malicious', since such attacks themselves presume 
it.  It may be guessed also that some terms offensive to Jews, like 'ethno-theology' 
[ibid 148 cf Breiner 1985:43ff] would not be likely to survive the process of bi-lateral 
dialogue.  It is true that the Jews whose thinking justifies such language are the less 
likely to enter into dialogue.  Comparable Muslim attitudes, however, have received 
gentler treatment from Cragg's pen. 
  
 
  
B  Hinduism and Buddhism 
 
 
  Cragg's personal engagement as a resident amid cultures shaped by 
other world faiths has been limited to the Middle East, and more briefly, Nigeria.  
Though he has travelled extensively throughout Asia his cultural and religious 
experience is Semitic and Western rather than non-Semitic and Indian.  He shows no 
knowledge of the further Eastern cultures of China and Japan, or the Pacific.  His 
understanding of religious cultures outside the Middle East is therefore gained 
primarily from literature.  We might in consequence expect some disclaimers of his 
competence to write about them, especially considering the emphasis put in the case 
of Islam on developing personal relationships rather than mere study, but none are 
forthcoming.  Buddhism in its Theravada form (described in a rare slip as the 
'northern' form in KC 1986 Christ 259) has caught his attention in recent years. [eg 
KC 85]  He makes only scattered references to Mahayana Buddhism, though curiously 
he tends to use a vocabulary which is more characteristic of the Mahayana than of the 
Theravada tradition.  For example he consistently uses the name 'Sakyamuni' for the 
Buddha, and makes much of the concept of sunyata or voidness. [Parrinder  1971, art. 
'Shakyamuni]  He has three chapters on Hinduism and three on Theravada Buddhism 
in The Christ and the Faiths, and as with Judaism, this book contains his most 
substantial writing on these subjects.  All three, together with Islam would have 
formed part of his responsibilities as Reader in Religious Studies in the University of 
Sussex. 
 
  Again we have to ask whether the approach and techniques of 
interpretation developed in the case of Islam prove adequate for other faiths, and here 
particularly for faiths which do not share the same monotheistic and creationist basis 
that Christianity enjoys with Islam and Judaism.  If the doctrines of God and man 
cannot, as in the Semitic faiths, be plausibly understood as reciprocal, (chapter 2.A) is 
it possible to find some other common ground on which a constructive dialogue can 
proceed?  
 
  The difference in Cragg's handling of Hinduism and of Buddhism is 
instructive both in regard to the extent of the historical encounters between these 
faiths and Christianity, and also to the respective philosophical and religious gulfs 
between them.  In the Indian context Cragg is familiar with the life and writings of CF 
Andrews, AG Hogg, Raimundo Panikkar, Chenchiah, Chakkarai, Sadhu Sundar Singh 
and Gandhi.  All these figures, except Hogg, form an integral part of his developing 
argument, and others like Bede Griffiths, MM Thomas and Paul Devanandan make 
brief appearances.  In the Buddhist case Cragg quotes virtually no Buddhist writing 
except the Pali Canon.  His other authorities are Western scholars of Buddhism, and 
innumerable Western poets, especially, in this context, Traherne and Keats as 
celebrants of the goodness of the created order.  Of indigenous Christian writing in the 
Buddhist context he has only single references to the Sri Lankans Aloysius Pieres and 
Lynn de Silva, (the latter in criticism).  This imbalance no doubt reflects the long 
association of Britain with India (and Sri Lanka), and the consequent ease and 
familiarity of Indian thinkers with the English language.  The Western writers on 
Buddhism tend in contrast to be American.  It also reflects the relative strength of the 
Church in India compared with Buddhist lands.  But primarily it means that Cragg is 
able to report a vigorous ongoing debate in the Hindu context, where the term 'Indian 
  
 
  
Christian theology' has real meaning, whereas in the case of Buddhism he has to 
conduct his argument alone, with the help of his poets. [cf Boyd 1975]   
 
 
HINDUISM 
 
  Cragg's focus in his discussion of Hinduism is the simple issue of 
whether the Incarnation of Christ can in any sense be regarded as replicated by the 
avatars of Hinduism, the issue often termed 'the uniqueness of Christ'.  He finds the 
question most sharply posed not by Hindus but by the Indian Catholic theologian 
Raimundo Panikkar, who attempts 'to think Christology from within Hinduism.' [KC 
1986 Christ 187]  Panikkar, as interpreted by Cragg, believes that 'we may locate in 
Hinduism the living presence of the mystery which Christians call Christ.'  Cragg 
believes that if Panikkar's view is accepted  
It is as if a Christ of concept or of contemplation is replacing the Christ of actuality, 
with a readiness to equate the two by dispensing with the event-character which in 
Christianity defines it. [ibid 186] 
In other words the historic Christ has ceased to be significant, and the historic 
parameters of Christhood do not matter.  'Christ' can be equated with the Krishna who 
appears as Arjuna's charioteer in the Bhagavad Gita, and with many other human 
encounters with the reality which defies definition, and for which 'Christians have no 
other name than Christ.' [Panikkar in ibid 185]  Cragg responds to this in a number of 
ways.  He questions the moral significance of the appearance of Krishna as the 
charioteer compared with Jesus.  He asks what will prevent the elaboration of such 
Hindu 'Christologies' to include 'the lurid Puranic tales or the antics and lusts of the 
other Krishnas'. [ibid 191,190]  But most of all he responds by rehearsing, at some 
length, the 'happenedness' of Jesus the Christ.  This is ground familiar to readers of 
Paul and Peter. Meeting in Jerusalem (1980).   
 
  Cragg is convinced that the significance of Jesus was not immediately 
grasped by the New Testament Church, but that the development of exalted language 
about him did take its origins essentially from the genuine character of the events of 
his life and teaching.  It was not an invention of the early Church in compensation for 
an otherwise failed Messiah.  It was not the illegitimate product of an enthusiasm for 
Jesus which found no warrant in his own understanding of himself.  Cragg clearly 
feels that it is not only Hindus who are adrift in this issue, for he patiently expounds 
his philosophy of history, which is also a kind of epistemology.   
There is what happened and what what happened meant.  Without the latter, noted, 
pondered, stored and probed in mind, the former never becomes history and is, as it 
were, unhappened into oblivion.  It is thus the historian who 'makes' history, given the 
'history' (as yet unrecorded) which makes him historian. [ibid 199 cf KC 1980 Paul 
31ff & passim, & KC 130:1] 
The last qualification is vital, for it is by the 'given history' that religious communities 
live and shape their own history.  The difficulty for Cragg, sharply posed in Panikkar's 
proposals about Christology, is that Hinduism is religion of a different sort, for which 
human history is little better than illusion.  Other Western theologians determined to 
retain the centrality of the historic record of Jesus have encountered the same 
difficulty as Cragg, in that Hinduism encourages a 'gnosticising' tendency to all 
Scriptures. [eg Robinson 1979:58ff] 
 
  
 
  
  Cragg is not, however, left simply in opposition to Hinduism.  He is 
able to determine a number of parallels between Hindu and Christian thought, such as 
the suggestion, taken from Sadhu Sundar Singh, that the concept of karma, described 
as 'the entailing of evil out of a past into a future' resembled the New Testament 
meaning of the wrath of God. [KC 1986 Christ 229]  He also suggests that the 
struggle of Gandhi against untouchability was a witness against Hinduism from within 
Hinduism, and as such it had something of the moral passion of the Hebrew prophets. 
 Consequently Gandhi might in some sense be counted among them. [ibid 235]  Cragg 
might also have reminded us that Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu extremist.   
 
  Cragg's conclusion about Hinduism is that the witness of India shows 
that 'Jesus may indeed be known in a "following" which is not a "confessing"', and 
that the warning of Jesus not to prevent those who cast out devils in his name (Mark 
9:38f) can remind us not to forbid the association of any gracious, prophetic action 
with his name.  For God's grace operates by its own laws, unrestricted by human 
religious frontiers, and once identified in its perfect form in Jesus can be recognised 
everywhere.  This is the abiding truth behind all the attempts to 'Indianise' 
Christology.  'Divine revelation is consummated in the historical Jesus and his cross 
but is everywhere refracted in the human search.' [ibid 238,232] 
 
 
BUDDHISM 
 
  As already noted, Cragg has to pursue his argument in the case of 
Buddhism without the help of a strong indigenous tradition of Christian interpretation, 
though, as we shall see, he does not always accept the help that there is.  The 
consequence is that the discussion becomes rather rarified at some points, and at 
others digresses to engage related themes in Western existentialism.  He does note 
Buddhist warnings that Buddhism is not understood in the West [ibid 246], and might 
have enlivened his work by quotations from Western Buddhist authors, as done in a 
somewhat comparable book by Stephen Neill. [Neill 1984:125-158]  His reason for 
not doing so is unstated, but was probably connected with the wish to avoid an 
eclectic account from a variety of Buddhist traditions, such as that given by Christmas 
Humphreys [Humphreys 1951 cf De Silva 1975:60], in favour of focussing 
exclusively on the Theravada tradition with its uncompromising and allegedly original 
non-theism. 
 
  This gives him the opportunity of making the whole thrust of his 
discussion of Buddhism the question of the reality of the Self, and the desire or 
craving (in Pali tanha), which according to Theravada teaching sustains the illusion of 
the Self.  Against some Christians like Lynn de Silva who credit Theravadins with a 
kind of functional equivalent of theism in the Buddhist sense of the transcendent, the 
ineffable, Cragg wants to insist that there is no place for 'intentionality' or any sense of 
purpose in that system, and therefore no genuine theism, however shadowy.  For 
Theravadins we cannot be 'guests within divine hospitality' for 'the fact is that 
Buddhism, or at least its Theravada form, has never wanted to be theological.' [KC 
1986 Christ 310]  Cragg accuses Buddhism of social unconcern, of a focus on the 
individual psyche and the means of its repair which excludes any significance for the 
whole of the natural and human environment. [cf De Silva 1975 ch 14]  Yet what we 
have called 'the individual psyche' has no real existence, and is only posited for the 
  
 
  
sake of convenience in speaking, sometimes being referred to as 'the conventional 
self'.  Cragg makes the most of the contradiction inherent in this: 
Will, clearly, is here involved.  Even 'undesiring' has to be desired.  Though the self 
may be in theory an illusion it belongs, in some sense, with the enterprise that aims at 
its surcease...  Theory may demand that this be called 'the conventional self' to 
safeguard the doctrine that it is not ultimate.  But, conventional or not, it is in some 
sense a self exercising a will about itself. [ibid 291f cf the major thrust of KC 85]  
 
  These sharp contrasts might suggest a thoroughgoing polemical 
approach.  But in fact they emerge only at the end of Cragg's treatment of Buddhism, 
while earlier passages, though never failing to distinguish the Christian and the 
Buddhist teaching, see many 'meanings' in Buddhist doctrine which run parallel to 
Christian thought.  Despite the later comments about the contradictions in the 
Buddhist understanding of the Self, Cragg is prepared for paradox about it, on the 
grounds that no faith escapes paradox, least of all Christianity.  'There is this strange 
paradox about the Buddhist thesis of the self, namely that the loss of the self is almost 
self-fulfilling.' [ibid 249]  Yet one is compelled to ask whether Cragg has not taken 
unfair advantage of the English language here, and whether such a term as 
'self-fulfilment' is ever used as a Buddhist expression in Buddhist languages.  The 
question is extremely complex.  [See de Silva 1975:ch.6 'The Quest for Self-Identity'] 
  
 
  As always Cragg's concern is to 'retrieve' the Buddhist concept.  In 
outlining the Buddhist understanding of death Cragg sees in it 'a clue which Christian 
faith retrieves and enlarges.'  The whole of Buddhist discipline can be regarded as a 
parable of what Christian discipleship means. [ibid 285]  Like other parables it has no 
one-to-one correspondence, and can mislead, but in general should be read positively 
for the truths it may illumine.  As Cragg sees it, the Buddhist confuses the elimination 
of selfishness, which is desirable, with the elimination of selfhood, which is not.  
Nevertheless 
It would certainly be a Christian's duty to maximize whatever in Buddhism would 
allow one to speak of 'selfless persons' in whom personhood was real and the 
selflessness was that of character, not of extinction. [ibid 293] 
So Cragg finds many points at which, to use a photographic image, the Christian 
understanding is the positive picture of the Buddhist negative.  He discovers Thomas 
Traherne, for example, using the vocabulary of Buddhism, fire, flame, discernment, 
emptiness, but all with the opposite sense, celebrating instead of turning away from 
existence.  Cragg maintains that the question of which is right must remain open.  
'Existence leaves to us whether to read it as annunciation or renunciation.' [ibid 263]  
Again he finds in Keats' idea of 'negative capability', or the ability to sustain doubt and 
uncertainty without requiring premature solutions, something in positive mode of 
what Buddhism conveys negatively through its concepts of anicca, anatta and dukkha. 
[ibid 267f] 
 
  The inevitable question is whether Cragg has rightly assessed the 
Buddhist meaning, whether the negative language is indeed the positive in another 
mode and therefore can be 'maximized', or something quite different.  Conversely, has 
Cragg correctly perceived real difference, as in the question of theism and 
'intentionality' behind the universe?  Some Christians who have lived much closer to 
Buddhism for much longer than Cragg appear to have made different judgements.  De 
  
 
  
Silva, for example, uses the well-known Udana passage which refers to 'an unborn, 
unbecome, unmade, uncompounded' and maintains that it clearly implies an 'Ultimate 
Reality' other than Nirvana.  For 'Nirvana is an experience related to the Absolute and 
not the Absolute in itself.' [de Silva 1975:123,124]  He quotes Romans 11:33 - 'How 
unsearchable are his judgements and how inscrutable his ways!' - to suggest that 
Christian theology has attempted to analyse God in minute detail, and consequently 
obscured him with its formulations. [ibid 125f]  Even Cragg himself suggests that 
sunyata, 'emptiness', or 'no-thing-ness', is properly understood as 'a silence to halt 
improper questions.' [KC 1986 Christ 252]  William Johnston, a Jesuit scholar long 
resident in Japan, and so, admittedly, speaking from a Mahayana context, has written 
Some (Western philosophers) have not hesitated to call Buddhism atheistic.  I 
believe... that this is a misunderstanding: we must not blind ourselves to the extremely 
positive elements which lie behind the negative language.  First of all we must 
remember that Buddhism is above all a religion of salvation. [Johnston 1981:113] 
Johnston goes on to quote the same Udana passage from the Pali Canon used by the 
Theravadins, and to draw the same conclusions from it as Lynn De Silva. [ibid 114]  
But Cragg does not accept that Buddhism is about 'salvation' in the accepted sense. 
[KC 1986 Christ 312 n 4] 
 
  We have noted earlier (chapter 2.B) Cragg's difficulties with negative 
language in his strictures on the knowability of God in Islam.  With Theravada 
Buddhism, on the other hand, it must be admitted that some Buddhists themselves 
hold an explicitly atheist view. [Dharmasiri 1974]  There are clearly great varieties of 
Western interpretation of Buddhism, and many problems arise because of the 
enormous contrast in philosophical assumptions and the sheer difficulty of 
understanding. [Johnston 1981:106f]  It is interesting, however, to note that Cragg 
appears not to have observed the similarity of both De Silva and Johnston's general 
approach to Buddhism to that which he has pioneered in relation to Islam.  Nor has he 
shared their conclusions.  This must raise doubts about the value of his interpretation 
of Buddhism. 
  
 
  
Chapter 8 
 
A VOCATION FOR ALL? 
 
 
  The main lines of Cragg's understanding of Christianity and other 
faiths are now clear.  The case of Buddhism reveals a mind to some degree made up 
before a close examination is undertaken, and unwilling to be surprised.  Perhaps the 
most remarkable thing about Cragg's writing is its revelation of a mind settled and 
even characteristic formulations evolved nearly forty years ago.  The same themes 
emerge in manifold variety: the God who undertakes for his creation the task of 
restoration for which the original decision to create has made him liable; how this 
restoration was worked for through the prophets and eventually brought about by the 
love that suffers; how Jesus became the Christ in whom this suffering love was finally 
and decisively made plain and effective for all; how that single event once recognised 
and accepted finds echoes or refractions everywhere.  These have to be retrieved, in 
the exercise of hospitality to unfamiliar and alien ways of thought and life.  For we are 
ourselves at all times recipients of the divine hospitality.  Then it will be clear that 
God can be known, not merely by the elite engaging the ineffable in mystic trance, but 
by the most ordinary person untrained in prayer or contemplation.  Cragg has written 
remarkably little about mysticism for so prolific a writer.  He regards it as an escape, 
an evasion of the real religious issues. 
 
  His preference is to search for signs of God where one might least 
expect to find them, and even where religion itself is neglected or denied outright.  
The work of Albert Camus has continually recalled him to ask 'Why should the loss of 
meaning be so meaningful?  Why should absurdity command such integrity in its 
defence?', and to feel beneath the literature of despair for the impulse of faith and 
hope on which every venture into literature depends. [KC 1968 Privilege 166f]  He 
quotes Camus saying that 'A literature of despair is a contradiction in terms.' [KC 
1977 Other 12]  His greatest gift is perhaps the ability to search out from the most 
unpromising material the unexpected evidence which indicates that the Spirit of God 
is never inactive.  He is prepared to risk the bathos which could result from beginning 
a chapter entitled 'The Holy Spirit' with a quotation from Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath: 
'"Can't you stick on somepin from Scripture so it'll be religious?"' [ibid 103]  The 
scene finds the migrant Joads, too poor for funerals but fearing the authorities, writing 
out an explanation over Grandpa's makeshift grave.  Cragg picks up, or using his own 
vocabulary we could say 'retrieves', the word 'religious' and asks what the text 
requested would be thought to add.  For the 'religiousness' is already there  
in the mortal pathos, in the dumb tragedy of social wrongs stoically borne, in the 
dignity of human courage in lowly quarters, in reverence for the dead, in the will to 
come clean, in the integrity that anticipates and cares about justification, in the family 
unity, in the patience of grief.  With these, has the psalmist or the evangelist anything 
more to say? [ibid] 
 
  He has, he concludes, though it is not something more in the sense of 
something other, but something which expresses what is already there, and seals it as 
a kiss or an embrace makes outward and visible the inward reality of love.  The inner 
reality requires the outer expression.  'We might almost make the paradox that if the 
Joads had not wanted the text it would not have been necessary.' [ibid 104]  Here is a 
  
 
  
magnificent 'retrieval' for faith of an incident at first sight merely pathetic.  The 
question that lingers, as we ask below, is whether everything is therefore religious? 
 
  The artistic illustration and the metaphor of expression are 
characteristic, and provide the clue and even the justification for much of Cragg's 
writing.  It explains not only the intricacy of his literary style but also the apparent, 
and in one sense real, circularity of thought.  Many Craggian sentences return at their 
end to the phrase they began with, as a composer may complete his work by restating 
the opening theme: - 'A living religion calls for study on the part of those whose 
religion is alive.' [KC 22:217]  Sometimes, taken out of context, such sentences seem 
simply tautologous: 'It is thus the historian who "makes" history, given the "history" 
(as yet unrecorded) which makes him historian.' [KC 1986 Christ 199]  Yet, as we 
have tried to show in that particular case (see chapter 7.B), a real point is being made, 
and a genuine development of the argument created.  Logic and mathematics, after all, 
are essentially tautologous and in them everything depends upon the force and 
elegance of the reasoning.  That reasoning begins from a stated premiss, and must 
reach its conclusion in consonance with it, without that conclusion covertly being 
made part of the premiss in the first place.  For that would be to sabotage the 
adventure of thought. 
 
  Cragg's writing may seem to some to be so constrained by its Christian 
premisses that it does not embark on any real adventure.  Such a view appears 
fortified by the very absence of any significant change of viewpoint in the years of 
literary production.  But this would be to ignore another fundamental feature of his 
writing which is symbolized by the love of paradox and irony.  Stimulated originally 
by readings in FD Maurice and Kierkegaard, this feature has actually grown with 
Cragg until he needs to coin one of his neologisms to express the incidence of it.  'The 
fact of paradox does not, of course, disqualify the faith that clings to them.  There is 
no religion exempt from paradoxiality.  Christians should be least minded of all to 
urge against it.' [ibid 249]  For the contradictions expressed in paradox and irony are 
not, in Cragg's understanding, weaknesses in the formal structure of a faith's 
reflections on the way things are, but rather warnings not to rest too much faith on any 
given formulation.  So he had found contemporaries doing in his youth.  'It is not 
seldom that faith erects a dogma where it would better hold a confidence.' [KC 1971 
Event 21]  For mere loyalty to a dogma cannot deal with the contradictions that the 
faith will be faced with: contradictions intellectual from those who perceive flaws in 
the sense of the proposition, contradictions practical in the failures of the faithful to 
live according to it, and contradictions moral in the self-preserving instincts of the 
religious community. 
 
  There is another reason for Cragg's distrust of dogma, which does not 
spring merely from the personal experience recounted in chapter 1.B, but from a 
particular understanding of the Christian faith which we have called dynamic.  'At 
least in our time, whatever may have earlier been true, relevance is not, first, to be 
realized by dint of proposition, but only of participation - ours with men.' [KC 1968 
World 215]  Cragg's argument at that point concerns the inviting of mankind to faith 
in the Incarnation, and therefore the exercise, on the part of those who invite, of an 
Incarnational faith, one which shares the life and thinking of those invited.  This is a 
stance, one might say a policy, well geared to deal with the explicit contradictions of 
opponents to the Christian faith, and the proponents of alternatives, both religious and 
  
 
  
secular.  Cragg speaks of the harshness of the Muslim response to Christian 
convictions, and says, 
Yet the harshness has to be transcended, for much of it is well intentioned.  And in 
any event the story to be told is only safe in the custody of those for whom every 
antagonism is an opportunity.  For that, precisely, is the heart of the story itself. [KC 
1986 Call 164] 
The commending of the faith must be in accordance with its own character, because 
there is an inner coherence of word and deed in Jesus himself which forms the core of 
the faith to be commended, and if that is lost nothing is left.  The heart of the matter is 
reconciliation, and the restoration of unity. 
 
  The mention of coherence raises the question of whether Cragg has 
done justice to the intellectual and spiritual problems inherent in a religiously plural 
world.  Does the character of his thought about other faiths offer real promise of the 
reconciliation he aims at?  We have noted the eirenic nature of his intentions towards 
other faiths, particularly, in the context of ancient enmity, Islam.  We have seen the 
highly appreciative comments of some Muslim reviewers towards his books, and the 
expected hostility of others.  Even his critics have had to concede the extent of his 
knowledge of the Qur'an.  Yet he does not by any means cover all aspects of Islam in 
his writing, and makes significant omission of most aspects of shari'ah.  Nor does he, 
like many Christian writers, focus on Sufism, but rather takes a special interest in 
contemporary Muslim apologetic.  His concern here is therefore theological, but he 
does not always indicate an awareness that for many Muslims theology, or right 
thinking about God, is of little interest or importance compared with discovering the 
right conduct which God requires.  Muslims lean to orthopraxy rather than to 
orthodoxy, and as people with a strong sense of God-given community think naturally 
in what Westerners would call 'political' terms, though all political life has a religious 
basis in Islam.  (In the Christian case it would be truer to say that the faith has strong 
political implications.) 
 
  This causes Cragg considerable problems.  Even among Muslims most 
positive towards him there is a feeling that he over-emphasizes the tragic element in 
life, and sometimes writes as though a successful outcome to corporate moral and 
spiritual struggle can never be authentic.  More hostile reviewers have asked whether 
his sensitivity towards the abuse of power by Muslim leaders should not be applied to 
Christian parallels.  Perhaps the limitations of his sympathies are most evident in the 
brief references to Christian liberation theology, which he identifies with the 
'power-assurance' and legalism that he repeatedly criticises in Islam. [KC 1984 
Muhammad 157,158 & KC 19:184-6,189f]  Cragg's 'reservation about Muhammad' is 
precisely his reservation about the Mexican theologian José P Miranda, and about 
Marx, whom Miranda couples with the Bible in the title of his book. [Miranda 1977]  
But as Cragg's discussion of Miranda makes clear, more is at stake for Cragg than a 
theology of law or of liberation.  The question arises: can God be known or only 
obeyed? 
 
  For the dominant 'imperative mood', as Cragg calls it, the prescriptive 
power of the Qur'an and of some Christian theologies, can be used, as in Miranda's 
case, to forbid any 'indicative' theology which speaks descriptively of God.  Miranda 
fears the pre-occupation with ontological descriptions of God which evade the 
prophetic call to obedience and social justice.  So Cragg is moved to ask: 
  
 
  
Is revelation only for obedience, or can it be also for fellowship?  Is the divine related 
only as commanding us?  Or also as 'desiring' us?  Is there a meaning in 
'transcendence' which truly descends into our knowledge, and dependably so, without 
ceasing to surpass all knowing? [KC 19:189] 
In the common tendency to discount or radically qualify all such knowledge Cragg 
finds threatened the reciprocal relationship between man and God which is at the heart 
of his theological understanding, and which alone makes sense of his hope for 
universal reconciliation.  But this leads him into considerable difficulties, as we have 
seen, with negative language about God, whether its source is al-Ghazali, Aquinas or 
the Buddha.  He does not seem to have benefited as he might have done from contact 
with Christian Orthodox theology, with its strong apophatic tradition, and its openness 
to mysticism.   
 
  The same influences might have placed a question mark over his 
fondness for 'kenotic' language about God, and the ideas of Bushnell and 
Wheeler-Robinson which place such emphasis on Calvary.  The Orthodox tradition 
balances the Cross with the Resurrection, which features surprisingly little in Cragg's 
presentation of Christianity.  It also fights shy of any suggestion of passibility in God, 
and would have grave reservations about Wheeler-Robinson's 'Kenosis of the Spirit'.  
For Orthodoxy 'Pentecost is not a "continuation" of the Incarnation.  It is its sequel, its 
result...  Pentecost is thus the object, the final goal, of the divine economy upon earth.' 
[Lossky 1957:159]  In the light of this Cragg emerges as a man still firmly identified 
with his Protestant background, despite an eclectic cast of mind.  He also appears 
open to the criticism made of other liberal Protestants that he has unduly 'humanized' 
the faith.  For this is clearly the danger, as it is the fascination, of his doctrine of 
reciprocity between God and man, and the doctrine of 'divine liability' which goes 
with it.  Can man really call God to account?  Cragg would say Yes, because of the 
faithfulness God keeps with himself and his venture in man.  So Camus and others 
can be seen as secular prophets calling for a purer understanding of the character of 
God, in the confidence that every protest against religion is at heart a demand for 
better religion.  The trouble with this very skill in observing religious significance 
everywhere, is that if everything is religion then nothing is religion, and the word 
ceases to have useful meaning.  Man has simply made God in his own image.   
 
  This is merely the negative aspect of Cragg's powerful concept of 
retrieval.  As he uses the term, retrieval is the work of God in mending the broken 
creation.  Christ is his chosen instrument, and those who become his followers share 
in his work of retrieval, knowing themselves called to be redeemers in their turn.   But 
the work of the Spirit of Christ is not limited to the Church, and others can share in it 
too.  Cragg does not use and will not approve the idea of 'anonymous Christians' or 
'anonymous Christianity'.  Yet his positive assessment of so many elements in Islam 
and to lesser degree other faiths does in other respects suggest a Rahnerian approach, 
in which all that is good in other faiths must be claimed as the work of Christ.  At the 
same time he retains a Barthian suspicion of religion in its established forms, though 
this is directed more at the institutions of religion, and the morality of religious (like 
other) collectives, than at the enterprise of religion in itself.  Cragg is then both 
positive and negative towards religion as a human phenomenon, though he is most 
positive towards the tentative, fragile expression, and most hostile to the exercise of 
religious coercion on the part of governments.  But Cragg has never abandoned the 
aim of 'recruitment' to Christian understanding and loyalty.  Though he has questioned 
  
 
  
the policy of administering baptism to individuals in some circumstances, his position 
as regards mission has not fundamentally changed from that of the young missionary 
who wrote in 1943 that 
our Christian evangelism must go on battering by thought and literature, by speech 
and service, by lip and life at those ears and minds and hearts which are so fortified, 
till the fortifications begin to crumble and to fall.  And fall they must, for they are 
false. [KC 107:45] 
Even the quotation from Hamlet which begins that article and provides its controlling 
image is used and re-used later: Sit down awhile, and let us once again assail your ears 
which are so fortified against our story. [KC 1986 Call ix]  His latest book is no less 
insistent that 'The Christian Gospel is conversionist through and through.' [KC 1986 
Christ 17] 
 
  It is for this reason that, in spite of early experiences at their hands, 
Cragg is still acceptable to conservative evangelical thinkers about mission, and 
frequently called into their counsels. [KC 13, 17, cf Parshall 1980:192]  They are 
aware that he owes much to the tradition of Protestant missionary venture towards 
Islam, with his acknowledged debt to Temple Gairdner and Constance Padwick, and 
distinct resemblances to Duncan Black Macdonald, Gairdner's teacher.  He shares 
Macdonald's fascination with the Muslim mind and his determination to let Islam 
speak for itself, while struggling to relate that speech to Christian faith and Western 
culture. [Bodine 1973:67f]  Nor will Cragg repudiate entirely the tradition which 
focussed on controversy with Islam, because 'for all our revision of their methods, the 
great Lulls and Martyns of the past still serve as our exemplars... From such 
"controversy" there is no loyal escape.' [KC 22:281]  He even sympathises with the 
central contention of men like Kraemer, with whom in other respects he disagrees, 
that Islam is fundamentally  superficial on the question of sin, and that the hinge-event 
of Muhammad's career, the Hijrah, reveals the spiritual inadequacy of the faith.  His 
treatment of faiths other than Islam, beneath its sophistication, is firmly in the 
traditions of Western Protestantism.  But he has not simply left the tradition where he 
found it.  He has developed a theology of mission to Islam, and not simply to 
Muslims, which takes with profound seriousness the self-definition of those believers, 
while probing its real adequacy as a vehicle for the worship of a God able to deal with 
the world as we know it.  So he is able to ask persistently not whether Islam is to be 
adopted, or retained, but how a true islam can be offered.  He thus avoids both the 
negativity towards other faiths of the so-called Exclusivist tradition, and the uncertain 
Christian anchorage of the Pluralists, where Christ is no longer, or not pre-eminently, 
definitive of God.  He is one of the elder statesmen of what has become known as 
Inclusivism, boldly hospitable to other faiths, and ready to learn from them, but secure 
in the Christian home from which such hospitality is offered. [cf D'Costa 1986:122] 
 
  What then has Cragg achieved?  There is no doubting the depth of his 
engagement with the Qur'an and with Muslim apologetic.  The manner of his 
treatment of other scriptures and religious traditions is open, positive, humane and 
perceptive.  He commends by precept and example an approach to other faiths which 
continually struggles to keep open the channels of communication while never 
evading the controversial questions.  He attempts new and important refinements of 
these questions which offer real liberation to minds clouded with historic 
misunderstandings.  His consistent emphasis on personal relationships is of particular 
value to the newly plural societies of the West, where historic prejudices threaten the 
  
 
  
growth of mutual acceptance.  At the same time there is a certain evasiveness on the 
major questions of the Christian theology of religion, and a deep reluctance to 
pronounce on the status of other faiths in relation to Christianity. 
 
  This can be understood in terms of his personal history, and as 
missionary method, but does not assist Christians deeply puzzled about what 
sometimes appears to be the Church's corporate endorsement of religious alternatives 
to its own Gospel in the daily policy decisions of its social witness.  Here his repeated 
reminders of the immorality of collectives, while passionate and pertinent, do not 
make for clarity of thought about the religio-political issues of the day.  Both his 
literary style and his unease in handling questions of political theology indicate a 
rather private, even idiosyncratic, mind whose fertility is easier to admire than to 
transpose into specific decisions.  His theology, in short, is admirably adapted to 
inspire and invigorate a struggling minority of Christian believers.  It has not really 
come to terms with the current situation of many Western countries, where Christians 
made deeply uncertain of the value of their own historic Western culture are 
nevertheless representatives of the dominant religious tradition, and so compelled to 
make or influence decisions profoundly affecting the lives of the adherents of other 
faiths.  'We do not here take up the politics of inter-religion', he warns in the opening 
pages of his latest book. [KC 1986 Christ 7]  So, unlike his fellow-Anglican bishop 
and Islamic scholar David Brown, he declines to assist us directly with the 
construction of a Christian vision of a plural society. [cf Brown 1982] 
 
  We cannot, however, leave Cragg's massive and enduring contribution 
there.  The nearest equivalent figure is perhaps Louis Massignon, with his own 
lifelong service to Islamic scholarship on Sufism and his intense desire to serve the 
cause of Muslim-Christian reconciliation for Christ's sake.  Though, unlike Cragg, 
Massignon was from the beginning an Orientalist, like Cragg he believed he had 
found 'Islamic reasons for being Christian'.  Cragg's influence among his Anglican and 
Protestant circle has been as extensive as Massignon's in the Roman Catholic Church. 
 He would want to be assessed first as a missionary to Islam rather than as an 
Orientalist, and in this respect his concept of retrieval does in a Protestant context 
what Massignon's more sacramental idea of badaliyya does in a Catholic.  We have 
noted that as a theologian he refuses to be drawn on the question of the status of faiths 
relative to Christianity, and in that respect declines to join the current debate with its 
religio- and socio-political implications.  However his missionary concepts are 
thoroughly theological, not merely pragmatic, and offer, with the qualification already 
noted, a coherent and Biblically-grounded Christian theology of inter-faith relations.  
As scholar and Orientalist he has concentrated on the Qur'an and contemporary 
Muslim writers and hardly at all on  historic Islam.  The result is deeply-held and 
somewhat idiosyncratic views on Islam, and to a degree on other faiths.  However we 
have noted that some crticisms of his work are mutually contradictory, especially on 
the issue of 'Christianising' Islam.  As writer and poet he has immense skills to make 
the alien and bewildering suddenly familiar and attractive, though the richness and 
density of his writing does not always carry the reader with him. 
 
  Cragg stands firmly in the succession of missionaries to Islam, but in 
no clear intellectual tradition.  His instincts intellectually are eclectic, guided more by 
artistic than logical considerations.  The range and richness of his work constitutes a 
call to the missionary, the theologian and the ordinary Christian with neighbours of 
  
 
  
another faith, a call to retrieve ignorance, misunderstanding and alienation in a 
Christ-like hospitality to the world, and a Christ-like embassy resident within it. 
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